15. Milorg and SOE
Arnfinn Moland
My subject for this chapter is the relationship between the
Norwegian Military Organisation and the British Special Operation
Executive - henceforward 'Milorg and SOE'. The evolving relationship
between the two ad hoc organisations followed a pattern familiar
in occupied countries during the Second World War. It was one
of growing together from point zero through a period of reluctant
acceptance, and then finally entering an almost frictionless stage
with virtually no discord at all. The wartime period can thus
be divided into three phases. The first may be labelled the
phase of non-collaboration, to put it somewhat dramatically.
This attitude, which was mutual, lasted from the summer of 1940
throughout the year 1941 and into the best part of 1942 as far
as the rank and file of the two organisations were concerned.
At the leadership level, however, one aspired to do better, and
consequently a period of coexistence and even cooperation
developed from the autumn of 1941 onwards. It was, however, the
last two years of the war that constituted the time
of cooperation on all levels.
In order to understand this development, it is necessary
to sketch the events from 1940. Having recovered from the shock
created by the German attack on 9 April, different groups of people
in Norway began to plan for some sort of resistance. By the end
of 1940 an organisation for military resistance - Milorg - existed,
though at an embryonic stage. It was founded, inspired and directed
by Norwegians in Norway, and was recognised as part of the Norwegian
armed forces under the command of the Norwegian government and
the Norwegian High Command in London on November 20, 1941. During
this premature stage, Milorg was joined by an unknown, but large
number of men. The aim was to build up a secret army in the most
careful manner, avoiding actions and even weapons, and to prepare
for the day of liberation. Milorg wanted to 'go slow, lie low'.
One should not attract German attention and thereby jeopardise
the lives of civilians and have the fragile Milorg nipped in the
bud.
As for the British, their military intelligence had jumped
the gun and dispatched a few men to Norway a few days before the
German attack. The man who later became head of SOE, Major-General
Sir Colin Gubbins, participated in the campaign in Norway in the
spring of 1940. These men established contacts with quite a few
Norwegians, and when SOE was established in July 1940, they became
the core of the Norwegian component in the British effort to hamper
the German exploitation of the country. SOE's aim was to carry
out acts of sabotage in German-occupied countries. Its Scandinavian
Section, began to develop under the direction of Charles (later
Sir Charles) Hambro. Norwegian refugees were happy to be asked
to go on special training courses with the purpose of becoming
British agents in Norway. Gradually, this resulted in the formation
of the Norwegian Independent Company No. 1, later called the Linge
Company after its leader, Captain Martin Linge. In December 1940
the important Shetland base was established as a joint base for
SOE and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). Norwegian refugees,
who had crossed the sea in their fishing boats, were recruited
as agents. These agents joined the Linge Company and Shetland
base, and adopted the British view of active resistance policy
in occupied countries, which corresponded roughly to their own.
It is therefore evident that this group of Norwegians was bound
to clash with their Milorg colleagues - in spite of their having
the same goal, a free Norway - as their ways of achieving this
objective differed so much.
What, then, was SOE's resistance policy for Norway? While
the Milorg leadership wanted to build up a centralised secret
army, slowly and carefully over a long period, avoiding activities
that might endanger the work of the organisation, SOE's leaders
were in a hurry. They had a great need for activity that would
produce results to present to MEW. The idea of a 'secret army'
was not too popular in the Admiralty, in the War Office or among
the Chiefs of Staff. 'Irregular warfare' could easily become
a war fought by amateurs. But SOE had Churchill on its side as
he favoured any offensive strategy, especially in Norway. SOE's
solution was raids and sabotage, contrary to the policy of Milorg.
Furthermore, inside SOE's Norwegian Section, both in London and
Stockholm, there were 'several Britons who took the absolute standing'
that SOE should conduct its work without interference from Milorg.
Colonel J.S. Wilson, head of the Section, put it like this:
There was still amongst its staff the inherent British attitude
of kindly - but none the less galling - superiority to the foreigners.
There existed ... a distrust of Milorg's ability to take ordinary
security precautions. The arrests in the autumn of 1941 gave apparent
reason for this distrust.
Wilson concludes that 'the tendency of the British officers concerned
was to demand that all S.O.E. organisation should be independent
of Milorg'.
