Militarism, Realism, Just War, or Nonviolence? Critical Geopolitics and the Problem of Normativity

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Despite illuminating multiple modalities by which armed conflict is discursively justified, critical geopolitics can be criticised for providing a weak normative engagement with the social institution and practices of warfare. This has limited the impact of this school of thought outside of geography and critical security studies at a time when the ethics of military intervention have been prominent in public debate. This article explores the moral discourse of critical geopolitics through an examination of Gerard Toal’s writings on Iraq and Bosnia. This scholarship is reviewed in the light of Coates’s typology of major traditions of moral reflection on war – militarism, realism, just war theory, and pacifism/nonviolence. This analysis interrogates Toal’s narratives, in which American military intervention was advocated in the Former Yugoslavia and opposed in Iraq. This suggests that rather than a thoroughgoing commitment to pacifism/nonviolence, or a blanket cynicism about American foreign policy, Toal’s thinking includes an underlying attachment to some form of just war reasoning. However, its implicit and partial appropriation leads to a certain incoherence and selectivity that calls for further reflection. This presents a challenge to critical geopolitics. If it chooses to engage more explicitly with just war theory, its insights into identity and militarism could in turn inform a reworking of aspects of the theory, thereby facilitating critical geopolitics’ engagement with wider public anti-militaristic modes of discourse. However, as this risks blunting the political potential of the project and repeating the mistakes of twentieth-century
geopolitical thought, the paper concludes with a call for a whole-
hearted commitment to nonviolence.

INTRODUCTION

In what circumstances, if at all, should a state (or group of states) be consid-
ered right in making war? This is a question that is unavoidable to every
scholar of international studies. The argument presented here is simply that
critical geopolitics has failed to grasp this nettle and as a result this has lim-
ited both its utility as a source of political and moral reflection, and its
impact on scholars beyond a relatively small and self-selecting readership.
I suggest that engagement with two major schools of thought on the moral-
ity of military force, just war theory and nonviolence/pacifism could prove
fruitful sources of reflection on this question and reinvigorate the subdisci-
pline both intellectually and politically.

CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS AND THE NORMATIVE

Critical geopolitical texts are thoroughly infused with the vocabularies of
normative moral judgement. Dowler and Sharp desire an “anti-geopolitics
that is angry at injustice, exploitation and subjugation.” 1 Routledge calls
for a critical geopolitics that identifies with social movements, 2 Dalby for
one that expresses solidarity with those who suffer violence and injustice,3
and Heffernan for one that celebrates “the gradual re-configuration of per-
sonal and political identities ‘from below’”. 4 Polelle conceives of the goal
of critical geopolitics as being “to alter present practices by criticising cur-
rent and unjust geopolitical orderings of the world”. 5 Dodds contends that
“students of geopolitics should retain a sense of humanity, justice and
commitment for those oppressed, tortured and deprived of basic human
or community rights”, and that “critical geopolitics needs to continue to
make a difference through our intellectual commitments and normative
engagements”. 6

If the strident normative language of critical geopolitics is striking, so
too, paradoxically, is the marginal disucssion of such ideas in those texts.
The quotations cited above tend to be almost throw-away remarks, rhetor-
ical gestures that are neither elaborated nor critically grounded in any
form of justification or explication. The insubstantial nature of these rather
flimsy gestures to moral reasoning has been observed, commonly by pro-
ponents of the approach themselves. Dalby notes that the ‘critical’ in criti-
cal geopolitics usually refers to the problematisation of discourse rather
than the presence of a worked-out alternative political project. 7 Dowler
and Sharp likewise accept that whilst providing eloquent deconstructions
of dominant political discourse, there is often little sense that it offers alternatives. Sharp criticises Toal’s critical geopolitics for “a rather vague, impersonal and uncommitted embodiment.” Murphy faults Dodds and Atkinson’s landmark text on geopolitical thought for failing to “wrestle with a broader range of values and ethics. What geopolitical positions are more constructive and moral than others? Are there examples when bad impulses have given way to good and vice versa?” Murphy’s conclusion that the book offers little sense of how such questions might be answered is generally true of critical geopolitical studies as a whole. Writing sympathetically from outside the subdiscipline, Kelly lambastes critical geopolitics for offering “neither a clear characterisation of a better society nor a specific road map for attaining such an improvement,” and observes that its advocates “have written so sparsely about the new community and its attainment.”

A defence of critical geopolitics against this charge might be mounted on the grounds that ‘it’ is not conceived as a single, coherent ‘project’ but a series of tentative and tactical engagements with the deployment of geopolitical discourses in the service of exclusionary and violent state power, predicated on post-foundationalist philosophical frameworks. Toal and Dalby do indeed argue something similar in contending, admittedly a decade ago, that “critical geopolitics is very much a work in progress, a proliferation of research paths rather than a fully demarcated research field.” Indeed, Dalby argues that the task of critical geopolitics is not to take a definitive stand on certain issues, but rather to explicate the implicit or explicit political implications of knowing the world in particular ways. However, this is unsatisfactory for two reasons.

The first is intellectual. In a critique from the right, Gottfried comments on Rorty’s work that although he might, following Dewey, dismiss metaphysical enquiry or objectivity, it is still fair to ask on what basis, besides subjective, rhetorical appeals to ‘social justice’ and ‘progressive’ values, he justifies normative calls to mould social attitudes. One can ask the same of critical geopolitics. It is beyond the scope of this article to address this, although it does inform the second reason why the defence cited above is inadequate. This is a practical concern: critical geopolitics does in fact sometimes take a particular stand on certain issues, notably wars. In many cases critical geopolitical analyses do not go beyond Dalby’s formula of explicating the political implications of knowing the world in certain ways: however, sometimes they clearly oppose certain wars and (more rarely) advocate others, either case being an example of taking a normative position. It is this question, in what circumstances and for what reasons critical geopolitics opposes or advocates the prosecution of particular wars, which this essay will examine.
THE ETHICS OF WARFARE – FOUR TRADITIONS

It is argued thus far that whilst many critical geopolitical texts formally eschew the adoption of normative political positions in favour of espousing intellectual engagements with the production of geopolitical knowledge, this is actually contradicted by both the adoption of strident normative language and, more significantly, opposition to or advocacy of actual wars. This will be demonstrated and explored in the section following this discussion of warfare. However, in order to critically examine geopolitical texts for evidence of their normative engagement with warfare, it is necessary to outline the ethical traditions within which the question of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of warfare has traditionally been considered. This is particularly important as it has not, to my knowledge, been done before within critical geopolitics.

