ACE1037 Stock Markets & Foreign Exchange Markets

Contents: 
1.   Stock Markets (markets for stocks of physical assets (land), and of financial assets (stocks and shares)) - Cleaver, chapters 7 & 9
2.   Forex markets - for foreign exchange. (Cleaver, Chapter 8)

1.    Financial and Asset Markets (The Stock Market) - who owns what bits of existing capital.
The Stock Market: where already existing shares are swapped between people who want more (buyers) and people who want to hold fewer shares (the sellers). The total stock of shares is pretty well fixed (aside from occasional new issues).

The land market, as an illustration: The total stock of land is Qf. Whatever the price, this total stock cannot be changed (aside from minor changes like draining lakes etc.) The sellers are signalling a negative demand for the thing (land in this case) - the offer curve (Oc) - the higher the price, the greater the quantity we might expect present owners to be willing to sell. By the same token, all present owners who are not selling are exhibiting a positive demand for their stock given present prices. This positve demand is labelled the reservation demand (RD) in the above figure, which is the mirror image of the offer curve (Oc). What is not being offered for sale by present owners is being retained (held onto) - that is, it is being demanded.
The excess demand curve (XD) shows how much more land present owners and non owners want to own at each price - more is demanded over and above present holdings of land as the price falls.
The horizontal sum of the reservation demand (RD) and the excess demand (XD) is the total demand (TD) for land, or stock. It is the intersection of this total demand (TD)with the fixed supply (Sf) which determines the market price for land (Pe).

The trades we observe in a stock market are those between people who no longer want to own the stock, for whatever reason, shown by the offer curve (Oc) and those who want to own more than they presently have (which might be some or none at all) - shown by the demand for additional stock (excess demand) labelled XD above.  Offer and XD intersect at the trading price (Pe) and Qt of land (or stocks and shares) change hands between buyers and sellers.
Land Market

When all these trades have been made,  the present owners are now willing to go on owning land at the present price, and are not willing to sell any.

Land Market Equilibrium

Share Prices and Stock Market price movements.
So, what is a stock or share (or piece of land) worth?  The simple answer first - it is worth whatever someone else will pay for it.  The current market price of the share, or piece of land, or any other physical asset, is as good an estimate of what it is worth as you can get.  The current price reflects the total demand (reservation and excess demand) matched with the fixed available supply.  The price will change, as in all markets, only if demand shifts or supply shifts. For land and stock markets, the shifts in total supply are usually pretty trivial compared with the total stock.  So it is shifts in demand which are critical in determining prices in these stock markets.

What will shift the demand curve for land (or stocks and shares) and hence change their prices?

The two values are related because the market price can be interpreted as the market buyers expectations of future earnings or returns. The key relationships can be illustrated through this perpetual asset: PV = R/i = Market Price of the asset: So, if a particular company discovers a new recipe for making profits, its annual returns (R) will be expected to increase, and its share price will increase until the internal rate of return falls back in line with the market rate of interest - given the risk and inflation element of the company.  Conversely, if the company falls on hard times, because its market is shrinking or because it is being badly managed, its returns will fall and its share price will fall as well, until the internal rate of return is once more in line with the market rate.

Suppose we do not expect rents to remain constant in the future.  What might they do?  They might be expected to increase (or fall) by some average and constant amount each year (say plus or minus £A per year).  In this case, the relevant sum for the present value of this stream of future rents (annual returns) becomes:
 PV = R/i + A/i2 , where R is the basic rent or annual return (expected this year) and A is the amount by which we expect this annual return to change each year in the future, and i is the discount rate (the opportunity cost of capital - what we could earn elsewhere, investing in something else).  So, if we expect returns to fall, the present value is reduced compared with the simple sum which assumes the return stays constant.  But, if we expect returns to increase, then the present value increases, too.

Or, we might expect a continual percentage change in the annual return, say plus or minus g% per year.  In this case, the PV sum becomes:
PV = R/(i - g), so that, if the expected growth rate (g) in the returns on this asset are higher than the opportunity cost of capital (i), the present value for this asset goes to infinity: there is no price it is not worth paying for such an asset - which is an explanation of why share prices shoot upwards for companies expected to do very well in the future.

Depreciating assets - ones that wear out.
So, how do we account for the fact that physical plant and equipment wears out and becomes obsolete?  By making an allowance for the depreciation of the asset - the continual re-investment necessary to maintain it in a non-depreciating state.  Suppose that this depreciation rate is d%.  The gross return we need to get from this asset needs to cover this depreciation rate, so the net return we need to get on any depreciating asset is the gross return minus the estimated depreciation rate.  So, the gross return we expect to get should be i = r + p + u + d on these assets.