It is fair to say that the British view on the lack of
security inside Milorg was based more on facts than on a condescending
attitude to foreigners. Members of Milorg and their leadership
were of course amateurs in the field of clandestine activities.
Some British officers claimed that Norwegians in general were
too talkative and open. But then again some Norwegians commented
on certain British officers: for instance the Milorg pioneer Paal
Frisvold remarked on Major Malcolm Munthe: '... to carry out secret
military missions in Norway, I don't know anyone who is less suitable
than him'. I shall not elaborate on this quotation, but as for
the British view, it is indisputable that Milorg had to learn
'the hard lesson of security' and they had to learn it 'in the
bitter school of experience', as the British put it. And, it
may be added, they did.
SOE decided to carry out its resistance activities in
Norway independently of Milorg and the Norwegian government and
other Norwegian authorities in London. SOE's important document
pertaining to this decision, 'Norwegian Policy' of 11 December
1940, gave directives to those Norwegians who worked for SOE in
Norway; it also reflects the importance that the British attached
to Norway. Although the document stated that the liberation of
Norway would most probably come as a result of an Allied invasion,
it was also necessary that SOE boost the Norwegian morale by means
of propaganda and sabotage. The key phrase here is that through
SOE, Norway was to become 'a thorn in the German side'. The ultimate
aim was a general rising in Norway. This could only be achieved
by having a separate SOE organisation in each district. The document
stated finally that SOE had a 'long-term programme' and a 'short-term
programme'. The former aimed at building up a Secret Army, trained
in guerrilla and sabotage, and assisting an Allied invasion. The
'short-term programme' aimed at raids and sabotage, so-called
'tip-and-run landings and air raids', carried out in association
with the Directorate of Combined Operations (DCO).
One such raid was the Claymore operation against
the Lofoten Islands on 4 March 1941. The British evaluated this
raid as a great success, 'a classic example of a perfectly executed
commando-raid'. I do not intend to go into details about these
raids as such, but it is obvious that the British attitude was
not shared in Norway. The Germans took heavy reprisals: homes
were burnt, people arrested. Besides, the targets destroyed were
regarded in Norway as Norwegian property, not as a blow to Germany's
capacity to wage war. It even struck a jarring note among the
participating Norwegian soldiers who began to doubt whether it
was right to operate under British orders and carry out British
plans, perhaps even without the knowledge of the Norwegian Government.
SOE, however, was thrilled by the success of Operation Claymore.
The result was a document entitled 'Scandinavian Policy' of 16
April 1941, in which SOE expressed its wish to do things its own
way and get things going in Norway's fight for freedom. In doing
this, however, SOE definitely overestimated the Norwegian willingness
to fight the German occupation regardless of the consequences.
Why then this concern for the consequences? The answer
is that the Norwegian resistance leaders felt a heavy burden of
responsibility. Norway had lived in peace for 126 years: they
were not mentally prepared for war. In their report of 10 June
1941, which was addressed to King Haakon, but ended up with SOE,
Milorg's Council emphasised that they did not want weapons and
that they resented any sabotage acts, whether carried out by SOE
or by any other organisation. It was this attitude that provoked
the famous remark from one of the Milorg pioneers in London: 'Military
Sunday School'. The Milorg leaders received a reply from SOE
in August of the same year, but it contained no changed attitude.
On the contrary, SOE stressed the need for a more active policy:
sabotage, training and arms drill. Last but not least, the reply
implied that Milorg must take orders from the British. This was
not at all reassuring to Milorg. Besides, they were not at all
convinced that the Norwegian government was kept informed about
SOE's activities in Norway. When the problems and misunderstandings
concerning their own attempt to make contact with the government
were solved in October 1941, they learnt that their letter of
10 June had never reached its destination. Their suspicion that
SOE was keeping the Norwegian government in the dark was proved.
To avoid further calamities, the Norwegian government recognised
Milorg in November 1941.
SOE responded quickly with a memorandum entitled
'Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration regarding the Military Organisation
in Norway', written by Sir Charles Hambro and sent to the Norwegian
minister of defence, Oscar Torp. Hambro expressed a wish to cooperate
with the Norwegian government and other Norwegian authorities.
