Since the end of the Soviet Union, many foreign policy intellectuals have peculiarly identified the Republic of Uzbekistan as the locus of Mackinder’s 1904 ‘pivot’ designation. A century on from his original ‘Geographical pivot of history’ lecture, this paper examines the work of a Russian, an Uzbek, and an American who use Mackinder to understand contemporary Uzbekistani geopolitical orientations, in particular with reference to the USA. Drawing on critical work on the history of geopolitics, it highlights that whilst these texts claim objectivity, they betray political and subjective foreign policy choices. It suggests that whilst the revival of interest in Mackinder testifies to the continued attraction of his ideas, this has, with rare exceptions, been based upon a superficial reading of both his work and the body of secondary literature, and that this raises both disciplinary and ethical concerns.

KEY WORDS: Uzbekistan, Mackinder, critical geopolitics

The editor of a recent book on security and foreign policy issues in Central Asia and the Caucasus introduced it by stating that Sir Halford Mackinder’s 1904 identification of this region as the key to world geopolitics is an apt characterization of twenty-first century reality. He implied that this was reason enough to study it (Jones 2000). Mackinder was not referred to again. What is striking is that, whereas geographers have produced much work in the past two decades exploring and critiquing Mackinder’s geopolitics, Jones simply took him as a premise. This is not unusual in contemporary writing on Central Asia, and Uzbekistan in particular, which has witnessed a remarkable revival in interest in Mackinder’s theory since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

This paper explores this phenomenon further and investigates the reception of Mackinder a century on, in one corner of his ‘pivot’. It examines the work of an Uzbek, a Russian and an American as it seeks to demarcate their respective understandings of Mackinder as well as their conclusions regarding his application to foreign policy today. The paper pays particular attention to the strategic partnership that has emerged between the United States and Uzbekistan since the US invasion of Taliban-run Afghanistan from Uzbekistan’s territory in autumn 2001.

Revisiting Central Asia with Mackinder

In January 1904 Sir Halford Mackinder delivered an elegantly crafted lecture to the Royal Geographical Society that was to become his best-known publication. According to Mackinder, the impact on Europe of successive population movements over ‘Euro-Asia’ demonstrates that this region is the pivot on which world history turns. In the industrial age, the natural resources of this great pivot are so vast that in time the state that controls them will develop into an economic superpower and be well placed to become ‘the empire of the world’ (Mackinder 1904, 433). For Mackinder, who saw the powers best placed to exploit this resource (Russia, Germany, and China) as inimical to the democratic freedoms represented by Britain, this was an alarming prospect, and one that British foreign policy ought to aim to counter.
In order to assess the way in which Mackinder’s ideas have influenced writing on Central Asia, it is necessary to define the region in question. The four million square kilometres bordered by the Caspian Sea in the west, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan to the south, the Taklamakan desert in the east, and Siberian Russia to the north are commonly termed ‘Central Asia’ in recent literature (Polat 2002), of which they have generated a great deal since the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, this has not always been the case: Lewis and Wigen observe how these lands have frequently been occluded from the gaze of Europeans, who have not consistently conceived of them as a single region (Lewis and Wigen 1997). Indeed, although including them in all three iterations of his heartland thesis (1904 1919 1943), Mackinder himself did not single them out for particular significance. In the 1904 paper ‘The geographical pivot of history’, presented to the Royal Geographical Society (henceforth Pivot), Mackinder projects the ‘Heart-land’ east of the Ural mountains as largely undifferentiated, ‘unknown recesses of Europe’ and ‘vacant space’, through which swept a ‘cloud of ruthless and idealess horsemen’ (Mackinder 1904, 427). Whilst the term ‘Central Asia’ is mentioned in passing, its geographical extent is unclear and no special significance is attached to it. His 1919 and 1943 re-workings were, understandably, preoccupied with the core sites of the two World Wars and their aftermaths. Nonetheless, the Pivot paper has been of particular interest to Central Asianists, and has been claimed as the only major theory articulated using Central Asian source material (Schoeberlein 1999).

In 1990 Hauner remarked that ‘revisiting the heartland’ and re-assessing Mackinder’s theory in the light of changing realities has been a popular activity since 1945 (Hauner 1990, 191). This paper identifies three distinct periods of ‘revisiting’ Mackinder’s relevance for Central Asia: post-World War II, the 1980s, and the period since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Unsurprisingly, in the post-World War II ‘Cold War’ period many attempts were made to assess the USSR in terms of Mackinder’s theory, both as an academic exercise to test the theory and as a strategic evaluation of the level of threat to the capitalist world posed by the USSR (see, for example, Hall 1955; Mills 1956; Hooson 1962). However, apart from mentioning northern Kazakhstan, these studies rarely devote much attention to Central Asia. Mineral-rich and expansive Siberia was a more alluring target of analysis and, logistically, more accessible to the gaze of Anglophone Soviet experts.

This began to change in the 1980s, as witnessed primarily by Hauner’s important study of the place of Asia in Russian geopolitical imaginations, with particular reference to Mackinder (Hauner 1990). Citing the Afghan War and high birth rates in Central Asia, Hauner called for the ‘heartland’ debate to be revisited. But there were other reasons why foreign scholars began to conceive of Central Asia as an entity in its own right at this time. The transfer of resources meant that the region could claim higher living standards than any of its Muslim neighbours (Smith 1999b), and Central Asia became a showcase of Muslim socialist development in the midst of superpower competition, even sending hundreds of development specialists around the world (Sievers 2003). Finally, limited although rising anti-Moscow sentiment drew the attention of ideologically driven ‘Sovietologists’ (for more on this term, see Dalby 1990, chapter 5) who hoped that a resurgent Muslim Central Asia would prove the undoing of the Soviet empire (examples include Bennigsen and Broxup 1983; Imart 1987). Theoretically, these developments coincided with a renewed interest in the geopolitical legacy of Halford Mackinder (Hepple 1986).

