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Performance, Representation and the Economics of Border Control in Uzbekistan

NICK MEGORAN
University of Newcastle, UK

GAËL RABALLAND
Observatoire des Etats Post-Soviétiques, Paris, France

JEROME BOUYJOU
Independent Political Scientist, Osh, Kyrgyzstan

This article explores the contradictions and intersections between the performative and economic aspects of state boundary control. From 1999 onwards, Uzbekistan's formal trade with its neighbours declined dramatically, whilst cross-border smuggling mushroomed. This article examines these developments, using both an economic analysis, and a theoretical approach to the study of international boundaries derived from political geography, anthropology and 'borders theory'. Methodologically, it employs trade-flow analysis, discourse study and ethnography to construct an account of how an apparently economically counter-productive policy has symbolic and performative value to the state. The changes in trade patterns were largely due to the unilateral introduction of a new and highly disruptive border and customs control policy, which dramatically increased transportation costs, precipitating a growth in smuggling in which some state officials themselves colluded. Economically, whilst this policy would thus appear harmful to the state, the article suggests that border control policies also had a theatrical function related to the performance of national identity and the perpetuation of the incumbent regime. It concludes with policy recommendations addressed to both Central Asian states and international donors.

Address correspondence to Nick Megoran at Newcastle University, United Kingdom. E-mail: Nick.Megoran@newcastle.ac.uk

INTRODUCTION

International boundaries commonly occupy an apparently contradictory position in statecraft. They are not only sites where economic interchange between states is regulated and facilitated, but may also play an important symbolic role in constructing the identity of the state. Stated thus, as Coleman phrases it, statecraft at borders can be considered not as a coherent whole but as a fraught bundle of geopolitical and geoeconomic imperatives.[1] The mapping and theorisation of these tensions has emerged as a pressing concern for scholars of international boundaries, particularly those working on the US–Mexico interface.[2]

This article extends this analysis of the security/economy nexus at international boundaries by exploring a discrepancy between official discourse about Uzbekistani control of movement of goods across its borders, and the reality on the ground. There was a marked decrease in official cross-border trade in the Ferghana Valley (see Figure 1) from 1999 onwards, precipitated by Uzbekistan's formal and informal policies and procedures of border control. These raised transportation costs so much that smuggling mushroomed – yet some state officials were themselves deeply implicated in these flows of contraband. However, this article does not merely consider this discrepancy in economic terms. Rather, using theoretical approaches to the study of the crossing of boundaries from geography, anthropology and 'borders theory', it considers the border-control policy of the Uzbek state as theatrical/performative. It suggests that it

FIGURE 1 The Ferghana Valley.

performs and enacts an identity and vision of contemporary Uzbekistan that serves to justify mechanisms of surveillance and control, entrenching the rule of the current elite, whilst being harmful to many borderland dwellers.

This article has three major contributions to the interdisciplinary literature on both boundary studies and Central Asia. The first is an empirical study of the relationship between Uzbekistan's border control/customs policies and inter-state trade in the Ferghana Valley. This is a matter of great importance, because so many ordinary people depend on this trade for their livelihoods. It is also important that theory about boundaries is developed with reference to experiences beyond that of core states in the global economy. Secondly, whilst many recent boundary case studies have examined the discursive representation of borders in national politics, and others the quotidian experiences of people negotiating and living alongside them, it is less common to consider the two in tandem. This study attempts such a synthesis, arguing that boundary studies must not lose sight of either aspect. Thirdly, it demonstrates that economic and political representational readings of the same event can be usefully combined to give a fuller picture of a socio-economic process. It is based on research conducted by a political geographer, an economist and a political scientist between 1999 and 2004, in the Kyrgyzstani part of the Ferghana Valley, demographically and economically one of the most important regions of Central Asia.

The article begins with a study of the impact of Uzbekistan's border crossing/customs control policies on both formal regional trade and the underground economy. Drawing on work about the US–Mexico border, it then sketches a theoretical understanding of such boundary enforcement regimes as theatrical/performative, applying this to Uzbekistani border discourse, which is contrasted with the reality of collusion with smuggling. In the light of these observations, it concludes with critical reflection and recommendations on both Uzbekistani policy and the United States' provision of aid to assist the modernization of Central Asian border-control systems.

BORDERS AND TRADE

For an importer or exporter, moving any goods over a border is expensive. Crossing an international boundary usually involves negotiating different sets of regulations and business practices, a process that generally incurs both direct and indirect costs. Direct costs may be divided into official costs (largely documentation and compliance with regulations), and also unofficial costs (such as bribes to various border control agencies). Indirect costs are mainly the result of delays and uncertainty.

Recent empirical studies by economists demonstrate the importance of border-crossing costs. In the case of southern Africa, the World Bank calculates that delays at the main border-crossing between South Africa and

Zimbabwe (Beit Bridge) amounted to six days in February 2003. This could be translated into a loss of earnings per vehicle of around 1,750 USD, which was equivalent to the price of a shipment from Durban to the United States. Fox et al. study border crossing costs between the United States and Mexico. They calculate that border crossing inefficiencies (delays and 'extra costs') in southbound trade between the United States and Mexico are equivalent to explicit tariffs of between 1.8 and 6 per cent. Because of continual problems with transporting goods over the border, several *maquiladoras*[5] were forced out of business. In 2002 it was calculated that, over the preceding two years, more than 500 plants – most of them at the US border – had either shut down or moved operations to China, with the resultant loss of 256,000 Mexican jobs. A wave of 'Chinese *maquiladoras*' has emerged, and the president of the Maquiladora Association has complained that 'it is almost as inexpensive to cross the ocean as the border into Mexico'. Within NAFTA space, Taylor, Robideaux and Jackson[6] estimate that border and related trade policies are found to be costing more than 10 billion USD for the United States and Canada, which is the equivalent of 2.7 per cent of total trade between the two countries.