Implications

Cleaver (2013) Understanding the World Economy, chapter 1, p 21ff. describes the "Western Market Liberalisation" of the Thatcher & Reagan UK and US governments in particular beginning in 1979 - which 'liberalised' the financial and banking sectors on the presumption that markets know best.   For an update of the spectacular growth in the global finacial sector since then, see a summary report of Deutsche Bank’s "Mapping the World's Financial Markets" (Sanjeev Sanyal). Note, in particular, the substantial fluctuations in the market value of these financial assets versus their book values (Figure 3), reflecting the major swings in 'market sentiment' about the underlaying value of these assets.  Stock markets are particularly prone to such swings in sentiment. (See, also, Five charts that explain the world's wealth distribution.)

We should not necessarily be surprised that the value of global financial assets is 3 to 5 times as great as world GDP (Figure 2 of the Mapping link). In essence, this is the current market valuation of the stock of productive capital in the world, which shoud be able to produce future flows of income and GDP. What is more worrying is that the continual search for profit in these finacial markets encourages the development of 'derivatives' as a new supply of paper assets apparently related to underlying productive or valuable assets, but in practice substantially divorced from the underlying productive assets. As Warren Buffet famously remarked - they may well be 'weapons of mass destruction'. In particular, OTC derivatives contracts (over the counter, as opposed to those exhanged through organised exchanges) have grown substantially since financial deregulation in the late 1970s. Their importance is outlined here (by the Milken Institute), and documented by the Bank for International Settlements.

Hyman Minsky's “financial-instability hypothesis” - investment (in new plant, equipment etc.) is "in essence, an exchange of money today for money tomorrow ..money today can come from one of two sources: the firm’s own cash or that of others (for example, if the firm borrows from a bank). The balance between the two is the key question for the financial system. Minsky distinguished between three kinds of financing.
The first, which he called “hedge financing”, is the safest: firms rely on their future cashflow to repay all their borrowings. For this to work, they need to have very limited borrowings and healthy profits.
The second, speculative financing, is a bit riskier: firms rely on their cashflow to repay the interest on their borrowings but must roll over their debt to repay the principal. This should be manageable as long as the economy functions smoothly, but a downturn could cause distress. [this, essentially, is the principle behind joint-stock public companies and their share certificates]
The third, Ponzi financing, is the most dangerous. Cashflow covers neither principal nor interest; firms are betting only that the underlying asset will appreciate by enough to cover their liabilities. If that fails to happen, they will be left exposed."
"Economies dominated by hedge financing—that is, those with strong cashflows and low debt levels—are the most stable. When speculative and, especially, Ponzi financing come to the fore, financial systems are more vulnerable. If asset values start to fall, either because of monetary tightening or some external shock, the most overstretched firms will be forced to sell their positions. This further undermines asset values, causing pain for even more firms. They could avoid this trouble by restricting themselves to hedge financing. But over time, particularly when the economy is in fine fettle, the temptation to take on debt is irresistible. When growth looks assured, why not borrow more? Banks add to the dynamic, lowering their credit standards the longer booms last. If defaults are minimal, why not lend more? Minsky’s conclusion was unsettling. Economic stability breeds instability. Periods of prosperity give way to financial fragility."

2.    Macroeconomics & International Trade: The FOREX market.

What, if anything, balances Imports with Exports in the CFoI?   The Foreign Exchange (Forex) market  -  where people and businesses trade one currency for another - as recorded in the Balance of Payments.(Pink Book) recording the international transactions (across the (forex) exchanges).
e.g. 1996 UK situation: (for recent data on exports, imports, and capital flows, see the ONS balance of payments data, table B, current account, and table I, capital account. 2015 Exports of goods and services: £517.4bn, Imports of goods and services: £547.2bn, Other current inflows £153.6bn, other current outflows £204bn. -> current account balance: £-80.2bn. 2015 Capital inflows (net) £1.53bn,  Outflows: £2.64bn, Capital balance: £-1.11bn.  The financial account (Table A) shows how the overall Balance of Payments (£-81.3bn) was financed, through a range of 'official' (BoE) transactions, including, as a minor element, changes in forex reserves).
BalanceofPayments
DemandCeteris paribus, exports and capital inflows will be greater the lower the exchange rate - demand curve slopes downwards.
Supply : ceteris paribus, will be greater the higher is the exchange rate - the supply curve slopes upwards.
Equilibrium exchange rate balances exports plus capital inflows with imports plus capital outflows.
Exchange rate managed by Central Bank (BoE) control of Forex reserves, and also through borrowing (repaying) loans from foreign banks.
Dforex and Sforex are also affected by Incomes (Y) and Interest rates

Monetary Policy more powerful under floating exchange rates than fixed:  Expansionary monetary policy: Under fixed exchange rates, domestic expansion tends to increase imports faster than exports, opening up a trade deficit. If this deficit is not counter-balanced by a tight monetary policy (higher interest rates), then the BoP deficit tends to get worse - and can only be financed by running down forex reserves (or increased borrowing from abroad by the Central Bank).  The cure is then contraction of the domestic economy, tight fiscal and monetary policy, or devluation - which will tend to lead to inflation.

