Towards a geography of peace: pacific geopolitics and evangelical Christian Crusade apologies

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Geographers have been better at studying war than peace. Critical geopolitics in particular has proved adept at uncovering and explicating the circumstances and techniques whereby geopolitical reasoning constructs and reinforces divisions and thus underwrites exclusion, fear and ultimately violence. However, it has been much weaker at exploring the conditions whereby these processes might be reversed. It is thus important that geographers move beyond oppositional critiques and develop the tools to identify and explore transformative possibilities for peace. This is here termed ‘pacific geopolitics’, defined as the study of how ways of thinking geographically about world politics can promote peaceful and mutually enriching human coexistence. This is demonstrated with reference to the Reconciliation Walk, a grassroots US evangelical Christian project that retraced the route of the First Crusade in apology for it. It catalysed a remarkable transformation in its leaders’ geopolitical understandings of Arab–Israeli disputes. This points to the power of intimate geographical knowledge to challenge abstract geopolitical visions, exemplifying the potential contribution of pacific geopolitics.

key words critical geopolitics evangelical Christianity Reconciliation Walk peace religion personal transformation

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Introduction

On 27 November 1095, Pope Urban II preached a sermon to crowds of clergy and laity attending a church council in the French town of Clermont-Ferrand. Calling on Europe to unite and defend itself against Muslim attacks on Christian territory and pilgrims, his speech initiated what became known to history as ‘the First Crusade’. The First Crusade culminated on 15 July 1099, when Jerusalem fell and Jewish and Muslim defenders and residents were massacred.

On 27 November 1995, Christians gathered in Clermont-Ferrand to launch ‘The Reconciliation Walk’ (henceforth ‘RW’). This involved thousands of largely American and European Christians retracing the routes of the First Crusade and apologising to Jews, Eastern Christians and Muslims for the Crusades. Although based in England, the RW was largely a project of the influential US-based global evangelical Christian mission agency, Youth with a Mission (henceforth ‘YWAM’). The RW culminated in Jerusalem on 15 July 1999, when a formal apology was issued to, and received by, Muslim, Orthodox and Jewish leaders in the city.

This juxtaposition of parallel journeys between Clermont-Ferrand and Jerusalem undoubtedly appears bizarre. Nonetheless, an analysis of the RW can open new directions for the study of a vital yet historically neglected theme of geographical inquiry: peace. With few exceptions, geographers have devoted far more attention to the study of war than to peace. For our discipline to play a serious role in addressing the problems wracking 21st-century humanity, it is imperative that this balance be redressed.

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Many fields of geographical inquiry are relevant to the study of peace. This article focuses on one of them, geopolitics. Critical geopolitics has proved adept at uncovering and explicating the circumstances and techniques whereby geopolitical reasoning constructs and reinforces divisions and thus underwrites exclusion, fear and ultimately violence. However, it has been weaker at exploring the conditions whereby these processes might be reversed. It is vital that critical geopolitics moves beyond oppositional stances and develops the tools to identify and explore transformative possibilities for peace. This is here termed ‘pacific geopolitics’, defined as the study of how ways of thinking geographically about world politics can promote peaceful and mutually enriching human coexistence.

This article is based primarily on in-depth interviews with the three key leaders of the RW. It also draws on material from the RW archive, and ethnographic study of ongoing follow-up support meetings where these leaders were joined by former participants. The article claims that the project transformed the geopolitical visions of these leaders. It finds that their former militaristic, pro-Zionist and anti-Muslim assumptions were challenged, stereotypes were questioned, and a remarkable rethinking of the theology of Christian–Muslim relations was occasioned. This is significant because of the importance of YWAM within global evangelical networks. The RW presents a fundamental internal challenge to the mainstream geopolitical vision of the Middle East associated with the politically powerful US ‘Christian Right’. This study thus exemplifies the possibilities for pacific geopolitics.

This research emphasises the power of geographical proximity and intimate interactions to change deeply held worldviews. It thus contributes to the growing literature on the transformative potential of personal encounters in place. However, it advances this discussion by suggesting that it is not simply being in certain places, but rather the ways of being in certain places that is significant. The article stresses that changes were occasioned by the unique mode of comportment and engagement that apology engendered.

The article begins by considering the study of peace in geography, and outlines a project of pacific geopolitics as potentially conducive to the study of peace for geography in general and political geography in particular. The history of evangelical missions is outlined, and YWAM located in that story. It highlights how certain interpretations of prophetic scriptures and an alliance with right-wing US politics moulded geopolitical assumptions about the Arab–Israeli conflicts and the US role in them. The substantive empirical material demonstrates how participation in the RW came to challenge and rework geopolitical visions.

The geography of war and peace

The geography of war . . . and peace?
The establishment of peace has long been a scholarly concern. It engaged Christian theologians from the earliest times (Musto 1986), and was the topic of some of the most memorable European writings from the early modern period (such as Erasmus 1917 [1521]). The 18th century saw the proposition of more concrete schemes for ensuring ‘perpetual peace’ (Saint-Pierre 1714; Kant 1903 [1795]). In the past century, international relations emerged as an academic discipline for which ‘[t]he search for peace was a founding preoccupation’ (Moore et al. 2008, 411). Following the Second World War ‘peace research’ developed as an empirical, comparative science (Jutila et al. 2008, 624).

Geography has lagged behind, in spite of some limited attention in the first half of the last century. The aftermaths of World Wars One and Two occasioned various geographical interventions on post-conflict peace. Typical of these was Taylor’s ‘geopacifics’, which assumed a geographical basis to the problem of war and thus the efficacy of rational managerial geographical interventions for its solution. He advocated the division of Europe into four segments, each with enough natural resources to survive without recourse to war (Taylor 1946, chapter 13). Yet this analysis of Europe’s recent wars was simplistic, eliding the role of ideologies such as nationalism. Crucially, this genre involved no programme of empirical research into how ‘geopacifics’ or its equivalents might be implemented, and it had little lasting impact.