But Milorg must work along the same lines as SOE had drawn up
for resistance in other occupied countries, based on mutual confidence
and harmonious cooperation between British and Norwegian resistance
leaders in England. Torp accepted the invitation and, with his
personal assistant Thore Boye, met Sir Charles Hambro. He assured
Hambro that 'not only was he in favour of continuing the arrangements
that existed between the Norwegian authorities and S.O.E., but
that he wanted to facilitate them'. In return he personally expected
to be taken into SOE's confidence 'absolutely'.
In the meantime, a report on the raid against Måløy,
Operation Anklet in December 1941, stated that the year
'ended on a sad note', with Captain Linge himself being among
those killed. This time a group of twelve Linge soldiers took
action. They felt they could not go on fighting, feeling almost
like mercenaries as they did not have the blessing of Norwegian
authorities. Though in a minority, their view was soon approved,
after a short period of internment. The principle at stake -
full information and approval of the Norwegian government - was
guaranteed in the year 1942.
There were no more raids. Instead, SOE concentrated on
the long-term programme. On 1 January 1942 a special Norwegian
Section, headed by Wilson, was established within the SOE to direct
SOE's work in Norway. In addition, the talks between Sir Charles
Hambro and Oscar Torp resulted in the establishment of the important
Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Committee (ANCC). Thirdly, on 6
February, Torp established the Norwegian High Command (FO). On
16 February the first meeting of the ANCC was held, with representatives
of SOE and FO. One may say that the two organisations now entered
the phase of cooperation, and one might consequently conclude
that this goes for SOE and Milorg as well. However, though these
organisational improvements at the top marked a great step forward,
the problems in the field were far from being solved. The gap
between word and deed was in fact at its greatest in the year
1942, as the policy of non-collaboration continued among the rank
and file. Agents were still sent to Norway with strict orders
to avoid contact with members of Milorg. I therefore choose the
expression 'coexistence' to characterise the relationship at this
time.
As for SOE's relation with the Norwegian legation in Stockholm,
which also had an important link to Milorg, the legation was,
according to Wilson, more reluctant to adopt the new policy of
'complete trust and co-operation'. As a result, Major John Rognes,
who had assisted SOE activities from Shetland in 1941, was sent
by Minister Torp to Stockholm. His mission helped to improve
relations between the legation and SOE, Norwegian Section in Stockholm.
The main issue for the SOE-Milorg relationship in 1942
was the question of their role in the reconquest of Norway. A
Norwegian committee in Great Britain had drawn up the main tasks
for Milorg, and their view was then evaluated by SOE. Lack of
space prevents me from elaborating on this theme, but an important
Norwegian claim was that Milorg should only be fully engaged in
case of an invasion aiming at a permanent reconquest of Norway
or part of it. This meant, according to SOE, that SOE could not
carry out its 'short-term actions'. A meeting was held in Stockholm
in February to coordinate the view of the Ministry of Defence
with that of the Milorg leaders. Finally SOE delivered its report
in April on 'The Reconquest of Norway. SOE's Role'. Here they
summed up their activity and expressed their will to cooperate.
However, it would still be necessary to maintain separate SOE
organisations in the districts in Norway, which would have no
contact with their Milorg colleagues. The formal expression for
this 'apartheid' policy was 'certain lines of parallel action'.
SOE and Milorg should, however, let these lines fuse 'when the
proper time for amalgamation comes'. SOE considered the establishment
of radio communications between Norway and Great Britain, between
Sweden and Norway, and inside Norway, to be SOE's main role in
the future, together with supplying Norway with weapon and explosives,
training and transporting Norwegian agents. Finally SOE would
do the utmost to help with 'long-term planning with a view to
the reconquest of Norway'.
During the year 1942, the policy of 'parallel action'
often led to grave episodes. At Lillehammer, the agent 'Anvil',
suspected of being a traitor, was nearly killed by Milorg. Careless
agents jeopardised Milorg's regional resistance network, and the
crises piled up as the year progressed. The process began when
'Penguin' and 'Anchor' got into a fight with the Gestapo, leading
to the German reprisals at Telavåg in April 1942, 'the greatest
shock that Resistance in Norway had yet encountered'. This community
on the western coast of Norway was destroyed and its inhabitants
deported. In addition, eighteen men were shot as a reprisal.