It was not until the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of independent states that Central Asia really crystallized as a concrete issue in the application of Mackinder’s ideas. Geographers have, however, been relatively quiet on this topic. Blouet says of Central Asia that ‘[t]he geopolitical faultlines still lie around Mackinder’s Heartland’ (Blouet 2001, 176), but this is simply a passing observation. Geographers interested in the reception and use of Mackinder in the former Soviet Union have tended to focus on Russia rather than Central Asia (for example, O’Loughlin 2000 2001; Kolossov and Turovsky 2001). There is as yet no study of the place of Central Asia in geopolitical imaginations to even remotely match Bassin’s detailed account of the Russian far east (Bassin 1999). This neglect is somewhat ironic, as Central Asia was of great significance for the institutionalization of British geography. Indeed, Watson argues that, ‘[t]he Royal Geographical Society established its credentials as an Orientalist authority to no small degree through the exploits of its surveys of Central Asia’ (Watson 1998, 118). This history, with its multiple imperial entanglements and enduring legacy, is still largely waiting to be recovered and evaluated (but see Gregory 2004).

It cannot be said, however, that scholars of other disciplines have overlooked the geopolitical significance of Central Asia, nor been shy to consider it in the terms of Mackinder. For example, Sloan, Head of the Department of Strategic Studies and International Affairs at the Britannia Royal Navy College in Dartmouth, writes that as hydrocarbon-rich ‘Central Asia is once more a key to the security of
Revisiting the ‘pivot’

Uzbekistan in Central Asia

The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic was created in 1924 by the new Soviet authorities from territories of the abolished Khanates of Khiva and Khoqand and the Emirate of Bukhara, which had come under tsarist rule in the nineteenth century (Soucek 2000). The Soviet authorities divided Central Asia up into union republics and novel ethnicities, constructing concepts of national culture and history, and forming administrations in new capital cities within new boundaries (Allworth 1990; Glenn 1999; Roy 2000).

It was this Soviet creation that became the independent republic of Uzbekistan (see Figure 1) with the termination of the Soviet Union in 1991. With no history of independent statehood to recover, the President, former Uzbek Communist Party boss Islam Karimov, legitimized the existence of Uzbekistan through the national framework created by the Soviets, a framework that had institutionalized ethnicity in Central Asia (Smith 1996 1998). President Karimov describes this project as the ‘ideology of national independence’ (Karimov 1997 1998; March 2002; Jalilov 2002), involving a rewriting of Uzbek history (Sodiqov et al. 2000) that projects putative Uzbek statehood back into the pre-Christian era (Ziyo 2000). In particular, he has exalted the ruler Amir Timur (1336–1405), whose Samarkand-based empire is shown in Figure 1, as the paragon of patriotic Uzbek statesmanship (Khidoyatov 1996; Jalolov and Qo’chqor 2000; Melvin 2000; Thaulow 2001). That Timur’s dynasty was actually expelled from Central Asia by the Uzbeks is an irony that is conveniently overlooked in this narrative.

The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic was created in 1924 by the new Soviet authorities from territories of the abolished Khanates of Khiva and Khoqand and the Emirate of Bukhara, which had come under tsarist rule in the nineteenth century (Soucek 2000). The Soviet authorities divided Central Asia up into union republics and novel ethnicities, constructing concepts of national culture and history, and forming administrations in new capital cities within new boundaries (Allworth 1990; Glenn 1999; Roy 2000).

It was this Soviet creation that became the independent republic of Uzbekistan (see Figure 1) with the termination of the Soviet Union in 1991. With no history of independent statehood to recover, the President, former Uzbek Communist Party boss Islam Karimov, legitimized the existence of Uzbekistan through the national framework created by the Soviets, a framework that had institutionalized ethnicity in Central Asia (Smith 1996 1998). President Karimov describes this project as the ‘ideology of national independence’ (Karimov 1997 1998; March 2002; Jalilov 2002), involving a rewriting of Uzbek history (Sodiqov et al. 2000) that projects putative Uzbek statehood back into the pre-Christian era (Ziyo 2000). In particular, he has exalted the ruler Amir Timur (1336–1405), whose Samarkand-based empire is shown in Figure 1, as the paragon of patriotic Uzbek statesmanship (Khidoyatov 1996; Jalolov and Qo’chqor 2000; Melvin 2000; Thaulow 2001). That Timur’s dynasty was actually expelled from Central Asia by the Uzbeks is an irony that is conveniently overlooked in this narrative.

Evoking further comparisons with Timur, the authoritarian president has earned a reputation for tolerating little dissent (Kangas 2002), epitomized by his widely reported statement to parliament in May 1998 that ‘Islamic extremists . . . must be shot in the head. If necessary, I’ll shoot them myself’ (Bohr 1998b, 29). Opponents have been silenced, imprisoned or executed: Human Rights Watch claimed in January 2003 that there were almost 7000 prisoners of conscience in Uzbek jails, and that torture is routine (Lee 2003). Karimov is particularly hostile to any form of politicized Islam, which he identifies as having the greatest potential threat as an opposition force.

These fears are not unfounded: the underground non-violent Islamist group Hezb-ut Tahrir, which seeks to abolish nation states and establish a single pan-Islamic ‘caliphate’, has shown resilience and growth in recent years (International Crisis Group 2003). Furthermore, the so-called Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, claiming to be seeking to topple
Karimov’s secular regime, launched guerrilla raids from bases in Tajikistan in 1999 and 2000, and is blamed by Karimov for a series of devastating bomb attacks in Tashkent in February 1999. However, analysts had long warned that the government’s anti-Islamic policies may themselves catalyse the politicization of Islam (Clark 1994; Bohr 1998a). They suggest that the intensity of radicalized opposition is partially a product of the absence of legitimate channels through which to express dissent, and a reaction to police brutality of those suspected of disloyalty (Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan 1999; Human Rights Watch 2000). Karimov has, however, used the spectre of both this opposition and the civil wars in neighbouring Tajikistan and Afghanistan as sound reasons not to make too hasty a move towards democracy – a sentiment that many people in Uzbekistan in fact appreciate. He has used this threat to twice extend his term of office by referenda, side-stepping the constitutional provision of a maximum of two five-year presidential terms.