It was rather scholarship in the service of imperialism that had more influence in moulding political geography. Thus, for Halford Mackinder, British imperialism had brought ‘[i]nternal and external peace’ to India (Mackinder 1907, 344), and the coercive threat of the Royal Navy had bought ‘peace’, ‘goodwill’ and ‘friendly’ relations with other states (1905, 138). This illustrates that even when discussing ‘peace’ geography has, as Lacoste (1973) famously put it, long been about warfare.
However these tend to be simple assertions,' imagining alternative ways of organising society. Hope that the project should contribute towards justice for the oppressed, and frequently cite their commitment to normative values, for example Proponents of critical geopolitics invariably stress much the same can be said almost two decades on. For example, O’Loughlin and Heske argued in 1991 that, with few exceptions, geographers had made little effort to develop its most enduring subfields, geopolitics. O’Loughlin’s 1991 volume is entitled, The political geography of conflict and peace, the presences and absences in the opening chapter clearly reveal that it is mostly about war and in fact has little to say about peace (Kliot 1991). This trend has continued. Flint’s (2005a) collection, similarly entitled The geography of war and peace, has eleven chapters in the section ‘geographies of war’, and only three under the parallel ‘geographies of peace’ heading. Most recently, Gregory concludes his article ‘war and peace’ by stating his desire to reposition geography as one of the ‘arts of peace’ (Gregory 2010), but accepts that his ‘emphasis is on peace’ heading. Most recently, Gregory concludes his article ‘war and peace’ by stating his desire to reposition geography as one of the ‘arts of peace’ (Gregory 2010), but accepts that his ‘emphasis is on war’. Indeed, it has much to say about war and resistance to it, but is almost silent on peace.

As geography in general has been better at thinking about war than peace, so too has one of its most enduring subfields, geopolitics. O’Loughlin and Heske argued in 1991 that, with few exceptions, geographers had made little effort to develop what they called ‘a geopolitics of peace’ (1991, 52). Much the same can be said almost two decades on. Proponents of critical geopolitics invariably stress their commitment to normative values, for example justice for the oppressed, and frequently cite their hope that the project should contribute towards imagining alternative ways of organising society. However these tend to be simple assertions, ‘rhetorical gestures’ that are neither elaborated nor rigorously defended (Megoran 2008, 474). These writings contain ‘neither a clear characterisation of a better society nor a specific road map for attaining such an improvement’ (Kelly 2006, 43). Kuus astutely observes that, with its tendency to focus on situations with a clear discontent with the status quo, critical geopolitics has taken a sharp resistance/domination dualism (2008, 259–60).

Kuus’ point is well taken and germane to the argument of this paper. The geographical response to militarist, imperialist and Orientalist geopolitical visions needs to be twofold. Firstly, it demands an exposure of such geopolitical designations, which can be done both by intellectual critique of the ideas themselves and by demonstrating the resistance of activists (Phillips 2009), artists (Gregory forthcoming) and others to them. But as Gregory readily acknowledges, it is naïve to assume that confronting the geopolitical designations that have informed and underwritten divisive politics can easily end such politics and undo its damage. Secondly, therefore, a geography of peace needs to explore in the same detail successful alternatives. It is here that there has been little substantial empirical research. The emphasis on resistance has left a whole raft of potentially useful geopolitical questions unanswered. What is the role of geopolitical discourse in sustaining good relations between states? In what circumstances have geopolitical discourses contributed towards the avoidance, de-escalation or ending of wars? How has geopolitics effected reconciliation?

This lacuna is demonstrated by the dearth of geographical research on the aspect of peacemaking that is the focus of this article, namely apology. From the 1990s onwards, scholars have observed the increased importance of ‘politics of apology’ (Cunningham 1999), meaning the worldwide rise in offers of, or demands for, apologies for perceived historical injustices. So striking is this phenomenon that ours has been dubbed ‘the age of apology’ (Brooks 1999, 3–12). These apologies have been analysed in various ways: as discursive acts (Harris et al. 2006), symbolic rituals (Trouillot 2000) and moral interventions (Gill 2000). Although Weyeneth (2001, 15) has commented on the importance of geography for historical apologies, there has been little geographical engagement with this topic. An important exception is Gooder and Jacobs (2000) on settler apologies to indigenous Australians. In exploring the psychology of apologisers, they shift attention from the effects of apology on inter-group relations to the effects on those delivering the apology. Gooder and Jacobs contend that ways of calling for and giving apologies are important for ‘reconstituting settler subjectivities’ (2000, 232). This article extends their work by showing how delivering the apology reconstituted
the subjectivities of RW leaders. However, whereas Goeder and Jacobs were sceptical about the politics of the process, this article argues that in the RW context it is an example of pacific geopolitics.

Towards pacific geopolitics
What is pacific geopolitics? Geopolitics is here understood, following Ó Tuathail and Agnew, as a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to represent it as a ‘world’ characterised by particular types of places, peoples and dramas. (1992, 192)

Dalby has defined the task of critical geopolitical analysis as being to ‘explicate the implicit or explicit political implications of knowing the world in particular ways’ (2003, 6). Recent (critical) geopolitical analysis in geography has largely sought to expose geopolitical visions as constitutive of violence or of the economic, social, imaginative or political structures that support violence. Pacific geopolitics would seek to extend this oppositional critical geopolitical scholarship by exploring the ways in which spatialising and ordering the world in imaginative geographies can contribute towards more harmonious relations between states and other human groupings. Pacific geopolitics is thus the study of how ways of thinking geographically about international relations can promote peaceful and mutually enriching human coexistence. Whereas critical geopolitics’ focus has been a critique of war, pacific geopolitics would conduct theoretically informed empirical research on peace. Methodologically, it would employ the same techniques that critical geopolitical analysis does: traditionally textual and visual discourse analysis, increasingly augmented by qualitative social science and ethnographic methods.

To clarify the meaning of pacific geopolitics, it is helpful to distinguish it from two cognate pathways of geographical research. The first has already been discussed: critical geopolitics’ oppositional stance of identifying and critiquing militaristic geopolitical designations. The second is scholarship that explores the geography of social movements. This work investigates the geographical and social contexts of protest movements (the ‘terrains of resistance’, in Routledge’s memorable terminology), analysing geographical factors to ‘provide us with important insights into why movements occur where they do’ (Routledge 1994, 559). These movements may or may not produce geopolitical knowledge, but that is not the focus of their enquiry. Miller’s work on anti-nuclear activism in the USA’s Boston area is a geographical example of a social movement study approach to a topic germane to pacific geopolitics. However, the questions he asks about the movements are different. Miller analyses the importance of geography for the success and failure of antinuclear movements in garnering support in different places at different scales, concluding that geography is ‘a fundamental dimension through which all social processes are constituted’ (2000, 172). Pacific geopolitics, on the other hand, considers not the geographical constitution of movements, but how actors such as protest movements, governments, think-tanks and film makers frame geopolitical knowledge in ways that contribute towards more harmonious relations between states and other human groups. Both social movements and oppositional critical geopolitical research may complement pacific geopolitics, and together contribute to a broader geography of peace: but their research questions are different.