The military resistance on the west coast of Norway received
a heavy blow through these arrests and executions. To add to the
problems, SIS played a part in the same area and 'contributed
in part or in whole to the disaster'.
The next SOE operation, Redshank, in Trøndelag
in May 1942, was more successful. It was the first coup-de-main
operation against an industrial target: a transformer station
was destroyed to slow down the delivery to the Germans of the
valuable pyrites from the Orkla mines. The drawback was of course
sharpened vigilance against resistance work in the district.
But the year 1942 continued to produce disasters. The capture
of the Anchor organiser in Drammen in May resulted in a
series of arrests two months later. Added to the seizure in Østfold
of the SOE agent 'Crow', this was a heavy blow to Milorg in eastern
Norway. The Milorg leader Knut Møyen wrote in a contemporary
report that had it not been for the standing order given to the
SOE agents to avoid Milorg, this would not have happened:
The difficulties and the situation as a whole change every
week, so to speak, and it is therefore necessary that all who
arrive get thorough additional briefing, no matter how well they
have been instructed in England.
In September and October, the time had come for Trøndelag
and northern Norway. To make a long story short, the first joint
SOE-DCO coup-de-main operation ever, Knotgrass-Unicorn,
against the Glomfjord Power Station and the SOE operation Kestrel
against Fosdalen Mines, both carried out entirely without the
knowledge of Milorg and with no information about the activities
whatsoever, led to a fervent search for resistance people in the
district. From 6 to 12 October, a state of emergency was inaugurated
in Trøndelag and 29 persons were executed.
As this tragic year in the history of military resistance
in Norway progressed, the Milorg leaders were on the verge of
giving up their work. New meetings were held at the highest levels.
To solve the crisis of confidence, not only between Milorg and
SOE, but also between Milorg and Norwegian authorities in England,
FO in June 1942 sent Jacob Schive back to Norway. A Milorg pioneer
highly respected by the organisation, Schive returned to London
with a report which slightly exaggerated Milorg's strength. Together
with the disastrous effects of the 'certain lines of parallel
action' pertaining to SOE and Milorg and the continuing process
going on inside the ANCC, it resulted in a new document issued
by SOE on 21 September 1942. Written by Wilson himself, this
amounted to nothing less then a new programme called 'SOE Long-term
Policy in Norway' in which SOE finally gave up its independent
course. SOE admitted the mistakes that had been made on both
sides, including the 'lines of parallel action' and declared that
a 'drastic revision' was necessary. Wilson's attitude played
a great role in this process of mutual understanding:
...in time all realised that it was impossible to run
two independent para-military underground movements side by side.
Inevitably it would lead to crossing of lines and to the two cutting
each other's throats.
Major Leif Tronstad, one of the leading resistance pioneers, now
in London and member of the ANCC, and 'whose memory as "The
Professor" will be held in reverence by all in S.O.E.', expressed
it this way:
We have experienced that it is impossible to maintain two separated
military organisations without intermixing and complications that
may trigger off the worst consequences. We must therefore go for
one effective organisation with a mutual strong
leadership.'
Directives were issued by both SOE and FO aiming at securing
good relationship on all levels. SOE and FO agreed on what were
to be their respective responsibilities and duties. Initiative,
planning, education of agents and instructors, transport, supplies,
were all to be taken care of by SOE, in cooperation with FO.
Milorg should roughly speaking provide the rank and file. Resistance
policy should be a matter for the ANCC, whereas the everyday performance
in Norway should be handled by the Milorg leaders. To quote Wilson
again:
Taking it all in all, FO IV/SOE/OSS seemed to have come
through most of their childhood's ills, and to be gaining in strength
and, possibly, in wisdom.
One should, however, bear in mind that SOE had been established
for the purpose of coordinating the irregular military resistance
with the Allied war effort. Consequently, it was important for
the Chiefs of Staff Committee that SOE's hegemony as the only
'co-ordinating authority' in these matter was recognised.
Though there are sources indicating that 'especially from
December 1943 ... the cooperation has had an intimate character',
it is fair to say that the period of non-collaboration in the
field and coexistence at the top level was transformed into full
cooperation on all levels from the beginning of 1943 onwards.