Therefore, we can conclude that there is a negative correlation between the number of border crossings and the volume of trade flows. Raballand demonstrates that the main explanation of the negative trade impact of being landlocked results from the number of border crossings.[7] Babetskii et al. find that, within Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, trade decreases by 15 per cent for each national boundary over which goods are transported.[8]

Uzbekistan has implemented a strict border control policy since 1999. We suggest that there have been two major economic impacts of this policy. First, official trade flows in the Ferghana valley have been significantly depressed. Secondly, cross-border trade activities did not disappear because of this, but rather smuggling has mushroomed.

Trade Decline in the Ferghana Valley

As Figure 2 demonstrates, there has been a gradual decline in official trade between the states of Central Asia. Between 1995 and 2003, the share of Uzbekistan's trade with its immediate neighbours declined from 17.4 to 12.3 per cent.[9] In absolute terms, the decline is even more dramatic as regional trade for Uzbekistan almost halved, from 1 billion to 540 million USD. Trade with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan has remained relatively stable. The relative stability of trade with Kazakhstan could be because Uzbekistan has no interest in disrupting 'strategic exports on strategic routes' by launching a long and costly trade war with Kazakhstan, which is its main external transit route. However, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were the



FIGURE 2 Trends in Official Uzbek Trade with Other Central Asian Countries. Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.



FIGURE 3 Trends in Official Trade Between the Osh Region and Uzbekistan. Source: The Statistical Committee of Osh Oblast, Kyrgyzstan.

countries most affected in this decline. Uzbekistan started to witness a major decline of its share of trade with Tajikistan in 2000 and with Kyrgyzstan in 2001. Between 1995 and 2003, trade with Kyrgyzstan decreased by a factor of three.[10] This decrease is even more pronounced if we consider the trade data for the Osh oblast (region), the most important Kyrgyzstani administrative unit in the Ferghana Valley (see Figure 3). Exports from this region to Uzbekistan dropped by more than 80 per cent[11] between 2000 and 2001 and fell by a further factor of three between 2001 and 2002. In terms of regional trade, Kyrgyzstan has mainly served as an export platform for Chinese goods like clothes and electronics, whereas Uzbekistan exports to Kyrgyzstan oil products, fertilizers, machinery spare parts, cotton and agricultural produce such as fresh fruits and vegetables. According to official figures, gasoline imports from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan shrank from 376.5 tonnes to

30 tonnes and cement imports from 862.6 tonnes to 465.5 tonnes. Therefore, it can be concluded that official trade flows have declined in the region.

This decline in trade with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could potentially be explained with reference to three factors – macroeconomic change, formal protectionist trade policies and transport costs. The first, macroeconomic factors, can be discounted, as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have not experienced serious macroeconomic crises since 1999. Likewise, protectionist policies cannot account for this decline. It is true that, apart from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan operates the most protectionist trade regime in Central Asia (see Figure 4). The attempt by the authorities to crack down on shuttle trade[12] is an example of this deliberate policy in the recent years. However, even if shuttle trade has been a main source of revenues for thousands of Uzbeks, it hardly explains the trade decline in the region in general. Indeed, shuttle trade occurs mainly with the UAE and Turkey and not with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In practice, it is the third, an increase in transport costs, which has acted as the main deterrent to trade.

Difficulties related to transport and trade facilitation are able to account for the major element of the increase in transport costs in the region. Seneviratne[13] describes in detail the impact of physical and non-physical barriers on transport costs (see Table 1). In theory, Uzbekistan is the Central Asian country that has striven the hardest to create a framework conducive to trade facilitation. For example, according to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), Uzbekistan is the only CIS country party to the seven conventions aimed at facilitating transport and transit that were previously adopted in Western Europe.[14] However, in practice,



FIGURE 4 Average Tariff Rates.

Sources: Grafe *et al.* 2003[15]

TABLE 1 Barriers to Trade Facilitation and their Impact on Transport Costs

Category	Barrier type	Constraint type	Effects on transport costs
Physical barriers	Road infrastructure	Bad quality infrastructure	Higher transit time addition (1–2 hours); higher maintenance costs; higher road maintenance costs
	Border infrastructure	Insufficent number of lanes; insufficient parking lots	Increased queues, delays (15 minutes to 2 hours)
	Control points	High number of control points and bad configuration of border controls	Increased delays (45–90 minutes)
Non-physical barriers	Tariffs and Non-Tariffs	Tariff duties; quotas; voluntary export restrictions	
	Road User Charges	Road tax	Charges according to nationally defined rules
	Overload regulations	Trucks overweight	Penalties charges
	Customs Documentation	Excessive documentation	Delays (2 to 3 days)
	Customs regulations linked to transit operations	Customs escort	Escort costs
	Visa requirements	Visa required for the truck driver	100 USD (10 USD for the visa) and delays (1 week)
	Sabotage regulations	Transit permit	
	Personnel	Corruption; lack of trained professionals	Unofficial costs of transport

Source: adapted from Seneviratne[13], information added by Raballand.

according to traders, customs management is among the worst in the whole of Central Asia.[15] In 2002 it was estimated that it took an average of almost four days to clear imports and exports over Uzbekistan's boundaries, which was worse than Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but better than Tajikistan. Globally, border crossings appear increasingly to be a major factor affecting transportation costs. Uzbekistan is no exception. In its major study of border-crossing costs and time in several Asian land-locked countries,[16] UNESCAP found that the longest delay at a border was between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.[17] At the time of their study, UNESCAP estimated the average delay at this border at more than four days, or the equivalent of 650 USD per truck. We conclude that the official and unofficial actions of the Uzbek authorities at their borders are likely to be the crucial factor in increasing transportation costs and precipitating a decline in trade in the Ferghana Valley.