In his classic study, Bainton identified three major Christian European ethical positions on war: pacifism, just war theory, and crusading.16 This article, however, will use Coates’s demarcation of four ‘images of war’ in his 1997 study *The Ethics of War* – militarism, realism, just war theory, and pacifism.17 The use of the term ‘militarism’ is preferable to ‘crusading’ because it carries less narrow religious connotations, and the category ‘realism’ is an important counterpoint for understanding both just war theory and the theoretical underpinnings of critical geopolitics.

Militarism

The first two images will be passed over relatively quickly, as they are not live options for proponents of critical geopolitics. Militarism is the glorification of war as a good in itself, rather than simply as a means to an end.18 Bourke has shown in her disturbing study of biographical reflections on warfare, *An Intimate History of Killing*, how frequently soldiers have spoken of taking pleasure in the actual act of killing.19 However, militarism is usually considered in the cases of ideologies that articulate some form of expressive or redemptive theory of violence, both religious and secular. The classic example cited is the Christian Crusading movement,20 but over the past century anti-colonial, revolutionary, Islamist, nationalist and state Communist movements have provided numerous examples of the belief that through killing, the mythical body politic/community can be purified, renewed or glorified, and the martyred individual immortalised. The recurrent appeal of violent revolutionary movements to left/critical scholars notwithstanding, because of its sensitivity to the fashion in which identities are constructed around damaging self/other dualisms, this ethical position on warfare is not a live option for critical geopolitics.
Realism

Coates’ second image of war is realism. Whereas militarism sees warfare as ethically positive in some circumstances, realism considers it outside the sphere of ethical reflection by virtue of the constraints of the anarchic international system of states. The essence of this position is distilled in the Latin *inter arma silent leges* ‘in time of war the law is silent.’ It has been memorably rephrased numerous times in the history of warfare, from the statement by English Parliamentary leader John Hampden (1594–1643) that ‘the essence of war is violence, moderation in war is folly’, to the quip ‘war is hell’, commonly (but probably incorrectly) attributed to American Civil War General Sherman. Realism holds that, by the very nature of war, it is impossible to attempt to prevent or regulate it through legal mechanisms, and thus “international space is structured by the conflicting interests of states.” Realism can be traced intellectually to both Hobbes and Thucydides, contending that the interests and relative powers of states determine international relations. Codified as a theory of international relations, it is a state-centric paradigm that posits states as the basic unit of an anarchic international system. States are conceived of as rational anthropomorphic entities, with stable and pre-existing identities, motivated primarily by a single drive, the wish to survive. This structure of international politics limits co-operation between nations: units worry about their survival, and this worry affects their behaviour, constraining them from co-operative measures and disposing them to competitive positions: “The international imperative is ‘take care of yourself.’” Realism is the dominant school of thought in US international relations, Schweller arguing that it “remains the most coherent, elegant, and powerful theoretical perspective that addresses the central issues of the field, viz., war and peace, conflict and co-operation.”

In terms of military ethics, this structural theory mitigates against the development of codes and rules to limit the occurrence and destructiveness of warfare as being futile and unenforceable. However, simply because realism sees warfare as being outside the sphere of ethical reflection, it does not valorise it as militarism does. Thus the influential American realist thinker Hans Morgenthau opposed the Vietnam War, and contemporary realist John Mearsheimer opposed the 2003 Iraq invasion, in both cases on the grounds of rational calculation of US national interest.

It is almost unthinkable that critical geopolitics writers would adopt the amoralism of realism as a framework for considering military ethics. Beyond simply an instinctive reaction against ‘might is right’, critical geopolitics has drawn significant intellectual inspiration and direction from the cognate theories of critical international relations, which explicitly set themselves against realism. Critiquing the basic realist delimitation of the domestic and international as radically different spheres, Ashley contends that “realism is itself the voice of a specific historical mode of international community that...
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has sustained a tentative hold on international political space”.28 Realist thought is thus not an objective uncovering of a given but rather the prevailing subjectivity of a community of thinkers and an instrument of its power. Biersteker and Weber have argued, contra realism, that statecraft is less about relations between different state units, as the social construction and reconstruction of those units themselves.29 As Wendt memorably put it, “Anarchy is what states make of it”, there being no logic of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate structures of identity and interests.30 ‘War is hell’ is thus not an observation – it is an active justification of contingent behaviour, and a deliberate intervention to delegitimise criticism.

Just War Theory

Whereas militarism regards warfare itself as positive and realism as beyond the realm of ethical reflection, just war theory considers warfare as morally wrong but ethically permissible in some circumstances as the ‘lesser evil.’ Anthropologists have shown that not all human societies have invented social practices of warfare, but those that do tend to develop codes to regulate its conduct. The most important such code to have developed in Europe is known as ‘just war theory’, and forms the basis of the normative international laws of war that have been created in the past century and half.

Just war theory draws on a variety of cultural influences. Its foundation was laid by Greek and Roman thinkers such as Aristotle and Cicero, who discussed just causes for war and the necessary authority to declare it. The later Roman Christian leaders Ambrose and Augustine adopted and adapted this, somewhat uncomfortably, to Christianity, drawing on both Hebrew and Christian scriptures to add that wars must be fought with the right intention (Christian love for victims of injustice, not vengeance or greed).31 From medieval codes of chivalry came laws about just conduct in warfare, and the protection of non-combatants. There was no smooth development, and at times just war theory almost completely fell out of fashion, particularly amongst clergy and laity who drew on the apparent nonviolence of the New Testament and early Christian period.32 However, by the fifteenth century these often contradictory ideas from multiple sources had come together into a broadly recognisable form.33

At its best, just war theory is about continual ethical reflection on the morality of a war, and is not a set of boxes that a politician can tick to establish if a war is ‘just’.34 It nevertheless traditionally distinguishes between two sets of rules.35 The first concerns ‘just resort to war’, or jus ad bellum, to establish the criteria by which a war may be begun or joined. Five criteria are commonly advanced. The war must have a just cause, that is, self-defence against an unlawful attack, or the righting of wrong, and the
re-establishment of peace. A ‘just cause’ would not include seizing territory or natural resources. Second, it must be waged by a right authority. A group of people such as criminals, rebels, or private militias cannot band together and start a war on their own initiative, even if the cause is just. In the contemporary state system as codified by the United Nations, established governments acting in self defence or the United Nations Security Council, are regarded as the only right authorities. Third, the proper authority must have a right intention. It is one thing to identify a just cause such as resisting the invasion of an ally, but if the authority is only using that as a mask for the real purpose of securing access to natural resources, for example, then the intention is not just. Likewise, vengeance is not a just intention. Fourth, there must be a reasonable chance of success. Even if the intent is just, it is not just to launch a war that has little chance of succeeding, as the expected good results of the war must outweigh the evil of war, that is, the suffering that it brings to all involved. Finally, war must be launched as a last resort, when all other avenues of resolving the conflict have been exhausted.