Contact between Oslo and London was improving, followed by a
better understanding between the Central Leadership of Milorg
and FO and SOE in their joint capacities. An important factor
in this process was Milorg's own decision concerning the future
character of the organisation. Was it to be a poorly trained
resistance group, built on the organisational principles of the
prewar army and not armed until the very day of an allied invasion,
or a decentralised, fully trained and armed guerilla organisation?
In the spring of 1942, the Central Leadership of Milorg through
its 'Directive No.1 to the District Leaders' chose the latter
alternative. This did not mean, however, that resistance policy
in Norway was settled once and for all. The decisive battle was
fought in the autumn of 1942 and in the spring of 1943 at the
top level of Milorg and its civilian equivalent, Sivorg. The
Central Leadership of Milorg gave an unconditionally answer to
FO in London in January 1943: Milorg wanted weapons, indeed their
whole existence depended on it. Sivorg protested, but shortly
afterwards, its leaders realised the necessity of this decision.
This acceptance of the reality of war, and of military resistance
as such, made it of course easier for Milorg to adjust to the
British activity and to appreciate SOE's new policy of cooperation
in the field.
Wilson attributed much of the improved atmosphere in the
field to the instruction of local Milorg leaders by SOE agents.
He explicitly mentions the two Gannet instructors dropped
in Gudbrandsdalen in November 1942. When they returned to Great
Britain two months later, they had held eleven separate courses,
training 59 men in lonely mountain huts in guerrilla warfare,
small arms, demolitions and unarmed combat:
Men from the United Kingdom were no longer looked on as
dangerous interlopers, but as friends and allies who were recognised
as well-trained and secure ... F.O. IV and S.O.E. were over the
top of the hill.
During this period, SOE intensified its sabotage activities
and Milorg was little by little engaged. The usual pattern was
for Linge soldiers to be dropped in the vicinity of the target,
or even sometimes in Sweden. They would then launch the attack,
often helped by local Milorg men. Three groups of targets were
hit: ships, industry and railways. It is impossible to go into
detail about these operations here. The most famous, Operation
Gunnerside against the heavy water plant at Vemork in February
1943, is, however a good example of thorough Anglo-Norwegian planning,
the use of Norwegian agents who knew the area like the back of
their hand, and, in the sinking of the Hydro ferry carrying semi-finished
heavy water, in cooperation with the local Milorg group. It is
also an example of the effectiveness of coup-de-main operations
as compared with heavy bombing, in terms of both casualties and
accuracy, a theme that was often on the agenda in Anglo-Norwegian
meetings and in which SOE, FO and Milorg took a unanimous view
in favour of the former.
From the turn of the year 1943, the Supreme Headquarters
of the Allied European Forces (SHAEF) decided the lines of policy
to be followed in Norway. In other words, the joint British-Norwegian
resistance had to adjust itself to the framework of SHAEF. Because
of the plans SHAEF had at that time for the invasion of the Continent,
no commitment in Norway was wanted, and Milorg was strongly warned
that it should not encourage any rising in Norway. Ironically,
the old Milorg slogan 'lie low, go slow' now had a renaissance.
The idea was to grow in strength and wait for the day to come.
Any untimely rising, like that of the French maquis in the Vercors,
would not be supported.
Nevertheless, the more than 30,000 men in Milorg waited
eagerly to do something more than mere training, and after the
Allied invasion on the Continent they were allowed to attack and
sabotage German shipping, lines of communication, industries etc.
This was quite important as the restlessness amongst the rank
and file increased. The sabotage of the offices for labour conscription
in the spring of 1944 represented a little outlet of steam. However,
when the above mentioned directive came in June, the opportunities
for action increased. Regular clashes with the Germans were still
to be avoided. Usually, the attacks were planned and launched
by combined groups of Milorg and SOE personnel. But even before
this new directive, Milorg's role in these joint British-Norwegian
operations had been steadily increasing. In fact, Feather
II, which crossed the border from Sweden on 22 April 22 1944
to attack the Thamshavn railway, was the last British operation
planned outside Norway. Henceforward, it was the
Central Leadership of Milorg that decided on these issues. Meanwhile,
Milorg grew in strength and numbers. Supplies, equipment, instruction
and training were provided by SOE and FO in London. This was
no easy task considering Norway's topography and climate.