Border Crossings and Transportation Costs

Up until 1999 Uzbekistan's Ferghana Valley boundaries were neither demarcated nor even fully delimited, many crossing points were unmanned, and those customs and checkpoints that existed were often thinly staffed and laxly controlled. From mid-1998, but particularly early 1999 onwards, this changed. Cross-border bus routes were terminated, unstaffed crossing points blockaded or (in the case of bridges) destroyed, new checkpoints opened or upgraded, and passport control regimes tightened. This was accompanied by a militarisation of the border, including the widespread construction of barbed-wire fences patrolled by armed guards, and the laying of minefields in some areas, notably around the Sokh and Shakhimardan enclaves. As a result, there has been a dramatic decline in both the number of official border crossings in the Ferghana Valley, and the ease with which they can be negotiated.[18] Before then, there were 50 road border crossings border-posts between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, both staffed and open.[19] In the course of the 1990s the Kyrgyz customs service cut back the number of staffed crossing posts, due to financial constraints. From 1999 onwards, Uzbekistan drastically reduced the number of border crossings. In 2003, Uzbek authorities only allowed trucks to pass at the Do'stlink/Dostuk crossing, near Osh (see Figure 1). Currently there are only five official border-crossing points through which vehicles are allowed to cross on the Uzbekistani side of the Ferghana Valley boundaries.

This process has been enormously disruptive to trade. For example, some intensively used border-crossings, like that at Kara-Suu in the Osh region, were closed. It had served what was one of the most important bazaars on the Kyrgyz side of the Ferghana Valley, until trade with Uzbekistan was severed when the Uzbek authorities demolished a section of the bridge linking the Uzbek and Kyrgyz sides of the town over a canalised river in 2003.[20] Another example is demonstrated by the Uzbek response to a 1999 Islamist guerrilla attacks on the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan, neighbouring the Ferghana Valley. The Uzbek authorities multiplied the number of checkpoints in the Ferghana valley. Travelling by road between the Kyrgyzstani towns of Osh and Batken, Uzbekistani document checks occurred seven times, almost one stop every 30km. The situation became unbearable for local people, and the Kyrgyz authorities retaliated by establishing checkpoints harassing local Uzbekistani citizens. Usually, border controls involve at least representatives from four state agencies: border guards, customs officers, police officers and personnel of the National Security Service. Eventually, Uzbekistan reduced the number of checkpoints, and today, only the two checkpoints remain at the Sokh enclave. However, a consensus was difficult to reach: negotiations took two years to agree to divide the road in two lanes (one Uzbek and one Kyrgyz) at Pulgon.[21] A third example of this disruption is that Uzbekistan generally now only allows trucks to cross at the Dostuk post, on the Andijon–Osh highway.

These difficulties in crossing Uzbekistan's Ferghana Valley boundary have substantially increased transport costs in general, and border-crossing costs in particular. For example, during the Soviet era, fruit produced in the Kyrgyz Soviet Republic's Batken region was transported by train via the Soviet Republic of Tajikistan (Kanibadam) and the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan, for processing in the Soviet Republic of Kyrgyzia's town of Shamaldi-Say. Today, it has to go through three international border crossings. These latter costs are now equal to 350–400 USD from Kanibadam to Shamaldi-Say. Consequently, the train route has been neglected in favour of the difficult and indirect mountainous roads that bypass border crossings.

A recent estimate gave the following figures for different costs related to road border crossings in Kazakhstan: 10 per cent for the costs of borders, 5 per cent for customs costs and 10 per cent for hidden costs.[22] In total, one-quarter of total freight costs can be said to be related to border crossings. In Uzbekistan, a study estimated that bribery represents 20 per cent of total transport costs to all major destination markets.[23] According to the Osh branch of the Chamber of Commerce,[24] the official mandatory costs for a Kyrgyz truck transiting through Uzbekistani territory are 300 USD[25] for a transit charge,[26] 75 USD for insurance, 60 USD for sanitary control, 10 USD for a visa, plus road user and escort fee charges, and an environmental tax.[27] On top of this, exporters interviewed in the Osh region reported that a truck could be delayed for three days at the Uzbek border, which translates into further costs. As well as these official charges, unofficial demands (bribery and extortion) can range between 150 and 200 USD for a single truck.[28] In total, a Kyrgyz truck entering Uzbekistan has to pay approximately 700 USD. For fruit, an important export from the Kyrgyz parts of the Ferghana Valley, this amount represents almost 8 per cent of the container value. Tajik exporters face equivalent costs to transit through Uzbekistan. Official and unofficial payments at Uzbek borders add up to 40 per cent of the total transportation costs of the export route from the Tajik capital Dushanbe to Moscow. Unofficial payments made in Uzbekistan account for 80 per cent of the total bribes given along this route.[29] The transit distance in Uzbekistan is equal to only 19 per cent of the total distance from Dushanbe to Moscow, but 44 per cent of total transportation costs. Payments in Uzbekistan represent almost half of the total transportation costs for the journey.

These high costs have seriously depressed the transport sector in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Only two transport companies in Osh undertake international transit operations. Drivers interviewed in the Osh region confirmed that Kyrgyz trucks no longer enter Uzbekistan, operating only in Kyrgyzstan. A Kyrgyz businessman importing wine from Uzbekistan reported that he drives an Uzbek truck up unto the Kyrgyz border, and then siphons the wine into a Kyrgyz vehicle for further transportation into Kyrgyzstan.[30] To tackle the above problems in transiting goods from one

part of Kyrgyzstan to another through Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan engaged in a programme of building roads to bypass Uzbekistani territory altogether. For example, the surface of the Osh–Jalalabat road via Uzgen is being upgraded. Likewise, a mountainous road is being rehabilitated between Osh and Batken, which will eventually connect to Tajikistan. However, the bypass roads add 100km to the Osh–Jalalabat journey, and 120km to the Osh–Batken route. An increase of a further 100km may add up to 100 USD in costs for a three-axle truck,[31] creating an additional constraint on the trade and transport sectors.