The distinction between pacific geopolitics on the one hand, and oppositional critical geopolitics and the geography of social movements on the other, is illustrated by reference to pacific geopolitics’ most promising precursor – Dalby’s late Cold War work on the geopolitics of superpower standoff. His research shows how US ways of thinking about perceived Soviet threats ratcheted up conflict and made a dangerous age even more dangerous (Dalby 1990 1993a). But it also illuminates how a political movement, European Nuclear Disarmament (END), sought to build a community of practice that mobilised different geopolitical visions to work for the removal of the threat of NATO–Warsaw Pact nuclear war from the European continent, and create a new political space of East–West dialogue. Dalby was not primarily interested in the geographical factors behind the mobilisation and success of END, valid though that question is for social movements research. Rather, he explored how END’s ideas challenged dominant geopolitical visions of conflict and division on both sides of the ‘Iron Curtain’ and, crucially, crafted new spaces of interaction. Drawing on historians of the Cold War, Dalby (1993b) argues that Gorbachev’s decision to end the conflict by indicating to Moscow’s allies that it would no longer intervene to direct their political futures was a result of his concluding that the USSR and the capitalist West could co-exist.
without war. This rejection of Lenin’s thinking on the inevitably of military conflict was informed in part by advisers who were influenced by the peace movement.

Dalby’s vital work on the end of the Cold War reminds us that just as geopolitical ideas and practices can contribute towards intensifying antagonism and making war more likely, they can also contribute towards the undoing of those antagonisms and the movement towards more peaceful coexistence. This is the very stuff of pacific geopolitics. An investigation of the RW as articulating and formulating a more pacific alternative to the geopolitical visions of the US Christian Right will illustrate what pacific geopolitics might look like two decades after the end of the Cold War.

**Geopolitical background: ‘the US Christian Right’**

*Geopolitics and religion*

Evangelical Christianity has played a significant role in multiple US imaginations of, and engagements with, the Middle East. The RW emerged from this movement, and sought to challenge and rework many of these understandings. Therefore a brief overview of the intersections between religion, geopolitics and US evangelicalism is crucial to set the context for this research.

Religion is an important aspect of the human geography of the world, shaping the spatial organisation of humanity’s activities (Buttimer 2006, 200–1) and being ‘as disruptive in some cases as it is unifying in others’ (Moodie 1947, 53). Although the importance of religion for geopolitics has increasingly been recognised (Agnew 2006; Dijkink 2006; Sturm 2006; Dittmer 2007; Megoran 2009), their intersection has until recently rarely been explored in any detail. As Sidorov argues, ‘Religion remains one of the most exciting frontiers for further geopolitical research’ (2006, 340).

The importance of subjecting mainstream US and UK Christianity to geopolitical analysis is underlined by the role in US politics of the so-called ‘Christian Right’ (Diamond 1998; Wills 2007). Goldberg describes the Christian Right as ‘the largest and most powerful mass movement in the nation’ (2006, 180), which allegedly (at least in the George W. Bush era) exerts considerable influence on US foreign policy (Martin 1999). Nuance is necessary; not all evangelicals are right wing (Swartz 2008), theological positions do not rigidly map onto particular political positions (Sturm 2008), and the actual foreign policy influence of this movement has been questioned (Croft 2007; Wuthnow 2009, chapter 6). Nonetheless, the RW’s organisers, and many participants, have backgrounds in the evangelical Christian communities associated with the Christian Right, and were informed by the broad positions it frames towards Middle East politics. It is therefore important to identify its historical roots and consider how these inform geopolitical visions.

Central to this history is the early 20th-century theological movement known as ‘fundamentalism’. Marsden (2006, 4) defines it briefly as ‘militantly anti-modernist Protestant evangelicalism’, a reaction against theological liberalism that was gaining ascendency in many US Protestant denominations in the late 19th century. For Sandeen, the Fundamentalist movement was not simply a reaction to liberalism, but was the coalescence of two 19th-century theological trends. These were dispensational premillennialism (see below), and a doctrine of Biblical inerrancy developed by Princeton conservative theologians (Sandeen 1970, chapter 7). After the Second World War fundamentalism co-opted broader segments of US Protestantism. Generally dropping the name ‘fundamentalism’, it spread the influence of conservative evangelicalism within US Protestantism (Harding 2000, 17–19). From the later 1970s under the leadership of preachers such as Jerry Falwell, founder of the ‘Moral Majority’ pressure group, evangelicalism became broadly aligned with the Republican Party (Harding 2000).

*Premillennialist geopolitics*

For geopolitical analysis, the key place of dispensational premillennialism (henceforth ‘premillennialism’) in forging contemporary American evangelicalism is extremely important. Premillennialism is a form of apocalypticism, the latter being ‘broadly described as the belief that God has revealed the imminent end of the ongoing struggle between good and evil in history’ (Collins et al. 2000, ix). Apocalypticism was important to the early Christian communities (Gray 2007, 4–7), but the modern theological system of premillennialism was developed in Britain in the first half of the 19th-century by John Nelson Darby. Darby divided history up into a series of ‘dispensations’ marked by different divine–human interactions. He posited that God had different dealings with the Christian church and with the nation of Israel (the Jews), and that at the end of the present dispensation the
church would be ‘raptured’, or safely removed to heaven in an instant. Thereupon great tribulation (including war, famine and disease) would befall the earth, before the final salvation of Israel and Christ’s return (Boyer 1992, chapter 3; Weber 1987, 1–23). By the 1970s, premillennialism was firmly entrenched in the USA as the prevalent evangelical end-times doctrine.

