AEF372: CLASS NOTES 2
Key Points:
There are two major issues or features highlighted by the Economic and
economical consideration of the CAP:
- the evolutionary progress of agricultural support policies in
Europe
- the meaning of the economic representation of the transfers and
effects
generated by these policies.
1. Evolution of European Policy (inevitable -
with
benefit of 20/20 hindsight?)
- Antecedents of the CAP:
- Common urge to protect and support the agricultural sector
against
"unjust"
world prices - the consequence of recent histories of food insecurity
(because
of war) and the predmominance of agriculturally dependent polpulations
(and associated sympathy amongst the rest of the population for
assisting
farmers).
- Differences between UK and Contintental (especially German)
support
policies
(deficiency payments versus import tariffs, plus the levels of each) -
stemming from the political weight of small farms in Bavaria,
especially,
and the differences in commonwealth ties to the "New World".
- The generation of the CAP as a bargain between Germany and France
(primarily),
with France accepting free trade with Germany for industrial goods in
return
for the opportunity to supply German agricultural and food needs at CAP
supported prices.
- The almost inevitable development of the original CAP from a
revenue
generating
device for the early Community to a fiscal drain, associated with
mounting
surpluses - you should understand and be able to explain why
(economically!).
- The atttraction of UK accession (as a net importer) at the time
when
the
Original 6 Common Market countries had begun to enter the surplus stage
- The nature of the debate surrounding UK entry - concentrating
on
uncertain
general economic benefits and the certain costs of the CAP to the UK
- The coincidence of dramatic change in world market conditions
with UK
entry,
and the consequences for the economic structure of the UK industry
- The inevitable complication of the policy as compromise was
sought
between
the expense of the policy (to the taxpayer, and limited EU budget) and
the political need to continue support to farmers (with inevitable
conflict
between countries where the farming vote was more politcally powerful -
both in number and in political position [reflecting political
landscape
and structure of the industry] (Germany, Ireland and France), and those
where it is less important (especially the UK) - leading to:
- Prudent support price increases (and weakening of intervention
prices -
how?)
- Maximum Guranteed Quantities (limits on exposure of EU budget)
- Co-responsibility levies (taxing farmers for over-production
against
MGQs)
- leading eventually to Dairy Quotas (1984) - why, and why not in
other
commodities?
- The build up of opposing pressures:
- budgetary costs and expanding EU budget requirements
- Increasing aggrevation of trading partners (especially the US)
(because??)
- culminating in the GATT Uruguay Round - putting agriculture at the
top
of the Multilateral Trade Negotiation (MTN) agenda for the first time
(see
next week)
- Increasingly obvious failure of policy to either preserve farm
structures
or farm incomes
- Increasingly divergent demands of countryside (as opposed to
farming)
interests
in policy and market outcomes (environment, animal welfare, food safety
etc).
- Finally, the seismic shock of the collapse of the USSR and the
unification
of Germany fundamentally altered German interests in farm policy - away
from prtection of Bavaria towards efficient and effective assistance to
the Eastern Lander.
- Generating the first real reform: the MacSharry reform -
shifting
the burden of support from users/consumers to taxpayers, albeit at the
risk of some increase in the latter, though now capped by the 'quota'
limits
on cropland areas and livestock numbers.
- This progression continued under A2K, which, despite its
rhetoric, pays
scant attention to the real difficulties of CEC enlargement.
- Which leaves considerable problems for the EU in the future,
since the
political pressures for farm support in Central Europe are difficult to
reconcile with a now very different set of pressures applying in
Western
Europe (leaving on one side the very substantial differences within
each of these country blocks).
2. Meaning and Implication of Economic Analysis - the
illustrative case of elimination of EU Dairy Quotas
Question 1. If quotas are a 'bad thing',
(as
outlined last week, and further explored below) why were they
introduced
in the first place?
Quotas
were introduced (April 1st. 1984) in response to the growing surpluses
and increasing taxpayer costs of the previous policy - unlimited
support
(in effect - aside from some co-repsonsibility levies, which were
largely
ineffective - see full notes) at price Pm. The quota
involved
a small reduction from previous production levels, which were then
fixed.
