An exchange in the 'letters to the editor' section of the Financial Times

Right to act with less than full certainty on Iraq weapons
From Robert Lerman

Sir, The FT recognises the central role of risk and uncertainty in its coverage of economic issues but apparently not in the much riskier and more uncertain arena of foreign affairs ("Coming clean on dirty weapons, June 5"). Just as business leaders must make investment and insurance decisions by weighing both the probability of an event and the gains or losses if the event materialises, so too must political leaders worried about the potential damage inflicted by rogue states.

You presume that no action against Iraq would be justified unless President George W. Bush and Tony Blair, the British prime minister, were virtually certain of the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Yet, given the potentially massive costs of Saddam Hussein's use of WMD to dominate the Gulf and threaten other nations, Mr Bush and Mr Blair would have been irresponsible if they did not act, even with less than full certainty about WMD in Iraq. They and other leaders had the 1998 United Nations report documenting WMD and the record of Saddam Hussein's aggressive wars, brutality, ambitions and consorting with terrorists.

Under the circumstances, what would the FT regard as enough of a risk for the US and UK to act? 20-25 per cent confidence in Iraq's holding WMD? 50 per cent confidence? 95 per cent confidence? It is hardly surprising that, in the aftermath of September 11 2001, Mr Bush and Mr Blair were risk-averse and willing to pay the insurance cost of stopping Mr Hussein in return for averting the possibility of catastrophic damage in the future.

Robert I. Lerman, Professor of Economics, American University, Washington, DC 20016, US
Published in Financial Times; Jun 09, 2003

Justification for war is akin to 1940s thinking on USSR
From Nick Megoran.

Sir, Prof Robert Lerman's retrospective justification of the Iraq war (Letters, June 9) is a crude form of geopolitics masquerading as scientific risk analysis. The recent arguments for pre-emptive war against Iraq resemble those made in the early cold war: the USSR may develop nuclear weapons; the USSR is evil and wants to destroy us; war is inevitable; therefore, let us fight it first on our terms. Senior US defence experts lobbied for massive pre-emptive nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union.

The USSR's threat was mediated through politics. Simple common sense shows that Iraq's infinitely weaker forces could diplomatically have been deterred from an attack on the US.

Prof Lerman's arguments, like those of the US generals of the 1940s, are based on neither risk calculation, argument nor political analysis but rather on a moral cartography locating our enemies in a realm of evil, beyond rational discussion - enemies who can thus only be destroyed. This very conception of international relations is itself an incitement to violence and is producing a less safe world for all.

Nick Megoran, Fellow, Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge CB2 3HU

Published in Financial Times, June 11, 2003.