The contemporary geopolitical implications of this theology are very significant. Premillennialists had long predicted a specific ‘ingathering’ of Jews in Palestine. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 ‘gave premillennialism a new lease on life and brought it more credibility and visibility than ever’ (Weber 1987, 203). Just as in the early 20th century when the millenarian movement ‘played a significant role in preparing the British for political Zionism’ (Sandeen 1970, 11–12), so US premillennialism was readily translated by the emerging Christian Right into political support of the state of Israel (Clark 2007, chapters 1–6; Sizer 2004, chapter 1). It has led to the condition whereby ‘the vast majority of [US] evangelicals instinctively believe that vigorous support for Israel is the only appropriate response to the conflicts in the Middle East’ (Burge 2003, 236). Thus, for example, Mike Evans, President of ‘Lovers of Israel’, a US ‘evangelical intercessory organisation, committed to encouraging our nation to stand with Israel’ (Evans 1981, 222), argues US support of Israel will ensure divine blessing and is thus ‘America’s key to survival’. Unsurprisingly, premillennialists view ‘the native Arab population in generally negative terms’, rarely calling for their equal treatment (Weber 1987, 206–7). The attitude of this ‘Christian Zionism’ towards Muslims is part of a wider geopolitical vision that is antagonistic towards Muslims. Thus, for popular US theologian Don Carson, the ‘war on terror’ is a ‘civilisational struggle between the world of Islam and the West’ (Carson 2002, chapter 4).

Christian Zionism translates into substantial financial support from US churches for settler movements in the Palestinian occupied territories. Politically, it has also bolstered the ‘Israel lobby’ that has influenced successive US governments to support the state of Israel in its conflicts with Arab states and the Palestinian populations (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006). As Mead (2008) and McAlister (2001, chapter 4) remind us, premillennialism is not the sole explanation of US affinities with Israel. But its political importance has nonetheless been recognised by Israel which, in 1980, awarded Jerry Falwell, one of the leaders of the Christian Zionist movement, the Jabotinsky Award for Service to the Cause of Israel (Burge 2003, 240). ‘In short’, conclude Ruether and Ruether, Christian fundamentalist support for Israel is not simply a matter of apocalyptic theories; it is a matter of garnering major economic and political support behind an expansionist vision of the State of Israel. (2002, 182)

The geopolitical impact of US premillennialism is an example of the central assumption of geopolitical study: the views we hold about the world have real impacts upon the way we act in it. Having identified the most common geopolitical implications of US evangelism in regard to the Arab–Israeli conflicts, this paper will now consider the ways in which the RW contested this geopolitical vision and moved towards an alternative one.

The geopolitics of the Reconciliation Walk

Researching the Reconciliation Walk

This research on the RW as a potential example of ‘pacific geopolitics’ has been conducted using three methods. Ethnographic participant observation (Herbert 2000; Megoran 2006) was used to study four RW feedback and prayer support meetings at the organisation’s Harpenden headquarters between 2005 and 2009. To ensure that this was overt (rather than covert) ethnography, I was introduced as a researcher. Secondly, the RW gave me access to its archives of internal correspondence, promotional material and press reports, going back to the early 1990s. Thirdly, I conducted interviews with the three people who were chiefly responsible for initiating and organising the RW. My rough interview schemas were constructed with reference to the archives which I consulted first. The interviews were long, for example that with Cathy Nobles taking place during different sessions over three days. As a Christian (albeit one with no decided end-times theology), I was able to establish a rapport with my informants: indeed, I do not imagine how I could have conducted participant observation were I uncomfortable with the prayer meeting format.2

This article is largely an analysis of the interviews and of the contributions made to the support meetings by the interviewees. This relatively narrow, elite focus is appropriate for two reasons.

Towards a geography of peace
Firstly, it enables a detailed study of the geopolitics of the genesis and development of the project. Secondly, as shown previously, theological ideas of ‘the American Christian Right’ have moulded particular geopolitical worldviews, which have in turn informed and influenced US foreign policy. The two main organisers of the project play important roles in YWAM, a highly significant agency within US and world evangelicalism. The geopolitical views of these individuals are thus important because they have the potential to affect the views and practices of significant numbers of highly active members of a politically important constituency.

**YWAM and ‘third wave’ evangelical missions**

To appreciate the geopolitical significance of the RW, and understand its genesis, it is necessary to locate it within its parent organisation, YWAM. Although registered in the UK as an independent organisation, the RW is largely a project of the evangelical mission agency, Youth with a Mission (YWAM). Indeed, its UK office is based at one of YWAM’s UK ‘bases’, in Harpenden, and most of the people involved in leadership roles within it are full-time YWAM staff. A brief outline of the historical development of US missions is therefore important to understand the context in which the RW emerged.

Missionary activity is as old as Christianity itself, but Tiplady (2003, 109–10) has identified three ‘waves’ of modern Protestant mission. The first was 18th-century denominational missions such the Baptist Missionary Society. The second was the 19th-century interdenominational ‘faith missions’ that sent laymen and women to areas made newly accessible by European and US imperial and commercial expansion. There exists a rich scholarly literature on particularly this second wave (Stanley 1996, as Brian Stanley, one of the leading historians of mission, said, ‘By and large, the scholars haven’t got round to serious analysis of these third-generation evangelical missions’).³

As ‘a mission aimed at sending out large numbers of young people for shorter and longer periods’ (Randall 2008, 5), YWAM is one such third-wave mission. It was founded by an American evangelical, Loren Cunningham, who began leading groups of young people on short-term mission trips to the Bahamas in the 1950s (Cunningham and Rogers 1984). In 1960 he established YWAM as an interdenominational mission agency aiming to ‘know God and to make Him known’ (Youth with a Mission 2009). With ‘900 operating locations in over 160 nations, and more than 17,500 full-time staff’, as well as training 19 000 people for short-term mission annually, it claims to be ‘one of the largest missionary organisations in the world’ (Youth with a Mission, England 2009). YWAM England was founded in 1971 by Lynn Green (an American), to facilitate ‘a new wave of British missionaries going out across the world with the love of Jesus’ (Youth with a Mission, England 2009). Like the leaders, young people come to Harpenden from largely evangelical churches all around the world (global North and South), and are sent out all around the world. Thus whilst located in the UK, the Harpenden base and the YWAM operations it conducts are very much ‘global’, and at the same time closely tied to the US through the influence of key American leaders on the base. Martin’s description of the modern US ‘evangelical expansion’ as ‘closely related to the emergence of a global society’ (Martin 2004, 273), aptly applies to YWAM.