Western debate on how to engage with Uzbekistan has polarized between conservatives who argue that Karimov’s authoritarianism is in the interests of stability and should be tolerated in the short term (Starr 1996), and radicals who have lambasted both the human rights record of Karimov and the forms of and motives behind US support since 2001 (Churchyard 2002).

With 25 million people, Uzbekistan has the largest population in Central Asia. This double-landlocked state is the only one that shares contiguous borders with the four other former Soviet Central Asian republics, along with Afghanistan. In a region rich in hydrocarbon deposits, it has the most ambitious foreign policy, balancing and continually readjusting ‘involvement’ with pro-American (such as GUUAM – Georgia–Ukraine–Uzbekistan–Azerbaijan–Moldova), pro-Russian (the CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States), and pro-Chinese (the SCO – Shanghai Co-operation Organization) organizations (Kuzio 2000; Barkovsky and Islamova 2003; Minasian 2003), whilst all these countries compete to strengthen military ties with Uzbekistan. Indeed, as Horsman puts it, ‘Uzbekistan has pursued a pragmatic and flexible but assertive and unilateralist foreign policy’ (Horsman 2003, 51). This has particularly been the case with the basing of US forces on its territory since their invasion of Afghanistan and overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001 (Albion 2003).
boasts the largest military in the region (McDermott 2003) and has not been afraid to intervene in the Tadjik and Afghan civil wars (Horsman 1999), or to engage in provocative border control policies with its neighbours (Megoran 2002). Indeed, as Cornell argues, ‘Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state to pursue a proactive and independent foreign policy, as exemplified in it relations with both its neighbours and great powers’ (Cornell 2000, 115). For these reasons, it has become the focus of a body of analytical, speculative, proscriptive and polemical literature on geopolitics and foreign policy, written by both outside (Burghart 2002; Kazemi 2003; Olcott 2003) and local (Toshev 2000; special editions of Central Asia and the Caucasus 2003a, 2003b) specialists.

It is three such geopolitical works, all of which use Mackinder, which I will examine in this paper. Whilst many writers refer to Mackinder in more general geopolitical analysis of Russia or link his name in passing to a political analysis of Uzbekistan, I have chosen the authors of these three. This is because they are examples of the few who actually focus on Uzbekistan, and are civil-society based foreign policy intellectuals who take the classical geopolitical tradition seriously – or, examples of public intellectuals who engage in formal geopolitical reasoning, in Ó Tuathail and Agnew’s terms (1992). As I conclude that the first two do not engage Mackinder’s writings in any depth, emphasis is placed on the work of the third, Chris Seiple.

All three experts exist in networks of other intellectuals, educational institutes and think tanks, some privately funded, others state funded. Their thoughts and pronouncements have had resonances with contemporary thinking. Whilst it is always difficult to establish the impact of any individual, they offer windows into how Mackinder’s work has been appropriated and recycled. Discussion of these writers is necessarily tempered by a concern with the consequences of operating within the different paradigms of intellectual freedom that characterize Central Asian states.

**Halford Mackinder and contemporary analysis of Uzbekistan**

**Russian analysis – Oleg Zotov**

A growing body of scholarship has highlighted the resurgence of geopolitical thinking in 1990s Russia (Smith 1999a; Ingram 2001; O’Loughlin 2001). In particular, it has drawn attention to a geopolitical imagination that casts recent history as that of enduring ‘Atlanticist’ versus ‘Eurasianist’ hostilities, a tradition that evinces Mackinder in support of its thesis. An example of a scholar who writes within this paradigm is Oleg Zotov, a historian at the Oriental Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Although little known amongst English language commentators, the prolific analyst of Russian foreign policy, Igor Torbakov, cites Zotov as an authority within the Russian geopolitical tradition that traces its roots back to the 1920s (Torbakov 2001). For Zotov, the ‘global geopolitical role’ of Central Asia will be even more important than oil politics in the twenty-first century (cited in Torbakov 2001), and at the heart of Eurasia is Uzbekistan, the target for Islamic extremists and Americans alike. His English-language anti-US foreign policy polemics have been reproduced on a number of radical websites.

Zotov does not believe that the US invasion of Afghanistan and its close involvement in Uzbekistan is primarily aimed at disabling Al-Qaeda, neither is it ideological (human rights and democracy) nor economic (hydrocarbons). Rather, for Zotov, it is geopolitical. In his historical geographical imagination, there are two forces struggling for control of Eurasia: Eurasian powers that seek the good of Eurasia on the one hand, and forces of ‘international terrorism’ and ‘Western hegemony’ that seek its destruction on the other. The behaviour of any state is determined by its location. Onto this geopolitical framework he maps the characters and empires of Eurasian history, with Timur as his icon of geopolitical genius.