Consequently, we conclude that Uzbek border policy is the major factor in explaining depressed trade flows.

THE GROWTH OF SMUGGLING

Whilst Uzbekistani border policy has depressed formal trade in the region, it has had the parallel effect of increasing informal trade, as traders turn to smuggling to make a living. Numerous reports, and ethnographic observations by the authors in Ferghana Valley border regions, attest to the multiple networks of cross-border smuggling that occur by hills, across streams and through houses and farmland. These new networks transport goods such as agricultural products, livestock, oil, household products, industrial output like cement, fertilizers, machinery spare parts, and 'fictitious exports' like cotton from Uzbekistan.[32]

Although these networks have arisen because of, and to avoid, official control, this does not mean that they necessarily operate without official collusion. It is not claimed that all state officials are involved, nor that they control and mastermind the smuggling business on the ground. However, goods smuggled from Uzbekistan are generally obtained on a 'special order' basis.[33] When a major local exporter initiates a large smuggling operation, neither border guards nor custom officials have the chance to control these goods. This corroborates information from major exporters in southern Kyrgyzstan, who usually complain much less about transit through Uzbekistan than do small traders. Indeed, if they have good connections with local political figures on both sides of the border, total transportation costs are reduced by the payment of bribes.

Smuggled goods can even reach CIS countries such as Russia and Ukraine when they are exported by train. Some industrial towns in South Kyrgyzstan are linked by rail to Uzbekistan, which further facilitates this trade. Smuggling operations would appear to be well organised in some instances. Indeed, in one case, an informant explained that products are escorted by a police officer specially mandated and bribed to avoid inspections en route from the factory to the station. Goods are loaded in wagons in the station. A specially mandated tax inspector or customs officer may

complete the documentation to secure free and uninterrupted transit of the goods to the final destination from this station.

In the most comprehensive study to date of corruption and crime in Central Asia, by the Office of International Criminal Justice, Redo argues that in Uzbekistan, 'Customs and border officials make small fortunes (and sometimes large ones) during a tour of duty. It is estimated that some of the smugglers share up to 25% of their proceeds with officials.'[34]

Two examples will suffice to illustrate how smuggling is organised and institutionalised. At the border with Kazakhstan, Dosybiev reports that the inhabitants of the border village of Yntymak survive by smuggling.[35] Because of the virtual closure of the border and the political geography of Yntymak (the village straddles the boundary), smuggling has developed and become a major source of revenue. Residents whose property is dissected by the frontier collect informal transit fees. Traders escape any tariff duties but have to pay bribes to local officials and local residents. Dosybiev reports that drivers of cars carrying contraband between the two republics via a house straddling the border pay a set fee to the Kazakh and Uzbek border guards, and the owner. In a separate investigation in the same place, Dosybieva claims to have spoken to a border guard who alleged that an operation to smuggle Kazak grain supplies into the Uzbek black market involved a number of very high-ranking Uzbek officials using their positions to get the goods through customs.[36]

A second example demonstrates that the situation is comparable in the Ferghana Valley. Following Uzbekistan's dismantling of sections of bridges over the canalised river that marks the boundary between the Uzbekistani and Kyrgyzstani parts of the trading town of Kara-Suu (see above), a vibrant industry in makeshift bridges to aid smugglers sprung up – made more profitable by subsequent hikes in import duties. These included wire pulley systems for goods, temporary wooden walkways, and the utilisation of gas pipelines, secreting goods between houses either side of the channel. According to both interviews and press reports, Uzbek guards regularly collude with smugglers, accepting bribes to turn a blind eye; at times, smugglers try to evade the officials, or transient agreements break down. Local businessmen interviewed in 2004 estimate that up to 70 per cent of the clothes sold in Kara-Suu are smuggled. This is a border landscape that is both dynamic and dangerous: many people have fallen into the water and drowned, and there have been cases of Uzbek guards fatally shooting smugglers.[37]

This corroborates the above argument, that Uzbek border-crossing control policies actually create the conditions for clandestine transborder trade, and those officials who claim to be countering it then may collude for their own benefit. However, the significance and meaning of this state of affairs is not exhausted in the mere description of economic transactions. To explore the political imperatives that permit it to exist, this essay will now

attempt to theorise this gap between official discourse and reality. To do this, it draws on literature in geography, anthropology and borders theory. As this body of material furnishes a well-researched example of a border becoming increasingly militarised and policed to control non-military illegal movements, the US–Mexico border will be taken as a comparison. The Ferghana Valley border crossing of Boylik[38] will form the focus of the empirical case study. The conclusion will reflect on the implications of the arguments of this essay for international projects to support Uzbekistan's border-control efforts.