**Reconciliation Walk – genesis**

According to its original promotional literature, the RW was designed to ‘make a major contribution to peace between the peoples of Christianity, Islam and Judaism’ (Reconciliation Walk nd). A particularly important recruitment booklet produced in 1996 argues that ‘the tap root’ to mutual distrust and conflict between these people ‘can be found in events which took place nearly 900 years ago’, the Crusades, whose epitaph was ‘a deep mutual hatred’ (Reconciliation Walk 1996, 2–4). Arguing that this was the exact opposite of the New
Testament injunction to ‘Love your enemies’, the Crusaders distorted and damaged the reputation of Christ, so the RW would be an opportunity to ‘repair this damage’ and ‘express remorse’. To do this, it would bring Christians face-to-face with Muslims, Jews and Orthodox Christians with a simple message of regret and confession … in an attitude of reconciliation, without a trace of the arrogant spirit that characterised the Crusades. (Reconciliation Walk 1996, 9)

An important cognate idea was that ‘defusing’ this legacy would remove an obstacle to the conversion of Muslims to Christianity, as one RW leader put it, removing barriers ‘between the Islamic world and evangelism’ (Cathy Nobles, interview Harpenden 4 August 2006). The genesis of the RW appears to be traceable to a small number of individuals working for evangelical Christian mission agencies in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These were principally Lynn Green, currently the International Chairman ofYWAM, and Matthew Hand of the US Lutheran Orient Mission Society (Interviews with Lynn Green 5 August 2006 and Matthew Hand 28 November 2006, both atYWAM, Highfield Oval, Harpenden). It was a highly geographical project from its inception. For example, the third significant individual, Cathy Nobles, whilst working as a schoolteacher in Texas, recounts that she was at a Christian conference in California and prayerfully seeking divine guidance for her future life direction, when, as she puts it:

I saw a picture in my head of Europe, the Middle East, North Africa – a map – with a finger starting here, at Lake Geneva, drawing a line across Europe, eventually into the Middle East, and ending in Jerusalem. (Interview, 3 August 2006)

As a result she joinedYWAM, and in 1992–93 was working for the organisation at one of its operations bases in Lausanne, Switzerland. She recounts that one day she was leafing through maps in an old atlas when:

I turned the page, and saw another one, and thought ‘wait a minute, this is the map that I saw in my head!’ [in California] – and it was a map of the First Crusade! (Interview, 3 August 2006)

Soon after this she heard Lynn Green speak at aYWAM meeting about his vision for the RW, and they eventually came to work together. Cathy Nobles trialled the delivery of the apology in Turkey and subsequently based herself in Istanbul, Beirut and finally Jerusalem for the practical implementation of the RW (Interview, 3 August 2006).

Outline of the Reconciliation Walk
The RW was officially launched with a day of prayer in Clermont-Ferrand on 27 November 1995, 900 years to the day when Pope Urban II called, in the same place, for what would become known as the First Crusade. In the spring of 1996, a few small groups of walkers retraced Crusader routes along the Rhine and Danube and via Italy and the Balkans, praying for peace and reconciliation and focusing on presenting an apology (see note 1) to Jewish communities, the first targets of the Crusaders. In the summer of 1996, the initial teams began to arrive in Istanbul. From then on, greater numbers of larger teams joined the RW for often short periods of time (two weeks). Following an induction, teams then fanned out across different parts of Turkey, meeting people en route in public spaces such as cafes, shops and parks, and being invited to homes. At the same time, leaders and teams held official meetings with religious and civic leaders, when framed copies of the apology were presented and discussions held in well-publicised meetings that attracted sometimes significant media coverage. The walk then continued down the Levant through Syria, Lebanon and to Israel/Palestine. A similar format was followed in these countries. Around 3000 people from over 30 countries took part in the RW, from a variety of Protestant denominations. The majority of participants were US and British citizens.

Post-1999, under the name, ‘The Reconciliation Walk … The Journey Continues’, the project has continued to undertake a number of activities. Building on relationships formed up to 1999, it takes groups of largely British and American Christians to Lebanon and Israel/Palestine, where they meet Christians, Jews and Muslims, and receive teaching about reconciliation.

The RW was a project with great sensitivity to geography. Following the exact routes that Crusaders took, and reaching places on the anniversary of their arrival, was considered a vital aspect of the historical authenticity of the project. As we saw for Cathy Nobles, visual spiritual cartography was crucial to her participation in and development of the project. Although it was not conceived as a geopolitical project, as the next sections will show, however, it was to become profoundly geopolitical. Because critical geopolitical theory stresses the
importance of discursive constructions of visions of global space, this article will explore the impact of the RW on the geopolitical visions of those doing the apoloising.

A previous section identified two geopolitical implications of the theological position of the US Christian Right: support of the state of Israel, and antipathy to Muslims. The remaining sections will examine how the RW came to question these positions and articulate alternatives.

The Reconciliation Walk and Israel

Those interviewed all spoke about having more-or-less developed Christian Zionist backgrounds, which they had come to re-evaluate and reject before and during participation in the RW. As a younger woman Cathy Nobles was influenced by her Christian Zionist pastor (interview, 3 August 2006). She said that she shared the theology of her brother, a pastor trained at Dallas Theological Seminary, described by Weber (1987, 238) as ‘[t]he center of institutional dispensationalism’.

Matthew Hand had a church background that was less explicitly Zionist, in that he said he did not have ‘any specific sort of theory as to Israel and the end times’, and that he did not have any great interest in this subject. Nonetheless, he went on:

I’d still grown up in a typical American evangelical cultural setting, where Israel was assumed to be essentially the church. I mean as a child growing up I would not have understood the difference … and I think that’s true widely in America, because you just naturally feel from all that’s transmitted to you through the church culture that Israel is us and we are there and there’s a natural sense of affinity and solidarity. (Interview, 28 November 2006)

Thus the RW leaders came from Christian Zionist backgrounds, a tradition that they came to question and reject, to the extent that Lynn Green says ‘I now see this end times theology as heresy’ (comment, RW support meeting, 6 August 2006). Whence this change? Four reasons can be identified.

Firstly, Cathy Nobles explained it in terms of divine leading of YWAM as a whole. As she put it:

we had a word from the Lord in Egypt, early 90s, that you’re only one eyed in the Middle East, and you need to be two-eyed, love both the Jew and the Arab. (Interview, 4 August 2006)

By ‘word from the Lord’ she meant an instance of divine communication of a specific message. This message was interpreted as a divine rebuke of a Christian Zionist world view that was pervasive at the time.

Secondly, reflection on the consequences of the premillennial Christian Zionist position contributed to a process of questioning it. At a RW support meeting (6 August 2006), Lynn Green said that although he had grown up with ‘this end time prophecy belief’, he had given no thought to the hardship and death that would accompany this scenario. As one anonymous participant in the meeting put it in response to this:

Yes, we were taught to pray and rejoice in the return of Jesus to the land, even though we thought that this would involve a big battle. It was uncaring.