Zotov lauds Timur for ‘eliminating chaos, establishing order, safe existence and development’ (Zotov 2000). Timur turned a ‘black hole’ in the heart of Eurasia from a Hobbesian space of ‘war of all against all’ into a zone of peace, stability and development. How? Whereas contemporary works by Uzbek scholars explain Timur’s ‘success’ as arising from his sense of justice, religion, and patriotism, for Zotov, it is simply geography. Realizing their geopolitical genius, he reconstructed the empires of Alexander and Chinggis Khan. On the one hand, he opposed ‘extremism’ and ‘Western hegemony’. Extremism for Zotov is Timur’s defeat of Sultan Bayazid at Ankara and the Golden Horde ruler Tokhtamysh. Western hegemony is the Crusaders – whose severed heads he catapulted at European warships, ‘by way of persuasion’, notes Zotov. The other side of his strategy was to ally with Eurasian states – Russia and China. Thus this enlightened ruler constructed Eurasia’s only superpower, bringing peace and stability to Eurasia, without wanting world domination. Needless to say, the claims being made stretch the bounds of historical credibility – for example, Timur’s destruction of Delhi in 1398 was shockingly savage, and he eventually died on the eve of a planned invasion of China in 1405.
For Zotov, however, this is not mere history. Rather he collapses political time into timeless geopolitical space, arguing that as ‘the problems and directions of his geopolitics were the same ones that Central Asian states face today . . . the principles of his exceptional geopolitics are instructive as ever’ (Zotov 2000). For Zotov, the contemporary struggle for Uzbekistan is simply the latest stage of this transcendent geopolitical struggle between timeless certitudes. Today, the international terrorists and extremists are the Islamists who have assailed Uzbekistan through direct military attack and support by US client states such as Turkey and Pakistan, and been backed by the US in the Balkans and elsewhere. The forces of Western hegemony are what he identifies as pro-US blocs such as GUUAM (which he sees as the reincarnation of the old CENTO Baghdad Pact), OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and NATO. Evincing material from the writings of Americans such as Strobe Talbott and ‘the odious’ Zbigniew Brzezinski, he believes that US foreign policy is actively stirring up instability in Central Asia to excuse US interventions, and is determined to break up the CIS, block the ascendancy of China, and scupper the formation of a stable and harmonious Eurasian alliance. The USA, like Britain before it, has never been a Eurasian power, has never sought the good or stability of the region, and will never do so in the future. ‘Globalization’ is a strategy of US hegemony that thrives on creating instability: the antidote that he advocates is the formation of authentic Eurasian unions including the CIS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Zotov 2001).

In drawing to a grand conclusion, Zotov adduces the name of Mackinder to confirm the importance of Central Asia and the veracity of his thesis. He concludes by saying that ‘[t]he struggle against international terrorism and hegemony of the West was quite actual in Timur’s time and is twice as actual today’ (Zotov 2000). Mackinder is not cited nor is any evidence displayed that Zotov is familiar with his particular ideas and concerns. Mackinder is merely used to rubber-stamp the reduction of 25 centuries of history to timeless spatial truths that reinscribe Central Asia as an otherwise empty zone of great power competition, and relegate the importance of moral qualities of leadership and governance behind the ability to project geopolitical power over the ‘heartland’. Whilst claiming to be adhering to objective criteria, Zotov’s geopolitics reveals both post-Soviet insecurities about the relative decline of Russian power, and casts Russia in the mould of benevolent Eurasian power, unlike the now-dominant Americans, who are illegitimate intruders in Central Asia.

Uzbekistani analysis – Sevara Sharapova

Just as in post-Soviet Russia, geopolitical thinking has become fashionable in contemporary Uzbekistan. In a recent example, Tolipov discusses the place of Uzbekistan in the ‘Heartland’ or ‘Rimland’, concluding that Uzbekistan’s objective geopolitical destiny is probably to use the new strategic partnership with the USA to assume a ‘special historic responsibility for the evolution of Central Asia’ (Tolipov 2003, 106). However, whilst using classic geopolitical terminology that can be traced directly or indirectly back to Mackinder, he makes no reference to the man himself – in spite of beginning the article with mention of Hauner’s study that concentrates on Mackinder! Yuldasheva begins her 1996 overview of recent Anglo-American writing on Central Asia by proclaiming, ‘[n]owadays, as never before, the geopolitical theory of Sir Halford Mackinder, which projected Central Asia as the core region of Eurasia, has acquired new actuality in international policy’ (Yuldasheva 1996, 38). Sevara Sharapova, a political scientist at the Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies who specializes in Uzbekistani foreign policy and the place of Uzbekistan in the policies of great powers, on which she has written over 30 articles (for a recent example, see Sharapova 2003), develops this argument. In 2002 she published a paper on this theme, exploring Uzbekistan’s involvement in international organizations, and making suggestions about future directions. The present study will focus on this article as she begins her theoretical analysis with Mackinder.

Her paper, entitled ‘Uzbekistan’s multisided diplomacy in the context of antiterrorist campaign’, opens with a statement that the anti-terrorist coalition formed around the US in the wake of the September 11 attacks has ‘turned Central Asia into a world political center’ (Sharapova 2002, 85). However, she argues that it is necessary to dig deeper for a paradigm to explain outside, and particularly US, interest in Central Asia. She posits two possibilities. The first is geopolitics, which she explains as either the Americans trying to implement Mackinder’s heartland strategy, or attempting to work towards a limited strategic partnership with Russia. The second is geo-economics, or the quest for access to the region’s rich hydrocarbon deposits.

Whilst Sharapova says that it is unclear which of the paradigms will dominate, her analysis tends towards the geopolitical. She explores different possibilities, reflecting the difficulty in finding models to match the relative simplicity of ‘Cold War’ antagonisms. Nonetheless, she concludes by positing the existence of an old clash between the
Atlantic and Eurasian worlds, with China now having replaced Russia as the leader of the Eurasian world, and the US following Brezezinski’s call to prevent any single force dominating the region.

Whilst more nuanced and sophisticated, Sharapova’s argument has certain parallels with Zotov’s. Both employ geopolitical explanations of Uzbekistan’s relations with other states, although Sharapova tempers hers with economic considerations. Both refer to Mackinder as an authority on the scientific basis of geopolitics, yet their engagement with him is superficial and there is no evidence that they have actually read him first hand – in fact, neither even cites a particular work. Indeed, in a personal communication, Sharapova explained that she heard about his ideas as a graduate but thinks that century-old notions have little place in a changed world (Sharapova, personal communication, 20 July 2003). Both Sharapova and Zotov do, however, quote Brezezinski, whose popular 1997 book seems to be a more direct channel for their knowledge of the Anglo-American geopolitical tradition.