The second set of criteria is known as jus in bello, or ‘just conduct in war’, and is about the actual conduct of war once it has begun. Two requirements are commonly stipulated in this category. The first is discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate targets. Thus civilians and non-combatants such as medics and padres are not to be purposely targeted for attack, although if they are killed as the indirect result of an attack on a military target, then that is not regarded as a crime (the so-called ‘law of double effect’). Likewise, prisoners of war must not be executed or otherwise ill-treated. Second, force used must be proportional to the aim, and only that firepower strictly necessary to secure one’s objective must be used – even against military personnel.

Just war theory is a dynamic and evolving tradition, and some thinkers have recently proposed the addition of a third category to these two traditional ones, jus post bellum, or ‘justice after war’. By this count, a war can only be considered just if the victors put sufficient planning and effort into stabilising the situation and restoring order and well-being after any war, and if they foster processes of reconciliation and forgiveness. Some writers have suggested that this must involve installing functioning democracies.

It should be apparent that these criteria are highly demanding. Even if a war has been justly begun, it may subsequently become unjust by virtue of the way it is fought. Far from celebrating it, the firm presumption of just war theory is against war: ‘History knows of no just wars’, writes just war theorist and theologian Oliver O’Donovan. It is formulated to aid statesmen and women in practical reasoning in the murkiness and confusion of the real world by providing a moral framework for reflecting on different aspects of war.

From the sixteenth century its development was largely carried forward by secularising (although often still Christian) thinkers, eventually morphing
into modern international laws on war, such as those arising from the Geneva Conference of 1864, the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and the covenants and charters of the League of Nations (1928) and United Nations (1945). The end of the Cold War has occasioned a revival of interest in the tradition. The potential nuclear violence of ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ rendered reflection on proportionate force redundant (Harvey 1999), but the plethora of smaller ‘new’ wars, not least the contested concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’, has occasioned renewed reflection on when wars can legitimately be waged to deliver victims of injustice and oppression in their own states.

Would just war theory appeal to critical geopolitics writers? At first glance, the obvious answer would be no: its origins in classical and modern political philosophy, medieval Roman Catholic theology, and contemporary jurisprudence, bespeak a systematisation and codification that critical geopolitics writers are intuitively suspicious of. However, the label ‘just war theory’ is a simplification: it refers to a diverse and dynamic set of practices, traditions and intellectual pedigrees – much as ‘critical security studies’ or ‘critical geopolitics’ does. Because it is a set of practices and traditions (well illustrated by Kelsay and Johnson’s comparative study of Western and Islamic just war traditions), it does not demand a single foundational metaphysic for its ethic. Indeed, Walzer, author of arguably the most influential modern book on the topic, freely admits that he elides an examination of the foundation of his ethics for the simple reason that he is unsure what that would be, but sees just war as an exercise in practical morality dealing with the messiness of a violent world.

Theoretically, just war theory is explicitly opposed to realism. Just war theory, developed long before the formation of the modern state system, does not valorise state sovereignty. The first chapter of Walzer’s book, Just and Unjust Wars, a popular and well-written text which occasioned a revival of interest in just war theory within military circles, is entitled ‘Against Realism’, the book seeking to “recapture the just war for political and moral theory”. Likewise, Hayden’s advocacy of just war theory on cosmopolitan grounds is premised on the notion that it is impossible to enhance and protect human freedom within the realist paradigm of states as rational actors driven to use force in power struggles under a condition of anarchy, a recipe, she argues, for global insecurity, not security. However, whilst critical geopolitics would be sympathetic to just war theory’s rejection of realism, it would be more cautious about its liberal commitment to practices and institutions of ‘international society’, from which it seeks to retain a critical distance.

At the same time, it is my suspicion (as I shall seek to demonstrate below) that many critical geopolitics writers do in fact operate with an implicit version of just war theory. For example, anyone who regards Britain’s declaration of war on Germany in 1939 as just but who opposes its
invasion of Iraq in 2003 on anything but realist grounds of national self-interest is already working with at least an ad hoc version of the tradition. The description of a particular war as ‘immoral’ or ‘illegal’ betokens the same. Walzer (who himself regarded American involvement in World War II as just but in Vietnam as unjust) contends that, if we reject realism and pacifism, just war theory is unavoidable.\textsuperscript{45} If critical geopolitical writers are thus using the theory implicitly, intellectual rigour demands a more explicit engagement.

Nonetheless, at least four weighty objections can be raised to just war theory. The first is that it is circular. By definition anyone fighting a war, except perhaps mercenaries, would usually think that it is just. As Christian humanist and Northern Renaissance scholar, Erasmus, argued against just war theory in the sixteenth century, ‘just’ effectively “means any war declared in any way against anybody by any prince.”\textsuperscript{46} Whilst insisting that it provides a non-partisan framework, advocates frequently seem convinced that numerous politically dubious wars fulfil the criteria. This is the conclusion reached by Johnson on the 1991 US war on Iraq,\textsuperscript{47} Evans on the NATO 1999 attack on Serbia,\textsuperscript{48} Cole and Elshtain on the 2002 US invasion of Afghanistan,\textsuperscript{49} and Elshtain on the 2003 invasion of Iraq.\textsuperscript{50}

The second objection to just war theory is related, being that it justifies the status quo. It allows those countries that have gained wealth by violence and military expansion to stay rich, by preventing those structurally disadvantaged to seek to redress the balance through the same methods. As Griffith observes, Augustine did not generate a theory of just piracy or just revolution: just war theory was shaped by the nature of his allegiance to the Roman empire.\textsuperscript{51} That is not to say that it could not be extended to such circumstances: simply that it has not been generally.