A third factor was historical study of the Crusades. For Matthew Hand, this was prompted by the frequent reference to them he encountered amongst Turks. He came to read, in Turkish translation, the works of Matthew of Edessa, a 12th-century Christian leader. Matthew of Edessa, Matthew Hand told me, read these events through the eyes of apocalyptic prophecy, specifically connecting political events and natural disasters of the time to Biblical prophecy. Matthew Hand commented that this was

the most intriguing thing I read, because it started getting me thinking about the apocalyptic mindset, which I discovered was not just Matthew’s, it was the whole Christian world at this time, and that is the context for the Crusades [pause] demonisation, these people as representatives of evil one, Gog and Magog, I mean, what better reason could you come up with to kill someone? And I thought this had tremendous resonance with today, Israeli politics and so on. (Interview, 28 November 2006)

But, fourthly, the fact that all three interviewees dwelt the longest on was the impact of actually meeting people in the Middle East. Cathy Nobles cited the example of a 2006 ‘RW follow-up trip composed of mostly Zionist-type Christians from the US, UK and elsewhere’ she had taken to Israel/Palestine. They began the trip on the city wall in East Jerusalem, and suddenly came across a group of angry Palestinian teenagers chanting and shouting. It transpired that an Israeli air-raid had hit the wrong target, massacring many families in Gaza. The Israeli authorities arrived and, without even attempting to calm down or disperse the crowd peacefully, began beating and arresting them. Cathy Nobles relayed that the visitors were shocked to see the actions of the state they
supported (Cathy Nobles, conversation, Harpenden, 11 November 2006).

The importance of face-to-face meetings with local people in transforming views was also stressed by Lynn Green. I asked him whether, bearing in mind how critically he spoke of Christian Zionism, there was a political goal to the RW (i.e. of changing these views). He replied that he didn’t think they ‘set out with any kind of political goal’, but that they became aware from their own experiences that meeting people face-to-face and ‘humbling ourselves and taking a message of apology over something that is such an open wound amongst these peoples’ changes people in a way that ‘will always have political implications’. These implications were that those who went on the walk ‘would be much more reticent about supporting militaristic action, for the expansion of the borders of Israel, for example’, whereas previous to their participation he thought that many would have had ‘no qualms’ about that:

Once you know the people, and they are people instead of images on the television screen, it does change your politics. That’s the tragedy, isn’t it, you know that often times the people making the decisions, the people who wield the power, don’t actually know the people that they are deciding about as people, they know them as images on the television screen, strategic objectives in some sort of geopolitical scenario. (Interview, 5 August 2006)

By bringing British and American Christians into contact with those suffering as a result of Christian Zionism, the RW sought to transform the theological and thus geopolitical visions of those taking part. As the next section shows, this was the case not only with regard to Israel, but also Islam and Muslims.

The Reconciliation Walk and Muslims
Just as participation in the RW transformed its leaders’ theological understandings and thus geopolitical visions towards Israel, so it shifted their positions towards Muslims. Crucial to this shift was the impact of meeting Muslims in the context of apologising to them. In many cases, this was the simple overcoming of prejudices and stereotypes by folk whom participants would instinctively have been afraid of. For example, Cathy Nobles spoke about her fears of meeting and giving the apology to a ‘rough guy, head of a fundamentalist, reactionary group’ in Beirut. She was surprised that not only did he ‘not look fundamentalist’, but was ‘sweet, welcoming, loving’. On a different occasion she was hosted to a sumptuous breakfast by Istanbul’s deputy mayor. She was struck by his suggestion that Christians and Muslims were on the same side facing overlapping moral concerns, such as pornography and secularisation (interview, 4 August 2006).

More striking than simply the realisation that Muslims who appear frightening may in fact be pleasant and personable, or the identification of common perspectives on social morality, was an appreciation of the spirituality of Muslims. This was more disconcerting for those involved. Cathy Nobles spoke about ‘meeting very godly Muslims’, people who

as far as works of godliness are far exceeding us, in their understanding of God, in the way that they treated their neighbour, you just had to envy and marvel at what they knew. (Interview, 4 August 2006)

This raised some uncomfortable questions for her, challenging her preconception that ‘they know nothing and I bring everything to the table’. It led her to a theological position that she identifies as ‘the openness of God’, that if the Holy Spirit is working in all the world, then ‘you should be finding truth in other cultures’. Lynn Green recounted a similar transformation. He described his pre-RW perspective as one of ‘Western superiority’, the

unconscious thinking was that God was at work amongst us, and outside of us it was kind of like a vacuum, a spiritual vacuum, and people were out there sitting in total darkness, and they had no understanding of God, or what understanding they had was heretical. (Interview, 5 August 2006)

He said that meeting Muslim groups in Turkey such as the Alevi and Mevlana, and learning of many more where ‘the fundamental message of Jesus has been proclaimed, that God is love, and we’re called to love our neighbour’, he saw so much evidence that the Holy Spirit was already at work. He professed to have read many books on this theology, ‘but the penny never dropped’, and what he found was ‘totally unexpected’ – ‘a sort of spiritual communion with some Muslims’. He underlined how unexpected and disconcerting this was for him, by adding to his previous quote that ‘even saying those words I realise that I’m going to be branded a heretic by a number of Western Christians, but there it is’.
Cathy Nobles did not understand this merely as human interaction, but as God speaking to her through it. Through these experiences, she concluded that:

God confronted me that in falling in love with the Jews, that I had hatred for the Muslims and [unclear], and I heard God speak to me that ‘I am in love with these people, I am passionate about these people’.

The implication of this for Cathy Nobles was that if God loved Muslims, she ought to too, but had not done so.

There were geopolitical as well as theological implications of this shift. RW leaders spoke about their desire to challenge visions of global space that pitted the West/Christianity against an Islam that they perceived to be dangerous. Lynn Green said that he had been increasingly dismayed at the tendency in the American Christian press for some of the best known spokespersons to go right along with the secular media perspective of casting Islam as the enemy, and not coming to grips with love of enemies, forgiveness, and getting the idol of nationalism in its proper place. (Interview, 5 August 2006)

Based on her experiences in Turkey, and listening to Turkish recipients of the apology, Cathy Nobles said she became aware that ‘we have carried prejudice towards Turks’, and ‘this whole image of a Christian Europe up against Turkey, two empires colliding, it really doesn’t have a whole lot to do with Jesus’ (interview, 3 August 2006).