Hence, the EU taxpayer gained, both by the initial reduction, as shown
here, and also by the fact that committment to support was now limited,
and no longer open ended. Consumers were not affected at all by
the
change, while producers only suffered relatively minor losses as shown
- clearly quotas were economically a good thing compared with the
previous
open-ended support - a step in the right direction?
Incidentally, as shown in the full notes,
the alternative to quotas - an equivalent reduction in the support
price
(to generate the new excess supply of EUx) - would have generated a
slight
increase in net gain (because of the consumers' gain), but a major
reduction
in producers surplus - hence was dismissed by the Council of
Agricultural
Ministers as being impractical politically, at that time.
Question 2: Just how bad a thing are quotas?
First,
there are very considerable practical problems in calibrating the
principles
illustrated in this diagram with realistic representations of the real
world - especially the supply and demand responses both within the EU
and
in the rest of the world, and equilibrium quota rents. Even, in
the
case of milk, identifying Pm and Pwa causes problems,
since
both are only known with certainty for butter and SMP, not for raw
milk.
However, we can leave these issues on one side, and hope that
accidentally
unrealistic estimates of these nearly unknowable points (footnote)
will either be unimportant or cancel out. Nevertheless, next
week's
material, on the mechanics of the world market, is important in
making
sensible judgements about the slope of the RoWxd curve (as it
passes
through 'known' point X, and, subsequently, what it might look like if
and when the EU adopts a free trade policy.
Whatever judgements we might make about these practical analytical
issues,
the diagram suggests a clear social gain - the Tax gain is
clearly
larger than the net loss in surplus (the difference between the
consunmer
gain and the producer loss). This will always be true so
long
as demand curves slope downwards and supply curves slope upwards.
That is the way the world is - this diagram is simply the partial
analogue
of the gains from trade logic outlined last week (Class
Notes 1). Any set of economic models representing
this
industry will necessarily come to this conclusion that free trade is a
good thing, so long as they obey the principles of economics.
The conventional explanations of what consumers and producers
surplus
measures mean and how they are to be explained is contained in the policy
primer notes. However, recalling the general equilibrium
gains
from trade of last week - the long run gains all accrue as consumer
gains
(or, alternatively, as additional producer incomes earned through
additional
trade). How are these related to the apparent partial gains shown
above? A sensible question, and not one addressed in the text
books
(or any of the literature that I am presently aware of). A
practical
and provisional answer is as follows.
The annual consumer surplus gain from the policy reform is a measure
of the potential for a perpetual stream of annual gains forever into
the
future. The producer surplus loss, however, is a measure of the
(negative)
incentive for the production adjustment - the shift round the
production
possibility frontier. Once this adjustment is achieved, there is
no further loss. The producers surplus measure is, in effect, the
annual equivalent of the extent to which the present policy has
increased
the capital value of the fixed and specialised assets employed in the
dairy
sector, which would otherwise be employed elsewhere. This capital
value is a finite sum, not an infinite stream - it is part of the
present
fixed costs of the industry, which would be reduced if the policy were
to be reformed (eliminated). The producers' loss is temporary, the
potential
gain is permanent. The partial welfare arithmetic (the conventional
measure
of the costs/benefits of policy change) seriously confuse these by
treating
them as exactly comensurate.
The key, therefore, to policy reform is to design (and then market
and
sell to the interested parties) a sensible transition policy which, at
least partially, compensates the present owners of these assets for
their
capital loss. Convincing people of the sense of policy
elimination
becomes the most critical part of policy analysis - the specific
estimates are largely beside the point - though the relative sizes of
gains
and (temporary) losses are clearly important in illustrating the case
for
reform. Here, there are several additional considerations which
are
important - as illustrated in the analysis of eliminating quota:
This
Table,
in bn. euros, shows the conventional measures of producers' and
consumers'
surplus changes, and changes in taxpayer costs. Producers' lose
9.9bn.
per year (about 75bn. in total, capitalised over ten years at a real
interst
rate of 5%). Consumers and taxpayers combined stand to gain
10.3bn.
per year without the policy in place (enough to completely compensate
producers'
loss over 9 years, if the latter is converted to an annual annuity
payment
at 3% real interest rate (reflecting the lower risk associated with
public
funds compared with private commerical risks).