Third, just war theory makes disturbing calculations about the relative value of human life. In his defence of just war theory, Evans acknowledges being troubled that whilst the moral equivalence of both sides’ soldiers exists in theory, it does not in practice. He gives the example of the 1991 Gulf War, widely considered ‘just’. High altitude aerial bombing minimised US casualties but killed untold thousands of Iraqi soldiers.\textsuperscript{52} Are their lives worth less than American soldiers? Further worrying calculations are made in rules protecting non-combatants from harm. As Griffith writes, “The effort to differentiate between combatants and non-combatants entails the crude suggestion that, in times of war, some lives are more expendable than others”.\textsuperscript{53} Such a suggestion should trouble critical geographers.

Finally, by accepting the legitimacy of warfare (albeit in carefully prescribed circumstances), just war theory perpetuates violence in the world. It is not merely that if people know that they can resort to violence if all else fails, they may be less likely to put energy into pursuing risky nonviolent alternatives. Rather, by designating certain actions ‘war crimes’, war itself is re-embedded as a legitimate activity. Just war theory, according to Griffith,
is “the cynical compromise of those who would seek to outlaw ‘war crimes’ without outlawing the crime of war itself” (ibid., p. 5). Thus, whilst just war theory is more likely to appeal to critical geopolitics writers than either militarism or realism, there are compelling reasons to remain wary of it.

Pacifism/Nonviolence

Although most societies have developed some form of warfare and some version of just war theory to regulate it, it is also the case that the fundamental legitimacy of its existence has frequently been questioned. Pacifism, Coates’s fourth major tradition of ethical responses to warfare, is the rejection of war as a means of resolving international disputes. This rejection may be based upon the pragmatic political calculation that violence is less effective than nonviolence, a personal revulsion to violence, a humanistic optimism that war will disappear as the human race evolves to become more civilised, or a religious conviction that God forbids participation in activities that will destroy human beings who are created with a ‘divine spark’ (as the Greek philosophers put it) or in His image (in Judeo-Christian thought). Like just war theory it opposes both the valorisation of violence in militarism and the amoralism of realism, and recognises that war is an evil. Unlike just war theory, it does not accept that a ‘just war’ is a morally acceptable ‘lesser evil’ in some circumstances. The concept (under different names) has existed throughout the world for millennia, but in the twentieth century it moved from being deployed in an ad hoc manner to being a deliberate and institutionalised tool for social change.54

Ironically, whilst also being the intellectual custodian of just war theory, in Europe the Christian churches have long been the major source of thoroughgoing pacifism. The New Testament narrative of Jesus Christ as a ‘king’ and ‘saviour’ of his people suffering under brutal Roman imperial rule – and ultimately of all humanity – presents him not as a military leader but as constructing an internationalist community of ‘peacemakers’ radically opposed to the rule and values of the imperial order yet eschewing political violence as a means of overthrowing it.55 This ‘pacifism’ (at the risk of anachronism) was replaced with just war theory as the empire increasingly co-opted the faith from the fourth century onwards.56 Nonetheless, as Musto shows, opposition to just war theory has been a constant if cyclical theme amongst both clergy and laity throughout (Catholic) Christian history. He collates numerous examples of pacifism from a period considered to be the high point of the ‘dark ages’. For example, in 1085, during a century when just war theory was almost absent from theological writing, Husmann of Speyer wrote a pamphlet denouncing the papacy as illegitimate because of its continued advocacy of the theory, declaring, “It is Christian to teach, not to make war; to endure injustice with patience, not to avenge it. Christ did nothing of the kind, and neither did any of his saints.” At the time of the
early Crusading movement Peter the Venerable, Abbot of Cluny, wrote to Bernard of Clairvaux, who was known for his support of the crusades, insisting that “the Church has no sword. Christ took it away when he said to Peter, ‘Put back thy sword.’” At the Plain of Pasquara, Verona, on August 28, 1233, 400,000 people of all classes gathered to demonstrate for an end to all war, opposition to the Crusades, and to call for peace and reconciliation. Whilst not more than 30,000 people were involved in the first crusade, by 1450 600,000 belonged to the pacifist ‘third order’ of Franciscans. He concludes that such massive popular peace movements might have been more representative of Europe/Christianity at the time than those which espoused just war theory. The Protestant reformation spawned numerous pacifist sects and movements, which have been active in peace movements. A modern example is one of the largest evangelical denominations in the USA today, the Church of God in Christ. Deeply rooted in the Bible-based church culture of the American South, it is theologically and socially conservative, opposing abortion, homosexuality, and the ordination of women. It also abhors war and instructs all its members not to enlist or otherwise engage in acts of war. In March 2003, the church’s Board of Bishops wrote a letter to President Bush, opposing the planned invasion of Iraq.

It was in the twentieth century that pacifism/nonviolence mushroomed to become a more significant global political and intellectual force. A number of explanations can be given for this. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw increasing resort to nonviolence in successful resistance to European tyrannies, coinciding with the rise of mass democratic nationalist sentiment. The trade union movements provided important mechanisms for resistance. Also significant were the writings and examples of a small number of key thinkers, particularly the Russian radical Christian pacifist Leo Tolstoy, who argued that authentic faith in Christ necessitated a complete rejection of nationalism, the modern state, and the use of violence.

Tolstoy influenced the man who “made the most significant personal contribution in the history of the nonviolent technique,” the Indian lawyer Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1948). Along with his Muslim counterpart, Abdul Ghaftar Khan, he worked Tolstoy’s principles into a set of practices of nonviolent resistance to British imperial rule: practices that were later appropriated by American Baptist minister Martin Luther King Jr. in his civil rights campaign in the USA. ‘Nonviolence’ has thus emerged as a set of political practices that use multiple forms of protest, non-cooperation and intervention to achieve political change through nonviolent methods. Subject to codification by Gene Sharp around a theory of violent power as vulnerable due to its dependence upon consent that can be withdrawn, advocates claim that nonviolent practices have been effective at bringing down or transforming corrupt regimes. Its advocates also claim that, although an ancient practice, it is a relatively new science. Historians have overlooked it, and “nonviolent strategies have not been developed or analyzed with the same energy and
resources as military and other violent means.” Indeed, as Zunes et al. pointedly observe, there is a massive imbalance of resources devoted to war and nonviolence: “We have no large nonviolent academies that parallel our military academies or widespread units of peace brigades stationed to intervene nonviolently in crisis situations.”