Matthew Hand spoke at length about his response to President Bush’s infamous 2001 remark about his ‘war on terror’ being a ‘Crusade’ (Ford 2001). He said that he thought it ‘revealed the default cultural mentality’, and undid the work of apology that the RW had done. In response, the RW organised a symposium in Beirut in 2002 in which representatives of 32 branches of Islam were present, as well as Christian leaders, to discuss the comments, and that a consensus emerged that the USA was very wrong to think in terms of Christianity against Islam common within American evangelicalism. They questioned those geopolitical visions that posited clashing civilisations or re-enacted crusades. They created spaces for more peaceful and transformative interactions with Muslims. This is remarkable enough, but as we shall see in the next section, the RW did not only contribute to changes in views on Islam. It also led to changed understandings of evangelicalism’s nature and its role in the Middle East.

**The Reconciliation Walk and US evangelicalism**

The RW challenged deeply held US evangelical views about Israel and Muslims. At the same time, it transformed understandings of Christianity and Christian mission. It began by seeing the Crusades as a discreet historical episode whose spiritual legacy could be ‘defused’. However, according to interviewees, recipients often expressed thanks for the apology but at the same time pointed to ongoing perceived Western and Christian injustices. Thus the RW leaders came to see the Crusades as emblematic of a ‘Crusader spirit’ of arrogant superiority that infects subsequent Christianity (and Westernism) down to and including contemporary evangelicalism. Cathy Nobles told me that she frequently observed participants going through RW training and then presenting the message, who came to realise (as Cathy Nobles herself had) that ‘I had a lot of Crusader in me and the way I live my faith.’ This ‘Crusader spirit’ comes into any place that we’ve got Manifest Destiny going, with the Northern Irish and the Scots feeling its their promised land, South Africans felt like that with their promised land, America is the promised land, so there’s that same ethos. I still think that’s the over-riding spirit we need to get out of the church. (interview, 3 August 2006)

The reference to ‘Manifest Destiny’ in the US context is clearly geopolitical, indexing the idea that the US has a unique, divinely endowed destiny that justifies – or rather demands – power projection outside its own borders. Lynn Green observes that there is still a great big chunk of, especially US American evangelicalism, that is just so firmly and closely identified with conservative politics there, including a deep belief in the efficacy of redemptive violence, and the idea that a lot of problems in the world can be solved militarily. (Interview, 5 August 2006)

He describes this as being generally seen as part of the ‘whole package’ of being an evangelical
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Christian, that if someone ‘holds steadfastly to the basics of the evangelical faith’ they ought naturally to hold to this right-wing conservative political position, and cannot understand why ‘you don’t cheer when the US military goes to war’. He reported that ‘I’m just no longer convinced’ by the idea that this conservative theological position should be wedded to the right-wing position on foreign policy, concluding that ‘it’s not a whole package’. He explained that through involvement in the RW he had come to realise that about US evangelicalism and reject it (interview 5 August 2006).

This would appear to be the chief impact of the RW on the understanding of Christianity itself by Lynn Green and Cathy Nobles – that reconciliation ‘is the core of the gospel’ (interview, 4 August 2006). This understanding leads her as an American Christian to see an important Christian task as being ‘to challenge power and weaponry in the age we’re living in’. In relation to the ‘war on terror’, it means ‘to get people, instead of being reactionary against Islam’ to ask

‘why is this happening?’, are we asking the right question of why these people [the 9/11 attackers] feel so passionately about why they kill themselves, and attack us in this way, and is there something that we can change, especially as Christians. (Interview, 4 August 2006)

This is a significant movement away from the geopolitical perspective that sees the USA as a righteous innocent violated by a pathologically evil world of Islam, a USA that Christians should back as it responds with military force and increased support of the state of Israel. Such a geopolitical disposition has increasingly come to be questioned and critiqued by evangelicals (Burge 2003; Chapman 2004; Wallis 2005). As Lynn Green put it to my question about how involvement in the RW changed him and his understanding of God, ‘it changed me in that I began to see the gospel completely differently’ (interview, 5 August 2006).

This change even extended as far as the nature of missionary evangelism: that ‘expressing the heart of Jesus’ is done primarily through seeking reconciliation. It is, said Lynn Green, ‘good news’ (the literal translation of the Greek word ‘gospel’) for people when we go to them and

apologise for the sins of our forefathers, and indeed our own sins, for our cultural, political, or tribal or linguistic superiority [. . .] our pride which stereotypes [them]. (Interview, 5 August 2006)

Significantly, this transformation of understanding on the part of RW leaders was one they wished to see extended into the broader evangelical community. Indeed, they claimed that this was already occurring because of the RW. Cathy Nobles explicitly stated that, in the course of time, the RW changed from being a way to remove the obstacles to conversion, to becoming ‘intentional’ in changing people’s theology (and geopolitics). Lynn Green located the RW as playing a role in a broader transformation of evangelicalism. As he put it when I asked him at the end of our interview if he wanted to add anything:

we have made our contribution to the process of broadening the evangelical understanding of the gospel. I also think that there has been this shift taking place in the church in the past four years that is huge [. . .] I really believe that the peace and reconciliation aspects of the gospel are part of that shift, a major theological sea change, part of it is evangelical churches getting involved again in social issues [. . .] and I think the RW may claim a contribution to that. (Interview, 5 August 2006)

Transforming participation?

This research concludes that participation in the Reconciliation Walk occasioned significant shifts in the geopolitical visions of its leaders. What began as a tactic to facilitate conversion led to a wholesale rejection of a theology of Christian Zionism and its associated right-wing foreign policy agenda. It also precipitated movement towards a very different theology and practice of engagement with Muslims. Due to the influence of these people within US evangelicalism, this potentially has significant broader implications – particularly as they have identified spreading the lessons of the RW within the movement as a key ongoing goal.

Three objections can be anticipated to these conclusions. The first is scepticism that an organisation such asYWAM would so reconsider its views on mission to Muslims. Admittedly, the transformations described relate to a relatively small number of people – albeit influential ones – withinYWAM. On the other hand, such change would not be unprecedented. In over-viewing the relationship between the history of Christian missionary activity in the Middle East and imperialism, Tejiran and Simon conclude that:

the motivation of the missionaries can be seen to have shifted over time from a desire to pursue good works for the purpose of conversion to a commitment to serve
I suggest that the RW is an analogous contemporary example of missionary activity in the same region. Holloway (2006) has argued that emotional and corporeal practices in specific spaces are key elements in the production of religious identities. A research agenda not open to the possibility of genuine transformation through geographical experience would be a blinkered and poorer one.