However, Sharapova departs from Zotov in considering Uzbekistan in its own terms, which leads her to adopt a pragmatic position that seeks to maximize Uzbekistan’s advantage. She observes that, whilst relations between the US and Russia have long been based on suspicion, there is a certain overlap of interest in fighting terrorism and drugs and preventing China emerging as a dominant power. Sharapova sees in this ambiguous relationship an opportunity that Uzbekistan, with its unique position at the heart of Eurasia, must exploit:

In this situation Uzbekistan will be free to act in the spirit of traditional geopolitics based on prolonged mutual mistrust that has existed and continues to exist between the White House and the Kremlin. This is a dignified role that leaves much space for maneuvering Sharapova 2002, 91–2

This is a classic example of ‘geopolitical reasoning’ as defined by Dalby, whereby the world is discursively constructed in terms of places which consign political actors to play roles dependant on their specified place in the global order (Dalby 1993, 440). It is also a good description of the ‘pragmatic’ foreign policy pursued by the Karimov administration (Horsman 2003, 51).

US analysis – Chris Seiple

The above examples drawn from Russia and Uzbekistan, whilst informed by a general body of literature on geopolitics that clearly owes a debt to Mackinder, merely mention him as a strategy to bolster authority, but make no detailed engagement with his arguments. The last example, in contrast, is Chris Seiple – an American whose work on Uzbekistan is informed by a detailed restatement of Mackinder, or, in his words, a ‘rediscovery of the real Mackinder’ (personal communication, 29 November 2003).

Chris Seiple is the son of Bob Seiple, who served as President Clinton’s Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom. A former Marine officer, he is President of the Institute for Global Engagement, which describes itself as a ‘think-tank with legs’, founded in 2000 by his father ‘to create sustainable environments for religious freedom world-wide’. He teaches at two universities and is a member of a number of foreign policy think tanks. He has served in the Strategic Initiatives Group, a Pentagon internal think tank for the Marine Corps, where he developed new constructs regarding national and homeland security and wrote speeches and Congressional testimonies for senior Marine leaders. He helped establish a Humanitarian Operations Chair at Marine Corps University in Virginia, and his (1996) book on military/NGO relationships in humanitarian interventions is widely read among humanitarian NGOs and within the US military. He appears regularly on TV and radio and publishes frequently, addressing not only religious freedom but also US foreign policy towards Uzbekistan, and supporting recent US military interventions in Afghanistan (Seiple 2001a) and Iraq (Seiple 2003a 2003c). A graduate of international relations at Stanford and national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, he is currently completing a PhD at Tufts on US–Uzbekistan relations 1991–2003 (Institute for Global Engagement 2003; Foreign Policy Research Institute 2003).

For this section, I will draw on material from his as-yet incomplete PhD thesis, which he has kindly allowed me to use, his publications and briefings on Uzbekistan, and email conversations and a telephone interview.

Seiple first encountered Mackinder as an officer-student in 1994, and was unimpressed at what he heard of him from his lecturers. However, it was not until 2000 that he actually read Mackinder for himself, soon after switching dissertation topic from a ‘homeland security’ theme to Uzbekistan, with which he had been fascinated since reading Fitzroy Maclean’s Eastern approaches (1949). Seiple read Mackinder as a vision of how to create a balanced and free world, his 1919 and 1943 publications reapplying his 1904 formulation in changed strategic eras. He argues not only that the military academy version of Mackinder (as an advocate of ‘land power’ against Mahan’s ‘sea power’) is a superficial
caricature, but that Mackinder himself provided ‘a timeless yet practical philosophy for Eurasia’ (Seiple 2003b, 3), combining principles of geopolitics with a concern for building global democracy. Mackinder struck Seiple as ‘a profoundly philosophical and spiritual man who most of all in his writings sought balance’, and ‘embodied that which he sought to imbue’ (Chris Seiple, telephone interview, 11 November 2003).

Seiple is dismissive of much of the existing scholarship on Mackinder (Seiple 2003b). Seiple understands the negative characterization of Mackinder as an imperialist, but insists that the salient feature of his belief system is a staunch commitment to democracy (Seiple 2003b). He admires what he sees as Mackinder’s prescient grasp of the relationship between democratic civil society and geography under the closed-world conditions of what today is termed ‘globalization’, and his moral commitment to shape the world (Seiple 2000, 7–8). He approves of Mackinder’s integration of ‘holisitic’ thought with his ‘bias for action’, demonstrated by developing a coherent geopolitical worldview and translating that into multiple activities such as teaching, instructing military officers, and influencing policy. In particular, Seiple respects Mackinder’s geographical gaze, his ‘disembodied, earth-scanning’ panoptical vision of world geography (2000, 7), precisely that characteristic of his thinking to which Ó Tuathail (1996) objects. This geographical gaze mirrors and informs Seiple’s vision of his own work. Speaking on 19 September 2001, he claimed that the attacks a week earlier demonstrated how critical it was for national security to develop ‘intragency experts who see the whole picture all the time, not just a specialized field of view’, and concluded by claiming that his institute was an example of an organization attempting exactly that task (2001a).

Seiple completely rejects the suggestion that Mackinder ‘got it wrong’ in predicting the course of events. For Seiple, this is a fundamental misunderstanding: Mackinder did not predict, but rather sought to warn, deftly re-applying timeless principles of geopolitics to the pressing issues of the day in 1904, 1919 and 1943. This being so, it follows that ‘it is for the practical philosopher to figure out what the latest manifestation is’ (Seiple 2000, 20). Seiple takes this task upon himself. For Seiple, the essential geopolitical principle of the importance of the heartland in a closed system remains unchanged, but the US in 2003 has replaced Britain a century earlier as ‘the primary advocate of democracy in the world and the obvious key to global balance’ (2000, 21), and Uzbekistan now plays the key balancing role that Eastern Europe did for Mackinder in 1919. Indeed, Seiple asserts that, ‘[a]t the center of the Heartland Hinge, that unchanging interior of the Heartland Concept across three iterations, is Uzbekistan’ (2003b, 14). He speculates that if Mackinder had lived until 1991 he ‘would have foreseen Central Asia, and Uzbekistan in particular, as critical to global balance’ (2003b, 21). This being the case, Seiple believes that Mackinder’s thought is the best framework within which to analyse US foreign policy towards Uzbekistan.