THEORETICAL OUTLINE

Since 1999 much has been much published about borders in Central Asia in general, and Uzbekistan in particular.[39] Whilst valuable in providing a background, this work has generally given little attention to theoretical considerations, being premised on unexamined realist assumptions about border policies being the outworking of the pursuit of states' national interests represented by incumbent governments.[40] However, the attempt to control the circulation of people, money and goods through borders – and the very existence of categories such as 'smuggling' and 'contraband' that this process creates – is more than just about economic calculation. It is also about domestic political contestation, and the politics of identity. This is particularly likely to be the case in countries that have relatively recently attained independence, and are attempting to construct national identities, as Uzbekistan is. This section will outline a theoretical approach to this, drawing first on political geography, then anthropology, and finding in 'borders theory' a formula that imaginatively combines the aspects of both that are useful for this study.[41]

Boundaries have been a staple theme of political geography since its inception,[42] although historically this field of study has largely been taxonomic and descriptive.[43] However, in the 1990s, scholars increasingly drew on wider theoretical developments within political geography to conceive of boundaries between states as both material and symbolic at the same time, representing moral codes and embodying norms.[44] As the example of the Baltic republics has demonstrated, international boundaries can be key sites where governments of newly independent states can assert identities as sovereign 'players' in the post-colonial context, demarcating themselves from the former colonial overlord.[45]

Of particular relevance to this paper, studies of the US–Mexico border have shown that policy debates in the US over how to police it were, from the Reagan period onwards, increasingly caught up in arguments about the racial/ethnic identity of the United States and the exclusion of Latinos.[46] The most detailed study has been Nevin's account of 'Operation Gatekeeper',

a well-funded early Clinton-era boundary-enforcement programme in the San Diego area. Locating the programme in changing US attitudes to the southern borderland, Nevins contends that it is inadequate merely to say that an increase in migrant flows necessitated tightened boundary control. Rather, he argues that from the 1970s public awareness of 'the border' grew as the borderland region became increasingly important economically, and in the early 1990s opportunistic politicians and nativist groups in California, exploiting race-based anti-immigrant sentiment, turned it into a crisis of national security that enhanced the sense of separation between the United States and Mexico. This 'securitisation'[47] of the border led to the criminalisation of large numbers of people by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS):

> The state did not simply respond to public concern with the supposed crisis of 'illegal' immigration. Rather, it has helped to create the 'illegal' through the construction of the boundary and the expansion of the INS's enforcement capacity.[48]

Nevins concludes that the overall effect of attempting to control illegal immigration has been negligible, as only a tiny fraction of vehicles can be searched. However, 'negligible' does not mean 'meaningless'. Operation Gatekeeper was successful in creating the image of a secure southern Californian boundary, and it increased the challenges of crossing by making it far more dangerous. For Nevins, the greatest significance of Gatekeeper, and the general build-up of the boundary of which it was a key component, is that it represents a significant shift in thinking and practice about the relationship with Mexico and Latino immigration, a movement from seeing the border as a zone of transition to a boundary of strict demarcation.[49]

This political-geographic perspective is extremely useful in elucidating the deeper story behind the concretisation of Uzbekistan's Ferghana Valley boundaries.[50] Uzbekistan's border policy in this period was not merely functional, but an important part of the national state-building project and a legitimisation of the autocratic rule of President Islam Karimov.[51] However, there are a number of dangers in the purely textual approach, as represented in this last piece. Accounts thus produced often struggle to adequately incorporate economic factors in their analysis. Furthermore, although recognising the politics of boundary control, they may be hard-pressed to draw policy-relevant conclusions. And finally, the largely textual approach may struggle to keep sight of the presence and experience of real people in dynamic interaction at boundaries – in the case of the subject of this article, both border officials and traders/smugglers.[52]

It is precisely this danger that the pioneering anthropologists of borderland studies, Wilson and Donnan, warn of in insisting that their discipline can remind the social sciences that

> nations and states, and their institutions, are composed of people who cannot and should not be reduced to the images which are constructed by the state, the media or of any other groups who wish to represent them.[53]

Contending that ethnography is an apt approach for assaying the dynamics of borderland experience and the negotiation of identities along boundaries,[54] they use it to highlight 'the subversive economy', including the smuggling of goods.[55] For border peoples the boundary is a barrier, but it is also a resource and an opportunity, as, obviously, the border itself is the pre-requisite for smuggling to occur. In describing it as 'subversive', they do not mean that it is revolutionary (i.e. aiming to destroy or overthrow the state), but rather that it 'threaten[s] to subvert state institutions by compromising the ability of these institutions to control their self-defined domain'. This anthropological perspective is indeed a corrective to the textual-focus of current political geographic study. Nonetheless, language such as 'subversion' and 'resistance' readily implies a conflict of interest and struggle between the state and its representatives on one hand, and smugglers on the other. In actual fact, as this article will argue, state representatives consistently collude with smugglers, blurring the distinctions and rendering this terminology too clumsy a tool to handle this intricate relationship.[56] Indeed, as Nugent argues in his study of smuggling over the Ghana–Togo boundary, 'it is problematic to interpret smuggling as resistance to the existence of the border when the benefits associated with the one could not exist without the other'.[57] For that reason, this essay will draw on the work of 'borders theory', an alternative formulation of cultural interaction in borderlands. Whilst of very different pedigree, it combines an apprehension of the rhetorical and propaganda deployment of boundaries with the experience of embodied identities.

'Borders theory' arose largely in the study of the US–Mexico borderland. It is concerned with critiquing the importance of boundaries and borders as both Enlightenment philosophy[58] and personal identity,[59] not to dissolve those borders but to render them contingent, sites shot through with indeterminacy and interaction. Exploring these postmodern 'breakdowns in the grand narratives of universal modernity'[60] in the concrete context of the Mexico–US borderlands, these authors use multiple media to demonstrate that, rather than demarcating distinct cultural zones, the US–Mexico boundary produces a borderland region with its own character. They do does this without sentimentality: as Anzaldua put it, in the classic text of this genre, the US–Mexican border is 'where the Third World grates against the first and bleeds. And before a scab forms it haemorrhages again, the lifeblood of two worlds meeting to form a third country- a border culture'.[61]

It is Avalos' innovative contribution to borders theory that will form the basis of the argument in this article. Avalos is a Chicano artist from the San