This section has thus provided an overview of the four main ethical approaches to considering war. Militarism endorses martial violence and realism locates it beyond the remit of ethical reflection, making both unappealing to critical geopolitics. Just war theory considers warfare the lesser of two evils and necessary to right injustice in some circumstances, and has more to commend itself to critical geopolitics. Indeed, I suspect that the majority of critical geopolitical writers adhere, whether they are aware of it or not, to some variant of just war theory. Pacifism/nonviolence shares with just war theory the rejection of both militarism and realism, but does not regard war as acceptable in any circumstance, seeking instead imaginative nonviolent alternatives to warfare.

Having established this conceptual framework for reflecting on the ethics of war, I will now use it to consider the work of leading critical geopolitical writer, Gerard Toal. In so doing, I will attempt to ascertain which of these positions he adopts, and what the consequences of this are.

GERARD TOAL AND THE MORALITY OF WARFARE

In order to explore the relationship between critical geopolitics and Coates’s four traditions of moral reflection on warfare, I will consider the writings of Gerard Toal (Gearóid Ó Tuathail) on America and post–Cold War wars in Iraq and Bosnia. This is not to single Toal out for particular criticism. On the contrary, I have enormous respect for the extent and thoroughness of his scholarship and his determined refusal to divorce theoretical rigour and empirical depth from political and moral reflection. Indeed, it is precisely because of this that I have chosen to focus on his writing. It is particularly appropriate for this study because he has written extensively on American (non)engagement in more than one war (Iraq and Bosnia), has identified the need to take personal positions, and has reflected on the moral challenges facing students of critical geopolitics. He has also taken the bold step of not merely opposing certain American wars (which is easy to do in the contemporary left-liberal academy), but actually advocating at least one other. Infused as it is with theoretical sophistication, there are no doubt many valid ways to understand Toal’s project. Here I will read his work on Iraq and Bosnia as a sustained study into the ways in which geopolitical reasoning facilitates America’s acquiescence in violence through the “social suppression of moral responsibility.” In the former case, this was a public acquiescence to their government’s violence against Iraq; in the latter, a
public and political acquiescence through inaction to Serb violence. For the purpose of this article, his relevant texts have been examined to identify when and how they make normative judgements about war, and how they relate to Coates’s four traditions.

Iraq

Toal’s 1993 paper, ‘The Effacement of Place’, was his first study of US foreign policy towards Iraq. He asks how and why the ‘Gulf Crisis’ of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 morphed into the US-led attack on Iraq in 1991. Regarding the explanation of oil security as inadequate, he considers President George H. W. Bush’s geopolitical reasoning about a ‘new world order’ as revealing of geopolitical assumptions that embed and facilitate Republican party political ambitions. He devotes particular attention to the way in which the ‘chronopolitics’ of military technology, and novel forms of electronic media presentation of the war, created a new sense of immediacy to the conflict that eviscerated knowledge of the real destruction being caused, thus facilitating public acquiescence in the war.

Toal is clearly extremely angry about and hostile to the US attack on Iraq, describing it as “a techno-frenzied slaughter” which “does not deserve the name ‘war’”. What is the basis for his opposition, and on what grounds does he articulate this?

Toal’s opposition to the war appears to be based on two central factors that reappear in places throughout the text. The first is the scale of killing by the US military. He begins his essay by referring to estimates of between 100,000 and 150,000 Iraqi dead and to ongoing fatalities (“mostly children”) caused by the direct assault and sanctions, contrasting these to the “remarkably low” American losses of 148 dead (ibid., p. 4). This “grim balance sheet” means that “geographers have a moral and political obligation to confront and challenge” the way in which the war was presented by politicians, experts and the media (p. 4). He describes the war as a “techno-frenzied slaughter” (p. 5), and “carnage” (p. 25). He regards casualty figures as a self-evident demonstration that the war was wrong, but does not expound or develop any form of argument around this simple presentation of numbers. Clearly, numbers do not speak for themselves and many people regard the war as legitimate in spite of these figures. As he does not develop an argument, it can only be speculated as to why he considered these figures so adequate to make a case that no further comment was needed. There are three possibilities. The first is a romantic notion that the relative scale of losses on each side shows the Americans had an unfair advantage by virtue of technological superiority, and the war would have been less objectionable had losses been more equal. However, as he goes on to critique American motivations for the war, this is unlikely. The second possibility is that Toal is adopting a pacifist critique of war, that all killing is
wrong and therefore mass killing simply demonstrates that this particular misadventure is consequently even more horrific and despicable. The third is that this killing was reprehensible because it caused massive suffering to civilian populations (in particular, he mentions the deaths of children (p. 4) and the Al-Amiriya air-raid shelter bombing on February 13 (p. 25), and because it caused an unnecessary number of Iraqi military deaths. These objections would correspond to the *jus in bello* (‘just conduct in war’) criteria of *discrimination* and *proportionality*.

Toal’s second major objection to the war is that American motivations were illegitimate. Adducing evidence from various sources, he contends that the Bush regime’s justification of the war as necessary to protect ‘Western interests’ in the form of Saudi Arabian security and access to oil reserves (pp. 11–13) do not stand up to critical scrutiny. This argument is largely based on both the weakness of the Iraqi military, the lack of evidence of a threat to Saudi Arabia, and on Saddam Hussein’s historic willingness to deal with the West.

Instead, he sees the primary motivation as being the shoring up of both the Republican Party’s domestic hold on power, and The United States’ global geostrategic location and identity. Cold War discourses of danger, he argues, afforded the USA an “identity, authority and role” (p. 7) as leader of the civilised world against a multitude of insidious threats (pp. 12–13). The Cold War assured the USA of a hegemonic position with potential capitalist rivals such as Germany and Japan subordinated to the USA in a network of anti-Communist military alliances. The Soviet threat narrative also disciplined the domestic order, Ronald Reagan having demonstrated the utility of masculinist nationalist ‘Cold Warrior’ bravado. The end of the Cold War thus threatened the global hegemony of the USA and “the lock of the Republican Party on the White House” (p. 7). Thus “traditional anti-communist threat narratives had to be rewritten”, Saddam Hussein comfortably filling the discursive void. Hussein allowed the Bush administration to represent itself as the guardian of global law and order in an “unconscious fantasy drama” (p. 13).