This reading of Mackinder informs Seiple’s publicsphere engagement with US–Uzbek foreign policy. He argues that Karimov’s presidency has been too easily dismissed as oppressive with superficial clichés by the left, or endorsed by security strategists on the right who overlook human rights concerns, and seeks to formulate a new mode of engagement between these positions (Seiple 2002b).

For Seiple, Uzbekistan as ‘the fulcrum of Asia security’ and ‘the backyard that everyone shares’ (2002a, 1) is absolutely vital to US interests and to the future of democracy in Eurasia. Yet it is surrounded by states which include those that he terms failed, ‘17th century’, terrorist and unstable, including one in George Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’, as well as by Islamic fundamentalism. Furthermore, Russia, still smarting from loss of empire, is attempting to regain control of Uzbekistan, and a resurgent China represents a new threat. It is imperative that the US is aware of and balances these threats.

In a May 2000 dissertation draft, Seiple was critical of US foreign policy towards Central Asia. He argued that, in fact, there was none – general platitudes about stability and economic and political reform could apply to ‘any planet, any region’ (Seiple 2000, 34). This was confirmed by his interviews with US government officials. In considering Uzbekistan as merely a less important part of the ‘former’ Soviet Union and as within the Russian sphere of interest rather than a sovereign state in its own right, Seiple argues that the US is unable to think geopolitically about Uzbekistan. He cites what he describes as hopeful signs in the mid-1990s: for example, Uzbekistan’s security cooperation with Israel, its desire to keep Russia at arm’s length, and, in 1997, its voting alone with Israel and the US at the UN against a resolution condemning US sanctions on Cuba (Seiple 2000, 28). However, Seiple considers that the US failed to develop this opportunity to engage more closely with Uzbekistan, and that this was a failure to think geopolitically. Seiple contrasts this with Russian President Putin’s realization of Uzbekistan’s importance following his rise to power in 1999. Quoting the Russophobe Lord Curzon as an authority on Russian intentions in Central Asia, Seiple casts Putin as a national leader pursuing the self interest
of his state pursuing influence in Uzbekistan. Indeed, Seiple observes that almost immediately after assuming power Putin travelled to Tashkent to sign a security pact between the two states (Seiple 2000). Thus Russia grasped the strategic importance of Uzbekistan, whereas the US did not.

However, for Seiple much changed with the attacks on the US in September 2001. US forces had been based in Uzbekistan to facilitate an invasion of Afghanistan, in October 2001, a move which Seiple called for immediately following the attacks, arguing that Uzbekistan was both geographically and politically a natural ally for the US (Seiple 2001b). Seiple considers that these events may prove to be a decisive break in US–Uzbekistani relations. They demonstrated to the US government what it should have known about the importance of Uzbekistan from Mackinder, and, symbolically, precipitated the first ever phone call by a US president to the Uzbekistani head of state (Seiple 2002a). They clearly underlined Mackinder’s contention that democracies cannot think strategically and do not appreciate the dynamics of heartland geopolitics until threatened (Seiple 2003b).

Seiple was in Uzbekistan interviewing foreign policy elites as part of his doctoral research in September 2001, and was thus well placed to observe their reactions. He posits an ongoing competition amongst political elites in Uzbekistan between those who advocated pro-Russian foreign policy orientation and those who favoured closer ties with the US. He argues that prior to September 2001 the ‘Russians’ were ascendant and the ‘Americans’ dormant, but that the attacks precipitated a reversal in the fortunes of both groups. He argues that America must encourage (Seiple 2002b) this shift by a new policy of comprehensive engagement with Uzbekistan. He recommends in particular supporting exchanges of officials to promote the strengthening of human rights and civil society; keeping the US military in the country long term as a statement of solidarity; and providing a full Marshall Plan through the IMF and World Bank to provide employment opportunities for the burgeoning young population (Seiple 2003b).

Seiple’s desire to apply what he considers objective analysis of Eurasian geopolitics and the future for democracy in Eurasia ultimately leads him to advocate a position which sees Uzbekistan accepting the US as its main sponsor, and supporting a strategic alliance cemented by the controversial US invasion of Afghanistan. Without suggesting that this is cynical, as Polelle’s language might be taken to imply, this illustrates his contention that:

The power of geopolitics was – and to some extent remains today – based on its ability to depoliticize through scientific-sounding rhetoric what are at heart deeply political and subjective choices regarding foreign and domestic policies.

Polelle 1999, 145–6

Conclusion

Shortly before the demise of the Soviet Union, writing the conclusion to his important study of the place of Asia in Russian geopolitical imaginations, Hauner speculated that, ‘if the empire goes, so will the heartland theory in the Mackinder mold’ (Hauner 1990, 253). This paper has shown that the emergence of independent states in Central Asia following the end of the Soviet ‘empire’ has occasioned a new phase in the literature on ‘revisiting’ Mackinder’s heartland. Few other modern academic geographers have had such impact outside the discipline, and this must challenge geographers to take Mackinder more seriously than some have been wont to. Even at 100 years of age, Mackinder won’t go away easily.

This paper is an exploratory essay, and points to the need for more extensive and detailed research. Further work is necessary to describe the intellectual biographies of these writers and their location in networks of foreign policy expertise, and to uncover institutional histories of how Mackinder’s geopolitical ideas ‘travelled’ from the UK to the US and the USSR and thence independent Russia and Uzbekistan. These are important issues, but beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, it draws four conclusions from the case studies used.