Diego–Tijuana border. Rather than working with a general cultural notion of 'the border', he concentrates on the mechanisms of border control, suggesting that they are effectively *theatrical*. He argues that, because countless crossings between Mexico and the US each day go unhindered, the segments of the frontier that are fenced and controlled are not so much like the Berlin Wall as a spectator show for domestic consumption. Economically, socially and culturally the border between Mexico and the United States is a figment of the imagination, but it

> still exists as an *idea,* as some kind of pillow on which the American public can rest their terrorized heads … The fence says, look, there are still defenders of the Alamo, maintaining a noble fight on behalf of America's sovereignty.[62]

This drama is specularised by the '*in situ* agit-prop theatre' of the border control, made fantastically literal by a policy of border building in designated places, and mytholigised by the media as it is televised and reported. In acting like a morality play that iterates the hierarchical structures of continents and nations by keeping the Anglo/Germanic races separate from the Hispanic, 'the border in this sense, then, is the heart of US culture, and not the skin'.[63]

Although 'borders are critical to the study of nationalism',[64] this has often been overlooked or even downplayed by scholars of Central Asia.[65] Undoubtedly, the different contexts of the US–Mexico and Ferghana Valley borderlands make a wholesale transplantation of this theory implausible. Whilst the United States and Mexico have been integrating economically and culturally, the Ferghana Valley peoples since 1991 have experienced an historically unprecedented period of cultural and economic disengagement. Indeed, Avalos's theory was a product of its time: since the mid 1990s, more resources have been diverted from the central US government to control the boundary. Nonetheless, we find his approach useful for the Uzbek Ferghana Valley boundary context. Applying it in relation to the movement of goods rather than the movement of people, we argue in the next section that smuggling, as much because of the collusion and cooperation of the customs and border guard services as due to a lack of ability to police the entire boundary, rendered the border control policy of the Uzbek state a theatrical dramatisation of political notions of identity and security.

UZBEK BORDER CONTROL DISCOURSE

The boundary enforcement measures, both military and administrative, introduced by Uzbekistan from 1999 onwards (see above) were principally justified in terms of protecting the economic and military security of the state.

They 'securitised' boundary control, rendering it an object of peculiar importance for the security of the state.[66] However, as the theory outlined above suggests, this can be understood as more than merely the rational response to perceived threats. The interpretation of danger, whether from terrorists or trade flows, is always subjective. Indeed, the portrayal of Uzbekistan as a threatened state – in presidential speeches, the media, even the cultural sphere such as pop music – has been an important discursive strategy in the articulation of the politicised version of Uzbek national identity favoured by the current regime.[67] In studying how the border was discussed in the official media, Megoran has demonstrated that the government framed the state border not merely as a legal line on a map actualised by buildings and institutions that police it, but rather a moral border between good and evil. Setting up a whole series of dualisms, it depicted Uzbekistan as a realm of order, progress, stability and wealth, surrounded by disorder, backwardness, chaos and poverty. At the same time, it served to enscript the official vision of Uzbek identity, of who belonged within the new Uzbekistan, and who did not, and legitimised the role of President Islam Karimov as the authoritative guarantor of that order.[68] This case was made largely with reference to military and narcotics threats. In this article, we will advance this argument with special reference to trade, customs and smuggling.

On 13 February 1999, President Karimov confirmed that the major Osh–Andijon cross-border bus service, along with many other routes in the Ferghana Valley, had been suspended. He explained the move by saying that 'Kyrgyzstan is a poor country, and it is not my job to look after the people. Every day five thousand people come from Osh to Andijon – if each of them buys a loaf of bread, there will not be enough left for my people.'[69] The suspension, which actually began in January, concluded a process that commenced with a reduction in services the previous summer.[70] This remark created much anger in Kyrgyzstan both amongst ordinary people and the Kyrgyz opposition press.[71] As a judgement on economics, it was wanting. For example, far from being a charitable exercise, traders came from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan to sell their wares. Uzbekistan periodically experienced grain shortages, when Uzbekistanis would then cross into Kyrgyzstan to buy flour. But such objections miss the rhetorical value both of selecting the sacred symbol of the staple food and closing the border: it was a statement about the identity of the state, attempting to depict the Uzbek people as wealthy, well governed and satisfied with their lot, and the Kyrgyz as wretched and poor. The following week, Tashkent was rocked by a string of bomb blasts blamed by Karimov on Islamist opponents. He swiftly responded by sealing the Ferghana Valley border for a number of days, beginning the process of the militarisation of the border that continues to this day.

US President George W. Bush's 'war on terror', launched following Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States' military headquarters and World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, provided a discourse that could be

readily incorporated into official Uzbek discourse. Indeed, *Halq So'zi* first reported the attacks with an assertion that this demonstrated the need to strengthen control of Uzbekistan's own boundaries.[72] However, this represented a new departure neither rhetorically nor practically.

Indeed, in 1999 and 2000 the institutional spaces and operations of the customs service became sites for the articulation of the idea that Uzbekistan was a wealthy land endangered by less fortunate neighbours, yet under the protection of a wise leader. This was enacted in regular and detailed descriptions of customs officers and border guard forces apprehending illegally transported goods.