This objection, or rather set of objections, can be located within just war theory’s *jus ad bellum* (‘just resort to war’) set of criteria, namely *just cause* and *just intention*. Toal is arguing that there was insufficient evidence to justify the attack in terms of the causes of either the defence of Saudi Arabia or access to oil supplies. He is also suggesting that, whatever the ostensible cause, a more significant ‘intention’ was the shoring up of the USA’s global identity and role following the end of the Cold War. His indication that these factors may be “unconscious” clearly stretches the meaning of the word ‘intention’. However, in Toal’s account of the war they act as the more efficacious and significant explanations. This point will be returned to in the discussion below.

Although he devotes substantial space at the end of his paper to considering them, I do not regard his discussion of the ‘chronopolitics’ of
military technology and the manipulation of the war by US politicians and media through new forms of broadcasting as being substantive grounds for Toal’s opposition to the war. As already cited, Toal begins his paper by arguing that because there is such a “grim balance sheet” geographers must therefore “confront and challenge the strategies by which the war was given to be seen” (p. 4). He is contending that, having once established that the war is illegitimate, it is therefore necessary to unmask the ways in which it was presented, and this element of his paper is therefore not central to the discussion of his normative commitments.

Toal’s second paper on Iraq, published a decade later, “‘Just Out Looking for a Fight’: American Affect and the Invasion of Iraq” mirrors his first. An angry reaction to the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, it essentially explores how President George W. Bush was able to legitimise his controversial invasion of Iraq. His answer is that a ‘Jacksonian’ “triumph of affect over intellect in American foreign policy”,71 which Bush and his supporters were able to skilfully manipulate and channel, allowed him to attack Iraq on the basis of tenuous claims that it was a campaign in the ‘war on terror’ launched in response to Al-Qaeda attacks in the USA in September 2001.

As with his previous paper, he begins by citing figures for Iraqi dead in the war. He dismisses Bush’s cited reasons for the war, claiming that there is no evidence of links between Saddam Hussein and the 9/11 attackers, and that Hussein was sufficiently deterred from using weapons of mass destruction (p. 857). He asserts that the “veracity of [the Bush Administration’s] claims and the legitimacy of its actions were widely questioned and challenged” (ibid.), “there is not convincing evidence” for the necessity of the invasion (p. 864), and that this central premise of Bush’s rationale “was unconvincing to most members of the international community and remains unproven” (p. 866). He finds the national-security rationale “questionable” (p. 857), and continues that “the US decision to go to war with Iraq was remarkable for the incoherence, inconsistency, and illegitimacy that dogged it” (p. 863).

Rather, he regards the American invasion of Iraq as being driven by two factors. The first is a desire to “avenge 9/11” (pp. 859, 868), and the second to perpetuate American global hegemony in the fantasy world where America is forever the “sole remaining superpower” (p. 868). This latter factor is tied up with securing Republican Party electoral success in 2002 (p. 866) and 2004 (p. 868), and with an “entrenched economy of defence appropriations” (p. 868). Thus, based largely on a discussion of whether the USA had just causes and intentions, Toal argues, the war was “illegal” (p. 857). Most of the paper is devoted to explicating how Bush was able to channel affective energy latent in the aggressive, masculinist, militaristic (geo)political culture of the USA.

In spite of the more polemical tone struck in the second, the two papers are remarkably similar. Each articulates strong opposition to the
respective Bush attacks on Iraq. Each grounds this opposition in a statement of fact about Iraqi war dead that Toal apparently expects to be taken as indisputable evidence for the wickedness of the wars. Each disputes the legitimacy of the wars by questioning both the causes adduced by America and the intentions of the Bush regimes. The weightiest discussion in each paper is a theoretically rich deconstruction of the ways in which the US government was able to obtain popular domestic support for these wars.

Returning to Coates’s taxonomy of ethical approaches to war, in which category can Toal’s critique of the Iraq wars be placed? Certainly not militarism: Toal is horrified by the death caused by American forces in Iraq, and detests the “cabal of restless nationalists immersed in an anti-intellectual culture of affect and aggressive militarism” whom he claims lead the US military p. 857). Nor is he a realist – his texts are permeated by the belief that the US’s wars can and indeed must be subject to moral scrutiny. His apparent assumption that incidence of Iraqi deaths be read as demonstrative of the illegitimacy of the wars could be seen as part of a coherent pacifist commitment to nonviolence. However, there is no other evidence to support this.

Rather, Toal’s opposition to the Iraq wars can, I believe, be squarely located within the traditional domains of moral reasoning demarcated by just war theory. These may be discrimination and proportionality, but as his conviction is that the wars were unjust in the first place, unsurprisingly his objections fall in the jus ad bellum set of criteria. Most attention is given to discussions clearly identifiable as just cause and just intention. Tellingly, he describes the second Iraq war as “illegal”: assuming that he is not deploying this phrase either loosely or tactically (a reasonable assumption in the case of a writer who chooses words carefully and precisely), it reveals belief in some form of normative judicial codes or practices to which states must submit for scrutiny their military actions.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Toal’s ethical position on warfare developed in his Iraq articles can be clarified by comparison with his writings on the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. In a series of articles “torn between anger and academia”,72 he explores geopolitical representations of the war that began in 1992, and their implications. Mapping the conflict in World War I terms as a futile ethnic quagmire, or scripting it as a World War II-type Holocaust, had profound implications for the position that British, continental European, and American governments adopted.73 Although certain journalistic reporting of Serb atrocities against Muslim and Croat populations disturbed the hegemonic geopolitical framing of Bosnia-Hercegovina,74 the British government’s portrayal of the conflict as a ‘humanitarian disaster’ rather than an aggressive war against the Bosnian government informed a non-interventionist approach that
facilitated Serb genocide. It is striking, contends Toal, that although Iraqi aggression towards Kuwait in 1990 and Serb aggression towards Bosnia-Hercegovina from 1992 were both challenges to President George H. W. Bush’s ‘new world order’, the first was presented as ‘vicious aggression’ that ‘will not stand’ and met with a military intervention, whereas the second was tolerated as a ‘humanitarian disaster’. Using the language of normative codes of war, Toal regards Serb genocide in Bosnia as “a war crime”, and sees political and economic hope for the republic by embedding in the European Union’s economic and political supra-state structures. The violence of the Bosnian war was brought to an imperfect halt by an eventual American-led NATO attack on the Serbs in 1995, and Toal’s work implicitly questions the reasons why such a ‘military intervention’ was not seen as an option in the years before then. Indeed, he admires Simm’s book on Bosnia for showing how “the case for limited military intervention on behalf of the Bosnia government was denied, ignored and suppressed by a host of British politicians and experts” (Toal 2004: 495). The implication of Toal’s corpus on the Bosnian war is that America (and its allies) should have undertaken a “military intervention”, to use Toal’s euphemism, sooner. Indeed, he makes this explicit: “Bosnia required selfless intervention in the name of universal human rights”.