Firstly, of all Central Asian states, Mackinder’s formula has been particularly re-appropriated in analysis of contemporary Uzbekistan.

Secondly, this ‘revival’ has occurred largely in spite of the body of secondary geographical scholarship on Mackinder. In re-visiting his ‘scope and methods of geography’ paper (1887) on the centenary of its publication, Coones observed that Mackinder has frequently been lauded, but not often read carefully (Coones 1987). Exactly the same can be said of his Pivot paper at its centenary: nor, it can be added, has subsequent work by geographers on Mackinder been much used (Seiple’s extensive interaction with Mackinder is something of an exception). For the most part, Mackinder is merely taken as a premise in a strategy to bolster authority and add a false sense of profundity to writing that otherwise lacks both theoretical rigour and political and geographical nuance. This would be entirely unimportant were it to be merely a question of the wounded pride of marginalized geographers. However, this scholarship has raised serious ethical concerns about the Mackinderian
tradition, accusing it of indulging great-power military imperialism, and an ambiguous relationship to democracy. That this has been largely ignored in this ‘revival’ is disturbing. This raises a question for further consideration: is this a failure of political geography to engage with wider policy debates?

Thirdly, whilst all three writers take Mackinder as offering timeless and objective geopolitical truths, the respective foreign policy positions at which they arrive reveal subjectivities embedded in both the time and space of the nation state. Zotov argues that it is best for Uzbekistan and the region to adopt a staunchly anti-American (and, by implication, a pro-Russian) position. Seiple, in contrast, is suspicious of the intentions and potential impact on Uzbekistan of Russia and other regional states and ideologies, and concludes that a strongly pro-US orientation is best both for Uzbekistan and Eurasia. Sharapova suggests that Uzbekistan would serve both itself and the region best by performing a pragmatic balancing act between these positions. Mackinder himself believed in universal ideals of freedom yet at the same time, as Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998) argue, his life and work exhibited a commitment to advancing the interests of his own country in competition with other states. This contradiction, as some would see it, or paradox of necessary engagement with geopolitical reality, as others would state it, persists within what might be termed the Mackinder tradition today. It illustrates Ó Tuathail’s contention that critical histories of geopolitics ‘disturb the innocence of geography and politicize the writing of global space’ (Ó Tuathail 1996, 20).

Fourthly and finally, these readings of Mackinder inform comment on the foreign policy orientation of modern Uzbekistan. In the autumn of 2003, Craig Murray, the British ambassador to Uzbekistan, was at the centre of media speculation about whether he had been recalled for his controversial criticisms of Karimov’s human rights record (Whitlock 2003). How Uzbekistan and the West should engage with each other is thus a question of great political importance (Ahrari 2003), a question for which the ideas and traditions surrounding Mackinder are of continued relevance. The geographical pivot of history paper should not merely be of interest to historians of geographical ideas.

Acknowledgements

I wish in particular to thank Chris Seiple, for generously allowing me to view and use sections of his unpublished dissertation and to interview him for comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and for challenging me to take Mackinder more seriously.

References

Allworth E 1990 The modern Uzbeks Hoover, Stanford
Barkovsky A and Ismailova R 2003 Where is GUUAM heading? Central Asia and the Caucasus 2 151–7
Bennigsen A and Broxup M 1983 The Islamic threat to the Soviet State Croom Helm, London
Blouet B 1987 Halford Mackinder: a biography Texas A&M University Press, College Station TX
Blouet B 2001 Geopolitics and globalization in the twentieth century Reaktion, London
Bohr A 1998b Uzbekistan: politics and foreign policy Royal Institute of International Affairs, London
Burghart D 2002 In the tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s path to the twenty-first century European Security 11 1–19
Central Asia and the Caucasus 2003a Special feature: Russia and the West Central Asia and the Caucasus 1(19)
Central Asia and the Caucasus 2003b Special feature: Muslim centres of power: their impact on the situation Central Asia and the Caucasus 2(20)
Clark S 1994 The Central Asian states: defining security priorities and developing military forces in Mandelbaum M ed Central Asia and the world: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan Council on Foreign Relations, New York 177–205
Churchyard S 2002 Tyranny in the name of freedom Red Pepper February 2003 16–17
Coones P 1987 Mackinder’s ‘scope and methods of geography’ after a hundred years School of Geography, University of Oxford
Dalby S 1990 Creating the second Cold War: the discourse of politics Pinter, London
Dalby S 1993 The ‘Kiwi disease’: geopolitical discourse in Aotearoa/ New Zealand and the South Pacific Political Geography 12 437–56
Dalby S 2002 Environmental security University of Minnesota Press, London
Gregory D 2004 The colonial present Blackwell, Oxford
Hall A 1955 Mackinder and the course of events Annals of the Association of American Geographers 45 109–26
Hauner M 1990 What is Asia to us? Russia’s Asian heartland yesterday and today Unwin Hyman, London
Hepple L 1986 The revival of geopolitics Political Geography Quarterly 5 S21–36
Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan 1999 Uzbekistan: the atmosphere of terror and violence Turkistan Newsletter 3 (288) SOTA, Amsterdam
Human Rights Watch 2000 And it was hell all over again . . . Torture in Uzbekistan Human Rights Watch, New York
Imart G 1987 The limits of inner Asia: some soul searching on new borders for an old frontier-land Indiana University, Bloomington
Ingram A 2001 Alexander DUGIN: geopolitics and neo-fascism in post-Soviet Russia Political Geography 20 1029–51
International Crisis Group 2003 Persecution of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan. A report detailing the cruel persecution and rights abuses against the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the people of Uzbekistan, by the country’s repressive government under its president Islam Karimov since June 2002 ICG, Brussels
Jalilov A 2002 Milliy istiqlol mafkurasining iqtisodiy va huquqiy negizi to‘g‘risida qiy negizi to‘g‘risida. Inson Huquqlari 1 40–50
Jalilov A and Qo‘chqor X eds 2000 Mustaqillik: Ixozli Ilmiy-Ommabop Lug‘at Sharq, Tashkent
Kangas R 2002 Uzbekistan: the Karimov presidency – Amir Timur revisited in Cummings S ed Power and change in Central Asia Routledge, London 130–49
Karimov I 1997 Uzbekistan on the threshold of the twenty-first century Curzon, Richmond
Karimov I 1998 Tarihiy Xotilarsiz Kelajak Yo‘q Sharq, Tashkent
Kazemi L 2003 Domestic sources of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy Journal of International Affairs 56 205–16
Khidoyatov G 1996 The builder of a new Maverannahr Labyrinth: Central Asia Quarterly 3 42–5
Kolossov V and Turovsky R 2001 Russian geopolitics at the fin-de-siecle Geopolitics 6 141–64
Kuzio T 2000 Geopolitical pluralism in the CIS: the emergence of GUUAM European Security 9 81–114
Lee J 2003 In the eye of the beholder: why human-rights abuses justify war on Iraq, but are rewarded in Uzbekistan New Internationalist 360 6
Mackinder H 1887 On the scope and methods of geography Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society 9 141–74
Mackinder H 1904 The geographical pivot of history The Geographical Journal 23 421–37
Mackinder H 1919 Democratic ideals and reality: a study in the politics of reconstruction Constable and Company, London
Mackinder H 1943 The round world and the winning of the peace Foreign Affairs 21 595–605
Maclean F 1949 Eastern approaches J. Cape, London
March A 2002 The use and abuse of history: ‘national ideology’ as transcendental object in Islam Karimov’s ‘ideology of national independence’ Central Asian Survey 21 371–84
Melvin N 2000 Uzbekistan: transition to authoritarianism on the silk road Overseas Publishers Association, Amsterdam
Mills D 1956 The U.S.S.R.: a re-appraisal of Mackinder’s heartland concept Scottish Geographical Magazine 72 144–53
Minasian S 2003 CIS: building a collective security system Central Asia and the Caucasus 1 131–7
Olcott M B 2003 Taking stock of Central Asia Journal of International Affairs 56 3–17
O’Loughlin J 2001 Geopolitical fantasies, national strategies and ordinary Russians in the post-communist era Geopolitics 6 17–48
Revisiting the ‘pivot’