However, there is also a significant cost associated with
implementing
and policing the present policy (and raising the necessary tax revenues
to finance it). This would also be saved if the policy were to be
eliminated - shown here at 10% of the transfer to producers - a
conservative
estimate.
This estimate is partial - it takes no account of the general
equilibrium
effects of the reform - which would effectively inject the static gain
(0.71bn.) into the circular flow of income - generating second round
additional
gains according to the value of the multiplier - another 0.14bn as
estimated
here.
There are also dynamic gains, resulting from the increased market
incentives
for continual productivity improvements and matching productive
potentials
to emerging market demands, adding a further 1.4bn, to the
potential
gains from policy reform.
Overall, the EU stands to gain 2.3bn. (net of the produecers' loss)
from the policy reform. Once producers' had been fully
compensated
for their loss, the gain would be an estimated 12.5bn. per year,
indefinitely,
as the gain to consumers and taxpayers plus the net gain to the
economy.
See here for an executive summary of this
report,
and consult the DEFRA
web site for the full report on this study.
Question 3. So why doesn't this change happen?
The short, and perhaps glib, answer is that the time is not yet
right
- the context and circumstance of the policy has not yet reached its
breaking
point, at least not realtive to the alternatives being talked of (e.g.
the Curry Commission made not mention at all of reforming the dairy
sector
- only of making adjustments to area and headage payments!)
Consider the history of the CAP - policy was introduced, and then
changed,
in repsonse to changing circumstances and contexts, opportunities and
threats,
as represented in the political market place (where both votes and
political
support are traded). It is a mistake to think that political
decisions
are all made on the basis of 'one person, one vote'. The votes
(and
associated political pressure and political party support) of the
producers
for support (although smaller in number) will be more strongly
expressed
because of their gains per head than the opposition of consumers.
It has also been argued that political support for farm subsidies
(however
implemented) can also be expected from the consumers and taxpayers, so
long as these groupd believe that farmers would be unjustly treated
without
such support - i.e. that altruism counts in political decisions.
Indeed, we had better hope this to be true - otherwise, the political
system
is merely a system for producers to exert their power over the market,
since it is in their apparent interests to control the market, if at
all
possible. Monopoly is the natural ambition of business.
Competition
is its only countervail. Businesses seek to eliminate or subdue
competition
whenever they can get away with it. If government can be
persuaded
to assist in this, then so much the better.
So, Question 4. when might the time be
right?
Several pressures can be identified against the present policy, which
are
building all the time:
- producers only win from the policy if they were the original
owners of
the assets (especially quota rights themselves) - increasingly, present
producers have had to buy their way into the supported industry, and
are
no better off than they otherwise would be without it (although would
clearly
suffer a capital loss if it were to be abandoned with no compensation)
- so producers might begin to think themselves better off without it -
a major pressure for reform.
- Competing claims on a small EU budget, especially as the euro
area
develops
and as enlargement comes closer, puts additional pressure on the budget
costs of the present policy
- However, offsetting this, is the potential budgetary cost of
compensating
farmers for policy change (since the budget would have to become
responsible
for the consumer share of the present support, at least for a while)
- The business of CEC enlargment presently involves allocating them
a
share
of the total EU dairy market, and hence allocating them quota - how
much,
and how should it be re-allocated to allow growth and development of
presently
underdeveloped industries in the CECs?? This could become a
substantial
pressure for reform, simply because the present system becomes
unmanageable
in the enlarged community. Unless quota rights are allowed to
become
freely tradeable between countries, that is. But this might prove
even more unacceptable than elimination
- Pressure from trading partners - disadvantaged by the present
policy -
and expressed in the Millenium round of the WTO?
- Pressure from the dairy processing sector, trying to adapt and
adjust
to
the ever changing market place within the constraints of quotas on
throughput.
- Examples (particularly from Australia) of policy reform elsewhere
-
added
to by the increasing weight of analysis and estimates of the costs of
the
present policy?
- The Australians have recently (as of 2000) embarked on a
transition
poliucy
to eliminate their own dairy quotas (introduced to restrict supplies
and
thus increase market prices) by levying a temporary (8 yr.) tax on all
dairy consumption, the proceeds of which are paid in unconditional
fixed
amounts to existing dairy producers. Quotas and associated trade
restrictions
are all eliminated, After 8 years, both the tax and the fixed producer
payments will cease. The fact that the payments are funded
through
an explicit consumer tax lends weight to the belief that the transition
policy will not become permanent.