All in all, Allied aircraft flew 717 successful sorties
out of a total of 1241, dropping 208 agents, 9662 containers and
2762 packages with arms, munition, explosives, radio equipment,
uniforms, medicine etc. In addition, supplies were sailed from
the Shetlands: in 194 trips, 190 agents and 385 tons of arms and
equipment were landed in Norway and 345 agents were brought back
to England. Instructors were sent to train members of Milorg,
together with W/T operators. It was mainly in the last year of
cooperation between SOE and Milorg that the figures grew to such
proportions and thus gradually increased Milorg's striking power.
The SHAEF directive of June 1944 was based on the assumption
that it would be easier to let the Germans retreat from Norway
and defeat them in central Europe. However, as the situation in
this part of Europe changed towards the end of 1944, SHAEF changed
its strategy. In a directive of 5 December 1944, Milorg was told
to attack the railways in Norway on a large scale to prevent the
Germans from withdrawing their fresh troops from Norway and sending
them to the central European theatre for use against the Allies.
Milorg was naturally very pleased to get this opportunity. After
the surrender in Finland, an enormous number of troops were withdrawn
into Finnmark in northern Norway and thence southwards. In close
cooperation with SOE parties which had been held in readiness,
Milorg attacked railways and bridges on a large scale. So well
did Milorg carry out its task that, according to the head of SOE,
Major-General Sir Colin Gubbins, 'From Norway, there was a reduction
in rate of movement from four divisions to less than one division
a month'. However, German documents such as the Kriegstagebuch,
do not support such an unreserved conclusion. Eleven divisions
were withdrawn from June 1944 until the end of the war, seven
of these in the first four months of 1945.
Despite sabotage activity, the main objective for Milorg
in the last year of the war was protection against German destruction
of communications, transport, industries,
ports etc., in case of a German withdrawal accompanied by the
scorched earth policy practised in Finnmark in the autumn of 1944.
The detailed plans were made in London and a total of 110 officers
were sent in from Great Britain to lead this work. In addition,
a considerable number of Linge officers already in Norway on various
other missions were directed to such tasks in the last phase of
the war. Milorg also established a few bases - groups of specially
handpicked men placed in camps far away in the forest and up in
the mountains - ready to strike if the signal was given. The
leaders and instructors were SOE personnel.
At this stage, in the spring of 1945, approximately 40,000
Milorg men, equipped, trained and well disciplined were prepared
for the worst alternative, a German last stand in Norway. The
equipment as well as the training and partly, I should say, the
discipline, could be attributed to the fruitful cooperation with
SOE which in turn had at its disposal some of the best specimens
of Norwegian youth. Milorg obeyed SHAEF's order not to provoke
the Germans but could not avoid a few clashes as the Germans attacked.
On these occasions, Milorg proved their capability to defend
themselves and even strike back. Their losses were small compared
with German casualties.
As we all know, the German Commander in Norway, General
Boehme, signed the German surrender in Norway on 8 May 1945. Milorg
did not have to fight at all. Their role in this rather risky
period of transition was to stand guard, protect buildings, arrest
traitors etc. They were finally demobilised in July 1945. As
for the Linge Company, they were inspected by Colonel Wilson on
30 June and demobilised.
These few pages are of course only a rough survey of the
relationship between Milorg and SOE. However, I have tried to
show how two ad hoc organisations, with basically the same goal,
operating side by side, at the outset virtually as antagonists
with an attitude of non-collaboration, managed gradually to adjust
themselves to each other's course and, in the last years of the
war, to achieve such a high degree of cooperation that the SOE
phrase from the spring of 1942, 'amalgamation' may be used. 'Basically
the same goal': yes, but the inherent contradiction in the SOE
programme made the first two or three years difficult: the building
up of a secret army combined with offensive actions. The
former required an attitude that did not attract the attention
of the Germans and thus agreed perfectly with Milorg's policy.
The consequence of offensive actions, on the other hand, was
precisely the opposite, and this was Milorg's constant worry.
For reasons already described, SOE had to concentrate on the
offensive part early in the war. As the war developed, SOE toned
down this aspect of its activity. At the same time, Milorg adjusted
its policy to the harsh reality of war. In this way the two lines
met and converged. Although this pattern may not have differed
much in outline from that which developed in other occupied countries,
there was perhaps one important difference after all: the degree
of success achieved by the partnership, or 'amalgamation',
between the two organisations.