O’Tuathail G 1996 Critical geopolitics: the politics of writing global space Routledge, London

O’Tuathail G and Agnew J 1992 Geopolitics and discourse: practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy Political Geography 11 190–204


Parker W H 1982 Mackinder: geography as an aid to statecraft Clarendon, Oxford

Polat N 2002 Boundary issues in Central Asia Transnational Publishers, Ardsley

Polelle M 1999 Raising cartographic consciousness: the social and foreign policy vision of geopolitics in the twentieth century Lexington, Oxford

Robbins G 1994 The post-Soviet heartland: reconsidering Mackinder Eurasian Studies 1 34–44


Seiple C 1996 The U.S. military/NGO relationship in humanitarian interventions US Army Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle PA

Seiple C 2000 The Eurasian ‘Shatterzone’: the politics of geography and a US foreign policy Unpublished draft of PhD chapter 1 May


Seiple C 2002a Scope of the problem & research questions Unpublished statement 24 August


Seiple C 2003b Mackinder: his life and writings, a heartland philosophy Unpublished draft of PhD chapter summer 2003

Seiple C 2003c Wars and rumours of (preemptive) wars Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs 1 41–7

Sharapova S 2002 Uzbekistan’s multisided diplomacy in the context of antiterrorist campaign Central Asia and the Caucasus 4 85–93

Sharapova S 2003 The U.S.–Western Europe–Russia triangle and Central Asia Central Asia and the Caucasus 1 65–72

Sharp J 2000 Condensing the Cold War: Reader’s Digest and American identity University of Minnesota Press, London

Sievers E 2003 Modern regression: Central Asian markets, democracy, and spoils systems Harvard Asia Quarterly 7 43–52

Sloan G 1999 Sir Halford J. Mackinder: the heartland theory then and now Journal of Strategic Studies 22 15–38


Smith G 1999a The masks of Proteus: Russia, geopolitical shift and the new Eurasianism Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 24 481–500

Smith G 1999b The post-Soviet states: mapping the politics of transition Arnold, London

Sodiqov H, Shamsutdinov P, Ravshhanov Q and Usmonov Q 2000 Turkiston Chor Rossiyasi Mustamlakamchiligi Davrida Sharq, Tashkent


Starr S F 1996 Making Eurasia stable Foreign Affairs 75 80–92

Thaulow M 2001 Timur Lenk før og nu - et spørgsmål om image jordens Folk 36 13–18

Tolipov F 2003 Are the heartland and rimland changing in the wake of the operation in Afghanistan? Central Asia and the Caucasus 5 99–107


Toshev S 2000 O’zbekiston tashqi siyosatining asosiy tamoyillari Ijtimoii Fiqr – Inson Huquqlari 1–2 24–8

Watson G 1998 Beyond the great game: British images of Central Asia c. 1820–1920 Unpublished PhD thesis School of Modern Asian Studies Griffith University, Brisbane


Yuldasheva G 1996 Modern Uzbekistan – problems of development: through the eyes of foreign researchers Labyrinth: Central Asia Quarterly 3 38–41

Zioyo A 2000 O’zbek Davlatchiligi Tarixi: Eng Qadamgi Davra Dan Rossiyasi Bosqiniga Qadar Sharq, Tashkent


Zotov O 2001 Pro-American military and political blocs around the Caspian basin livening up (http://greatgame.no.sapo.pt/acopiniao/pro_american_military_and_political_blocs.htm) Accessed July 2003