This leads to the second potential objection: can ‘being there’ really precipitate such transformation? These conclusions are not without precedent. An obvious counterpart is Gerhardt’s work on US evangelical engagement with the issue of civil war in Sudan. Gerhardt suggests that US evangelicals moved from a ‘hard-line’ position of seeing the Khartoum regime as an implacable enemy of the church (even calling on the US to bomb it), to a position of lobbying the US government for engagement with it. This contributed to the signing of a peace deal with (largely Christian) rebels in the South. Gerhardt (2008, 914) contends that this transformation in geopolitical vision occurred through personal engagement with Sudan, concluding that ‘exposure to local geographies fosters care’. Gerhardt theorises a ‘translocation of care’, whereby evangelicals much affected by personal trips to Sudan used existing networks to inform US evangelical constituencies, a translocation of experiences that eventually contributed towards policy changes (2008, 923–4).

Gerhardt’s arguments about on-the-ground engagement challenging right-wing presuppositions through a ‘translocation of care’ are paralleled with the RW. However, Gerhardt is curiously quiet about how the evangelicals he studied actually engaged with people in Sudan. This research advances Gerhardt’s work by spotlighting the mode of comportment with which the RW participants met people, ‘approaching them in the right light’ as Cathy Nobles put it. RW training emphasised listening and not arguing; not attempting to hand out tracts or proselytise or debate US foreign policy, etc. Participants were sent out into towns and villages without knowing the language or with the benefit of translators, taking only a written copy of the apology in the local language. Cathy Nobles described the approach as deliberately making Reconciliation Walkers ‘vulnerable’ to those they were encountering, in direct contradistinction to common western/Christian attitudes of superiority. It seems that approaching Muslims with an apology, which could be accepted or rejected, was an opening gambit that peculiarly lent itself to producing spaces whereby mutual understandings could be changed. For example, recipients would not simply say ‘thank you’, but raise unanticipated questions such as perceived ongoing injustices. As Lynn Green put it, going with an apology is a good antidote to the ‘western superiority’ he identified in US and UK Christianity:

When a missionary goes into a place with the mindset which says, ‘these poor people need what I have’, there’s a different spirit than the meek, broken, humble, mourning spirit that Jesus describes in his central teaching. When we go with this humility thing and seek to remove the barriers, you see people’s hearts. (Interview, 5 August 2006)

Lynn Green had been working for two decades in the Middle East, and was no stranger to encounters with Muslims. But the RW’s humbler form of engagement led him to a strikingly different type of interaction: ‘suddenly I saw people instead of objects of my evangelistic ambitions. I made friends, instead of having just conversations’. The CASE Collective (2008, 446) suggest that ‘personal encounters’ may be more effective in transforming conceptions of the world than intellectual arguments. This is not universally true: meeting people with the attitude that ‘I am right and you are wrong’ is unlikely to engender such transformation. Geographical research should thus pay particular attention to the ways in which being in certain places with certain people open or close the possibilities for transformative encounters.

A third concern is the question of whether these apparent epiphanies endure when back in familiar places and routines. Further research is planned to ascertain how many of the 3000 participants were affected in lasting ways, but that is beyond the scope of this article. For the organisers interviewed, the ongoing impact is clear. But ethnographic studies of support meetings suggest that the RW engendered a lasting commitment to reconciliation for at least some of the other participants. In one meeting, participants openly confessed and repented of their ongoing prejudicial attitudes to Muslims (RW support meeting, 6 August 2006). At another meeting, participants discussed their hopes for the future of Middle East peace in the Obama period, and reported back on reconciliation/inter-faith projects...
they had become involved with in Britain, Palestine/Israel and elsewhere. Current events were discussed: concern was expressed over the reporting of the trial of alleged Islamist bomb-plotters in Britain, and the jubilant tone struck by the ‘Coalition’ over the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the brutal head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (RW support meeting, 5 April 2008). ‘We know that you sorrow at a life that brought such destruction’, prayed Cathy Nobles as discussion of the latter topic moved to prayer (RW support meeting, 19 June 2006). This demonstrates that the RW – at least for some past participants and organisers – was not simply a one-off experience, but became a significant part of subsequent biographies. These biographies include personal inter-faith activism, critical prayerful self-reflection on global politics, and strategic attempts to reposition US evangelicalism away from the geopolitical agendas advocated by the Christian Right. It is, I suggest, an example of the ‘pacific geopolitics’ that this article has advocated.

Conclusion

Geographers have been much better at researching war than peace. It is vital that we develop tools to identify and explore transformative possibilities for peace. I have suggested one approach to this task, which I term ‘pacific geopolitics’. This is defined as the study of how ways of thinking geographically about world politics can promote peaceful and mutually enriching human coexistence.

In the case presented above, deeply entrenched geopolitical understandings held by US evangelical missionaries were transformed through the act of apologising for the crusades. Although this study is no doubt unique in certain ways, it nonetheless points towards the importance of carefully exploring the ways in which particular types of engagement with people in place can impact geopolitical understandings. The case is significant because it is part of a broader process within evangelicalism of questioning assumptions about its political commitments.

Agnew calls for ‘proponents of non-violent approaches to resolve the fundamental conflicts that will undoubtedly continue to wrack humanity’ (2001, 87). Projects such as the Reconciliation Walk are worth geographical study because, against the grain, they offer resources to envisage such approaches. I agree with Flint when he advocates that analysis of the ‘quiet successes,’ everyday settings where humanity nurtures mutual respect and interaction, should become the focus of attention, rather than being obscured by concentration upon warfare. (2005b, 13)

The project of pacific geopolitics as outlined and exampled here is offered as one productive approach for just such geographical enquiry.

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Notes

1 The text of the apology is available at the RW’s website: http://www.crusades-apology.org/Crusades%20Project/turkpres.htm (accessed December 2009).
2 For more on the author’s position as a geographer and a Christian, see Megoran (2004).
4 Critical Approaches to Security in Europe – a group of scholars attempting to advance a new agenda for security studies.
5 Ethnographic work conducted before, during and after a RW prayer/support meeting, YWAM Harpenden Oval, 20 June 2009.

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