Purchasing Power Parity:  this theory is derived from the fact that, in the long run, we would expect the exchange rate to adjust to actual trade flows, rather than to capital flows, since the latter should ultimately reflect the international competitiveness of the economy.  If trade were all one way (all imports, for instance, and no exports) then the exchange rate would depreciate, since more people would be trying to sell the currency than trying to buy it.  On the other hand, if trade were all exports and no imports, then the exchange rate would be expected to appreciate.  When in balance, imports will equal exports, and the exchange rate will be stable.  What this means is that exchange rates will tend to adjust (in the long run) so that the prices of tradable goods are the same in all countries in the trading world - so there is no incentive to buy in one place and sell in another. So long as there is no other intervention (taxes or subsidies etc.) in the domestic markets, then prices will be the same valued at the so-called purchasing power parity rates. The Economist regularly approximates these rates by calculating the exchange rates which would have to hold if the price of a Big Mac hamburger were to be same the world over (assuming that Big Mac hamburgers are essentially tradable).  See here for the results of this calculation, and the explanation. The World Bank has data for the PPP conversion factor (local currency per $) for conversion of national GDP to $ at the PPP rate, rather then the market rate. This table, for the UK, shows that the Sterling ppp rate has been constant at 0.7 (i.e. $1.428 per £) since 2000 (2016 data not yet available)

NOTE:  the capital account can be much larger than the current (trade) account. Capital inflows and outflows can dominate export and import flows, so the exchange rate is typically very sensitive to capital movements, especially short term capital flows (unless these are controlled).  This can cause serious short term problems:
The history of the Sterling exchange rate
£er1980to2016
Source: FT, 16.01.17: "What next for FTSE 100 after record breaking run?", Michael Hunter, who comments that the FTSE's recent record breaking run (Dec. '16 - Jan '17) has only begun to catch up with the stronger performance of the index's global rivals since 2000. It is now barely above its dotcom peak (1999/2000) and has underperformed against the S&P500 (New York) since the millenium peak.

    https://www.ft.com/content/3879a70a-d732-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e?segmentId=778a3b31-0eac-c57a-a529-d296f5da8125






















The (Macro Economic) Policy Trilemma:
Policy Trilemma"Where barriers to capital flow are undesirable or futile, the trilemma boils down to a choice: between a floating exchange rate and control of monetary policy; or a fixed exchange rate and monetary bondage. Rich countries have typically chosen the former, but the countries that have adopted the euro have embraced the latter. The sacrifice of monetary-policy autonomy that the single currency entailed was plain even before its launch in 1999."

"Building on his earlier research, Mr Mundell showed in a paper in 1963 that monetary policy becomes ineffective where there is full capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate. Fleming’s paper had a similar result."

"If the world of economics remained unshaken, it was because capital flows were small at the time (1960s). Rich-world currencies were pegged to the dollar under a system of fixed exchange rates agreed at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944. It was only after this arrangement broke down in the 1970s that the trilemma gained great policy relevance."

"
Keynes was acutely aware of it .. and ..believed a system of fixed exchange rates was beneficial for trade.  .. he proposed an alternative scheme, which became the basis of Britain’s negotiating position at Bretton Woods. An international clearing bank (ICB) would settle the balance of transactions that gave rise to trade surpluses or deficits. Each country in the scheme would have an overdraft facility at the ICB, proportionate to its trade. This would afford deficit countries a buffer against the painful adjustments required under the gold standard. There would be penalties for overly lax countries: overdrafts would incur interest on a rising scale, for instance. Keynes’s scheme would also penalise countries for hoarding by taxing big surpluses. Keynes could not secure support for such “creditor adjustment”. America opposed the idea for the same reason Germany resists it today: it was a country with a big surplus on its balance of trade. But his proposal for an international clearing bank with overdraft facilities did lay the ground for the IMF" (and its system of special drawing rights)
"What is clear [from Ms Rey’s work] is that the power of global capital flows means the autonomy of a country with a floating currency is far more limited (even) than the trilemma implies."

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