In what tradition of ethical reflection on warfare is Toal’s Bosnian work located? Again, he despises the militarism of the Serbs, and scorns the realism of “Western military and diplomatic leaders [who] tended to reason in a realpolitik manner”, concluding that it is not justice but rather the relative military weakness of the Bosnian Muslims vis-à-vis the Serbs that should be allowed to dictate the outcome of the conflict. Clearly, in advocating an American attack on Serbian forces, he is eschewing pacifism/nonviolence. The framework that he appears to be using in reflecting on war and responsibility in Bosnia is the just war tradition. He most frequently uses the jus in bello criteria of discrimination. The Serbs committed “war crimes” and “genocide” – illustrated throughout his articles with vivid and shocking descriptions of civilians being shelled, raped, executed, and forced from their homes. In righting wrongs and protecting the innocent, the Americans and their allies had a just cause, and would have been just in fighting a war so long as it had the right intention (“selfless intervention”, emphasis added); indeed, they should have fought a war, which is another implication of just war theory.

Discussion

Of the four broad traditions of thinking about war identified by Coates, this analysis of Toal’s writing on the Iraq and Bosnian wars locates them in the normative just war theory tradition. He opposed the US’s wars on Iraq, largely on the basis of the criteria of just cause and right intention, although
**legitimate authority** (George W. Bush’s war “flouted international law”\(^81\)), **proportionality** and **discrimination** also played a role. He opposed the Serb war on Bosnian Muslims largely on the grounds of **discrimination**, arguing that their deliberate targeting of civilians constituted a severe transgression of the war codes, but also implies that they had neither **just cause**, **right intention** nor **legitimate authority** to begin the war. He advocated an American war on the Serbs on the basis of **just cause** and **right intention**. His use of social theory (including critical geopolitics, discourse analysis, chronopolitics, and affect) does not apparently inform these moral judgements but follows on from them, being used to expound and expose how what he considers to be unjust wars were facilitated and legitimised, or necessary just wars avoided.

Toal himself, however, never explicitly uses the categories of just war reasoning. Indeed, he appears sceptical about the concept of “just war”, noting that the “mythic narratives” of World War II as such a war were nostalgically re-scripted by President Bush in justifying the attack on Iraq.\(^82\) Nonetheless, as this discussion shows, I contend that his work is dependent upon them. This contradiction is problematic for a number of reasons.

Firstly, there is potential confusion about the purpose of his writing because whilst it might appear that his opposition to the Iraq wars is based on his theorisation of the chronopolitics of military technology, critical geopolitics, electronic media representations of war or affect, this is in fact not the case. However, in response to this, it could be said that as all theory is situated, if it is understood that Toal deploys it tactically in support of antecedent moral and military judgements, rather than being informed by it, this confusion can be avoided.

Nonetheless, secondly, Toal’s analysis can still be turned upon itself. The success of a US-led war for “universal human rights” could keep arms producers in business, and bolster the reputation of the military and the electability of the politician who risked prosecuting it. It could provide America with the Other of new dangers and bogeymen, useful in reasserting its “identity, authority and role” in a world that is harder to discipline with the end of the Cold War. Toal’s selective support of US wars, if not inconsistent, certainly blunts his critique of the Iraq wars and demands a more sustained and coherent justification for the positions that he adopts.

Thirdly, and more seriously, his unacknowledged and selective deployment of just war criteria leads to a lack of rigour in his moral reasoning. For example, in his 1993 Iraq paper he curiously does not consider arguments about the justice of reversing Iraq’s invasion of its sovereign neighbour and the death and destruction that this caused. In his 2003 paper on Iraq he highlights the war’s lack of international legitimacy (**legitimate authority**), yet in his 1993 paper does not take proper account of United Nations authorisation of the 1991 war. In his 2002 paper on Bosnia he makes much of the contrast between American refusal to intervene militarily to assist Bosnia
and its 1991 willingness to make war on Iraq to aid Kuwait, but in his 1993 paper on Iraq he virtually overlooks the plight of Kuwait. His narrative effectively erased the suffering of Kuwaitis, depicting the country as the bogus patrimony of a wealthy and dishonest family and only “ostensibly a sovereign nation”. These are significant and troubling oversights, that would scarcely have been possible had he subjected himself to the rigour of engaging more fully with the just war tradition. This lack of rigour, which is by no means confined to Toal’s work, I suspect impairs the ability of critical geopolitics to engage with thinkers outside the subdiscipline.

Fourthly and finally, his commitment to a version of just war theory raises an acute political problem. The US-led attacks on Serbs in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) – incidents about which he is curiously quiet – were not isolated events. Rather, they can be read as stages in the much-debated post-Cold War neoconservative moment that articulates a vision of global democracy and peace exported and installed by force, where US values and interests are congruent with global interests. However much it can be critiqued, and however falteringly it was pursued, this was at least part of the vision behind George H. W. Bush’s ‘New World Order’ wars in Iraq (1991) and Somalia (1992), Bill Clinton’s Bosnian (1995) and Kosovan (1999) wars, and George W. Bush’s ‘War on terror’ invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Toal’s call for “selfless intervention in the name of universal human rights” can be read as a cognate call for just such wars, albeit fought with more attention to the jus in bello criteria than the American military has been wont to pay. As Chomsky has demonstrated, Japanese aggression in Manchuria, Mussolini’s imperialism in Africa, Hitler’s conquest of Czechoslovakia, and numerous American military interventions have all been done under the guise of selfless concern for the Other. There is a double irony in Toal’s admiration of Simms: he is Co-Founder and President of the British neoconservative foreign policy pressure group, the Henry Jackson Society. Its stated aims are to “spread” “liberal democracy” and “universal human rights” across the world under the leadership of the USA and Britain, by “intervention and example” using “a strong military with global expeditionary reach.”