Notwithstanding all these rather pragmatic arguements - there is no
solid analytical framework available for assessing the 'right'
conditions
(contexts and circumstances) for policy change. We could easily
spend
the rest of this course talking about why this is the case, and what
sorts
of frameworks we might think of developing.
For the current position of the CAP - the European
Commission's
Agenda 2000 Mid Term Review (MTR) Reform, introduced in June
2003, and still being developed - see the EU
Commission DG VI web site. Quoting from the outline paper: "The key
elements of the reform in a nutshell:
- a single farm payment, independent from production ("decoupling")
- linking those payments to the respect of environmental, food
safety,
animal
welfare, health and occupational safety standards, as well as the
requirement
to keep all farmland in good condition, ("cross-compliance"),
- a stronger rural development policy with more money, new measures
to
promote
quality, animal welfare and to help farmers to meet EU production
standards,
- a reduction in direct payments ("degression") for bigger farms to
generate
additional money for rural development and the savings to finance
further
reforms
- revisions to the market policy of the CAP,
- including the final 5% intervention price cut for cereals and
partially
compensated by an increase in direct payments for arable crop producers
- a wider ranging and accelerated milk reform with differentiated
price
cuts
for butter and skimmed milk powder and the maintaining of the milk
quotas
until 2014/15
- reforms in the rice, durum wheat, nut, starch potatoes, dried
fodder
sector
In effect, these proposals are for the conversion of commodity related
support (including area and headage payments) to payments to look after
animals, food quality and the countryside. Farmers will only get
these annual fixed payments (based on historic entitlements) if the
comply
with good practice in caring for the countryside, for food
production
and for animal welfare. Furthermore, the 20% of farmers who
currently
recieve 80% of the support can expect that their future streams of
payments
will be reduced - with the support diverted towards rural development.
This generally makes quite good sense, though will encounter
substantial
resistance from the member states. Major Problems?
- Who decides what is good practice, and how is it policed?
Major
bureaucratic
costs (transactions costs) associated with cross compliance
- What is rural development, and how can it be encouraged by public
funding?
European ideas on this are considerably behind those in the
international
development arena, where they have been trying seriously to answer this
question for the last 50 years.
- National (member state) arguments about shares of support - e.g.
UK
loses
if larger farms support levels are cut, simply because UK farms tend to
be larger. But, so what? Who actually loses? Is it
better
to be large farmer in East Anglian or a peasant in the Massive Centrale
or the Pyrannees?
Question 5: what critical problems remain?
There are at least two (which your tutor has thought of or come
across
in the literature):
- Multifunctionality - the
problem
that
farming delivers a number of external benefits (and also costs) which
are
not accounted for in normal market transactions. These
externalities
are also, often, public goods - once a diverse wildlife or
valued
landscape is provided for one, it is provided for all (the good or
service
is non rival in consumption), and individuals cannot be
prevented
from benefiting from these goods unless they have paid towards their
provision
(the goods and services are non-excludable), which means that
the
free private market will not provide these public goods and services at
their socially desirable level (market failure).
- Policy Dependency - policy
is path
dependent - the past history of policy intervention breeds
particular
responses and habits which tend to perpetuate policy, leading to policy
inertia. Breaking this inertia requires rather more than simple
economic
analysis.
See the recent UK Government's (Defra and HM Treasury) "Vision for
the CAP", which is about to be subject to a House of Commons
Select Committee Inquiry - to which I have contributed a pair of memoranda: a critique of the
"vision" and an 'alternative'. The CRE (Professors Ward and Lowe)
have also submitted their own CRE view,
concentrating on rural development aspects (Pillar 2 of the CAP).
Footnote:
Unknowable? It is worth remembering a fundamental principle of
physics:
the Heisenburg Uncertainty Principle: which roughly says: The
more
accurate is the determination of the position of a particle (an event
or
observation), the less accurate will be the associated information on
the
speed and direction of travel of the particle. There is an
irreducable
zone of uncertainty surrounding all events and observations. If
we
know their place (circumstance), we cannot know their status in time
(context),
and vice versa.
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