Crucially, there was a marked difference in the reporting of goods being seized *entering* the state and those being discovered on *exit*. As Donnan and Wilson have noted that scholars have given more attention to smuggling of goods *into* a country than *out* of one, this discrepancy is interesting to explore.[73] The vast majority of reports on the operations of customs forces in the government-controlled media, such as daily newspaper *Halq So'zi*, concentrated on seizures of criminal and harmful artefacts as they were being smuggled into the country. Whilst these included rare items such as weapons and ammunition, chief amongst these was narcotics.[74] A number of articles not only reported seizures of heroin consignments, but boasted that, whilst the (obviously incompetent) Tajiks had failed to apprehend them, they could not get past the Uzbeks.[75] One article listed quantities of narcotics, weapons, 'literature of a fundamentalist or extremist spirit' and pornography as items recently apprehended by customs, being brought in by the enemies of the state into 'our beautiful, lovely and peaceful state that to an increasing degree is astounding the world'.[76] This conflation of a range of different goods smuggled by different people into one dastardly enemy opposed to a lovely homeland is the rhetorical enactment of the Uzbek government's imaginative geography of Central Asia, and one that legitimised suppression of possible domestic opponents. Significantly, there were no accounts of people smuggling food *into* Uzbekistan, even though this occurs. The reason for this absence, we suggest, is that, even if caught, to report it would disrupt this geographical imagination.

In reporting the activities of the customs service, government media also trumpeted their role in halting the smuggling out of the state of goods that neighbouring countries needed, but that Uzbekistan was not prepared to part with. Tough new penalties on smugglers were introduced in 1999 and 2000. In reporting the apprehension of a gang of smugglers secreting scrap metal out of the republic, *Halq So'zi* informed its readers that they were caught at a location bordering Kyrgyzstan where there was no border control. This detail impressed the value of the new boundary control regime, no matter how disruptive it was.[77]

A presidential decree in January 1999 reorganised the border defence forces, establishing them as their own entity separate from the National

Security Service, to be supplied with the latest weaponry and technology. This date was henceforward to be celebrated as 'border forces day.'[78] This is a demonstration of Paasi's argument that '[a] boundary does not exist only in the border area, but it manifests itself in many institutions such as education, the media, novels, memorials, ceremonies and spectacles etc'.[79] The border-control facilities were sites where the processes of discursive and actual militarisation of society were realised. Its modernisation and reorganisation was portrayed heroically in accordance with the government's 'ideology of national independence'.[80] As the following extract from a news report indicates, the customs service was positioned clearly alongside the new forces and the intelligence services in the defence of Uzbekistan.

> Groups of the State Customs Committee, the National Security Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and also the border forces are working closely together in a systematic way. To tightly control some parts of the border area criss-crossed by many roads, mobile customs houses and checkpoints are in operation, the committee and its regional administrations have formed special effective action groups that, night and day, are controlling our borders.[81]

This detachment from the intelligence services into a separate armed unit, recognised by its own festival, is a clear demonstration of the militarisation of the border that was occurring during this period. *Halq So'zi* proudly reported the increased computerisation of the customs system,[82] and the president's rewarding of customs officials in recognition of their work.[83] More customs offices at border checkpoints were built: the opening of one was hailed as, 'Glad tidings' for the country: 'Now at last the movement … into our country of narcotic substances, weapons and ammunition, and other illegal products will be ended.'[84] Furthermore, a new college to train customs officials was established in the Ferghana oblast on 1 April 1999, the official media defining the customs house in military terms as the 'fortress of the state', a bulwark upon which 'the abundance of our homeland and the fullness of our dining tables are strongly dependent'.[85] Later in the year, a 'Letter of Gratitude' from the students to President Karimov was printed in the paper, thanking him for establishing such a well-equipped college. The students wrote:

> We want to underline that, with true commitment, we will from this day onwards be vigilant in defending social stability and peace, the well-being of the citizens and ethnic groups, the inviolability of our borders and the integrity of our state's territory against aggressors and evil forces, and if necessary are prepared to give up our own lives in so doing![86]

This short letter served to underline the binary dualism of good/evil that the state frontier demarcated. This side of it was a stable, peaceful, harmonious

collection of ethnic groups living together (with the homeliness of full, family dining tables), whereas on the other side lurked an 'evil' that threatened to destroy it. The perpetuation of this gentle commonwealth is conflated with the maintenance of the inviolability of the border, a task the young recruits are prepared to die for. Such heroic talk is usually associated more with warriors than customs officials. This suggests a country under siege, yet emphasises that the government, under the leadership of its president, is more than able to defend the country's borders.

The corollary of this safeguard is that the population ought to accept the sometimes disruptive and apparently repressive policies that ensure their safety. In October 1999, *Halq So'zi* announced that, in concert with new citizens groups established near borders, '"cleansing" measures were being taken to identify those in local communities with extremist tendencies, fundamentalists, criminals under investigation and foreign citizens living illegally in the oblast'.[87] This information was presented as part of an article about securing the Ferghana border against outside attack. Thus, proper control of the border extended to surveillance and arrest of anyone considered disloyal, wherever in the territory they might be living. Of course, criticism of customs officials and border guards for corruption was absent, as was discussion of the meagre wages that made them reliant on such activities. That would have been to disrupt the geopolitical narrative woven through customs-policy discourse.

UZBEK BORDER-CONTROL REALITY

There is no more appropriate place to examine the practical undermining of the new border control regime in the Valley than at Boylik, a crossing point on the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley boundary. It was at a similar crossing, Do'stlik, that President Karimov, with his '5,000 loaves of bread' comment, drew the discursive and material battle lines against supposedly impoverished Kyrgyzstanis pouring over the border to plunder Uzbekistan's wealth, confirming the commencement of the process of border closure. Following independence in 1991 Boylik became a lightly staffed customs control post, but with the tightening of the boundary regime from 1999 onwards was updated with a more sophisticated range of technologies of people and traffic control. This section draws upon ethnographic research conducted in 1999 and 2000, based on extensive experience of living and moving in the boundary region.