Toal is acutely aware of this danger, and attempts to head it off in the conclusion to his review of Simms’ book. He argues that Saddam Hussein’s crimes against humanity were conducted with the support of the ‘great powers’, whereas Serb crimes in Bosnia were not. This judgement understates the agency of Saddam Hussein, a man who was no-one’s puppet but rather sought different allies at different stages of his barbaric rule. However, it is also morally problematic: do mendacious foreign policy commitments in the past mean that the suffering of ordinary Iraqis is subsequently forever put beyond the realm of moral responsibility? Toal’s call for “responsibility without limits” would surely mean the answer to that is a resounding ‘no’. He also argues that
they are different because whilst America’s Bosnian intervention created “an imperfect state awkwardly slouching towards Europe”, the Iraq war “provoked a predictable backlash of violence”. Toal’s objection might be read as a call for a different strategy of invasion, application of the just war criterion of reasonable chance of success, or advocacy of Evans’ jus post bellum category of post-war planning for justice, peace and reconciliation. It might also be read as part of a discourse that argues the neoconservative moment has had both successes (Kosovo) and failures (Iraq), but the project should not be abandoned.

This concern informs the final problem raised by Toal’s position on the Iraq and Bosnian wars, illustrating the problems with any version of just war theory as outlined above. Following Griffith, the designation of some wars as ‘crimes’ perpetuates the legitimisation of the crime of all war, and is part of the very problem that the former Yugoslavia has faced. This point was made forcibly by Miroslav Volf, a Croat theologian and social theorist who taught in his homeland as it was being overrun by Serb forces. He remained a brave advocate of nonviolence, rejecting just war theory by concluding his major text on identity and otherness:

> show me one warring party that does not think its war is just! Simple logic tells us that at least half of them must be wrong. It could be, however, that simple logic does not apply to the chaotic world of wars. Then all would be right, which is to say that all would be wrong, which is to say that terror would reign – in the name of the gods who can no longer be distinguished from the devils.89

**CONCLUSION: CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS AND VIOLENCE**

The means recommended by traditional theories will ensure that the end will be the same old world with the same old dangers – and perhaps even worse . . . when powerful states use violence, even if it is claimed to be as a last resort for humanitarian purposes, they are not acting in a manner calculated to make violence less likely; if they achieve success in their own terms, they do so only by proving to others that strategic violence can have political utility . . . . The strategic challenge for emancipatory politics is to develop ideas for dealing with today’s security threats (to whatever referents we are studying) in ways sensitive to the view expressed by Albert Camus that the means one uses today shapes the ends one might perhaps reach tomorrow.

> — Ken Booth, ‘Beyond Critical Security Studies’90

Every student of the relations between states, who also holds that scholarly engagement must not merely be theoretical and empirical but also political and moral, cannot avoid facing the question: in what circumstances, if at
all, should a state be considered right in making or joining war? The argument of this paper is simply that critical geopolitics has not properly grappled with this question in a systematic and consistent way. By virtue of opposition to certain wars but advocacy of others, by implicit use of just war categories and language in moral reasoning, it is de facto operating within the parameters of a version of just war theory. However, because this appropriation is not made explicit – indeed, because just war theory is at times summarily dismissed – its appropriation is partial.

This selective appropriation is problematic. Whilst critical geopolitical analyses of individual wars might be insightful and compelling, the bigger picture may be one of incoherence and subjectivity. The purpose of theory selectively deployed becomes confusing, critique may be turned in on itself, there is a lack of clarity and rigour in moral reasoning despite superficial rhetorical appeals to morality, and the political intent of the project becomes unclear and even co-optable to the service of neoconservatism. This partial and contradictory appropriation of just war theory is also intellectually unsatisfying, and limits the potential of critical geopolitics to be taken seriously outside a small, self-selecting readership.

My objection thus far is not to just war theory per se. It provides a framework for reasoning about warfare that regards it as an evil to be deployed in only exceptional circumstances, and (despite its name), its presumption is against violence. We live in a messy and complicated and violent world. Just war theory’s insistence, against realism and militarism, that military violence is not beyond the legitimate sphere of moral reasoning is important, and the arguments for the occasional and limited use of force to restore peace and rectify injustice are strong ones. If critical geopolitics wishes to locate itself explicitly in this school of thought, it will find compelling reasons for doing so and many allies already there. By this process, it will certainly refine and advance the project (of critical geopolitics) with an injection of intellectual rigour. As I have suggested with reference to Toal’s critique of the 1991 US war on Iraq as being about American identity, it could in turn also make an original contribution to thought about the category of just intention.

However, whilst recognising its specific intent, I remain personally unconvinced by just war theory as used either consistently by theorists and jurists, or partially as in critical geopolitics. Critical geopolitics, as I read it, is not simply about exposing the power-knowledge relationships at the heart of geopolitical reasoning, and denaturalising the global order by portraying it as socially and historically constructed through an “examination of the geographical assumptions, designations, and understandings that enter into the making of world politics” and how places and people are stitched together to narrate and explain events. It is all of these, but it is more: a political project committed, as Dalby puts it, to challenging the specifications of politics and dangers used to justify violence. Nonviolence, as a
positive political method and also a vision of peace and justice that explicitly eschews the resort to force, is a project that has only recently begun to be studied and theorised in a systematic manner, and has already yielded many promising results. Personally, like a growing number of people, I am persuaded by the case for a Christian praxis of nonviolence. Geopolitics has a long and bloody history of providing arguments for war – critical geopolitics should reject the temptation to provide more, and place its capabilities and insights in the service of this exciting relatively new and under-resourced project, not just war theory, realism, or militarism. In his history of twentieth-century geopolitical thought, Polelle observed that it “led its believers to be resigned to the necessity of violent international conflict.” It would be deeply ironic if critical geopolitics were to make the same mistake in the twenty-first.

NOTES

12. Ibid., p. 48.
18. Ibid., p. 41.
42. Ibid., p. xx.
44. Witness the absurd position of many liberals in 2003, who held that an invasion of Iraq would be morally justified if the United Nations passed a ‘second resolution’, but not otherwise.
60. Sharp (note 58) p. 82.
68. Ibid.
70. Ibid., p. 5.
74. Ó Tuathail, ‘An Anti-Geopolitical Eye’ (note 72).
82. Ó Tuathail, ‘The Effacement of Place?’ (note 69) p. 17.
83. Ibid., p. 8.
91. Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics (note 73) p. 10.