Boylik certainly acted as a major impediment to the free flow of cross-border trade and movement, pushing up prices and disrupting movement. However, in terms of controlling the flows it was supposed to, Boylik was seriously compromised. The route is regarded as a major narcotics corridor and the role or involvement of authorities is ambiguous, as it is throughout

Central Asia. Occasional hauls of drugs, trumpeted on state and international news media, are necessary performances to suggest that action is being taken, but those caught by the police can frequently bribe their way out of custody and return to their trade shortly afterwards.[88]

This was highlighted by ethnographic research conducted in the Boylik area in 1999 and 2000. Close by Boylik, there was an area of the boundary that was undemarcated and, apparently, unguarded. A group of men smuggling salt from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan transported sacks on bicycles over this section, deposited them under the watchful guard of a Kyrgyz man, and then simply cycled back into Uzbekistan through an official checkpoint. They claimed that they were working for a salt smuggler and, that they used to go through Boylik itself until the tightening of border controls. They said that even though they passed through the same route continually the authorities never obstructed them, from which the reader can draw their own conclusions. Thus, this carefully organised undocumented trade network was performing a continual circuit around the back of the 'fortress' of Boylik!

Further up along the boundary, every few hundred metres the fence had either been completely cut through or, more commonly, the bottom few wires had been lifted up and put on the middle clasps to allow passage underneath. This was done largely by Uzbekistanis to allow them to continue their daily business. An Uzbekistani girl, watering cattle in Kyrgyzstan, was asked if the authorities minded their transgression of the border. She replied, 'If they close it, they close it, if they don't, they don't. They know that we have to make a living.' At a section of the border further along, Uzbekistan had demolished a road bridge over the narrow irrigation channel that formed the boundary, and put its ubiquitous barbed-wire fence up along the length of the boundary. However, the fence had been cut through, and tyre tracks suggested it was a well-used route. Half a dozen men in animated discussion by the border were negotiating the details, prices and times of a smuggling operation. On another occasion, the border on the other side of Boylik was investigated. A short distance from the control post, a constant flow of petty smugglers could be observed taking goods in both directions around the back of Boylik, through the *mahallalar* ('neighbourhoods'). Investigating this route, two Uzbek women, when asked, said that they did not know where the border was, but enquired hopefully if the author was dealing in aluminium! Thus, just a few metres from a potent symbol of the separation of Uzbekistan from Kyrgyzstan, and an assertive statement of the control of the state over border flows, both the state division and overseeing power appeared fragile and tenuous. Close to Boylik, where the barbed-wire perimeter fence had cut through someone's private property, they had pinned the wires up to allow access to their vegetable patch. What is more, they had even hung their underwear out on the wire to dry in the sun! It is inconceivable that the patrolling border guards

and customs officials would be unaware of this. In fact, following a complete closure of the post upon the explosion of bombs in Tashkent (in order to prevent terrorists entering or leaving), Uzbekistani guards stopped by a plank over a nearby stream ditch, collecting 100 so'ms from anyone who wanted to cross.

To what extent is it actually possible, then, to say that a border exists? It is important not to negate the massive physical, economic and psychological violence of the border, as controls such as Boylik suceeded in alienating and frightening many, as well as disrupting the formal economic, social and cultural fabric of the border zone. Some people in some places were affected and harmed more than others, particularly small traders. Yet for savvy traders with good connections this new order presented opportunities for enrichment and gain, if only the authorities could be outwitted or co-opted. If the border and customs regime is evaluated in terms of its efficiency in controlling the movement of goods and generating state revenue, then it would be difficult to judge it a success: it has contributed to significant falls in the quantities of goods traded 'legally' and earning revenues for the state, leading instead to a large rise in illicit trade of otherwise legal goods, conducted with or without the collusion of customs and other state officials. However, this article has suggested that the border and customs control regime is to be evaluated, at least in part, by other criteria – by which they may be judged to be more successful. They are to be seen as theatrical performances, staged to articulate a notion of authentic Uzbek identity, Uzbekistan's place in the modern world, and the legitimisation of the rule of a strong leader. To paraphrase Avalos (above): the border is a figment of the geopolitical imagination, mythologised by the official media, a *yostiq*[89] upon which the terrorised Uzbekistani public can rest its head, assured that Manguberdi and Timur[90] are still with them, maintaining a noble fight on behalf of Uzbekistan's sovereignty.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

On the basis of these arguments, we conclude that border crossings in the Ferghana Valley should be more open and demilitarised to reap the inherent economic and security benefits. There are steps that can be taken by both Uzbekistan and outside actors.

The transition of Uzbekistan's Ferghana Valley borders from 'virtual borders' in 1992 to a militarised 'frontline'[91] from 1999 onwards has had two major negative consequences. First, border militarisation in Uzbekistan has been associated with extreme violence. The death toll of people who have strayed onto Uzbek minefields, been shot when smuggling, or died accidentally when following precarious contraband routes to avoid customs officials and guards, has been high,[92] and Uzbekistan has been slow to take responsibility

for the actions of its agents.[93] Furthermore, inspections at the borders may be the opportunity for other forms of violation, including gender-based violence. Although we do not have evidence of this having occurred at Uzbekistan's borders, it has happened in other cases, such as at the US–Mexico border.[94] As Daily wrote of Tajik inspections, 'humiliation and intimidation, felt keenly during strip searches and examination of sexual organs, make the victim feel powerless and more willing to pay a bribe simply to be released'.[95] Secondly, the actions of border agencies probably contribute to a rise in inter-state tensions. Although the Uzbek government justifies the militarisation of its border as necessary to shield the state from narcotics smugglers, 'religious extremists' and terrorists in particular, the policy is seen as threatening by some in neighbouring states, who perceive the Uzbek border control (including customs services) as part and parcel of a policy of territorial aggrandisement, characterised most graphically by the unilateral positioning of border posts in disputed territory.[96] Whatever the reality behind such fears, fears are facts in this regard.

The main economic policy implication that can be drawn from this research is unambiguous. Uzbekistan's customs/border-control policy has considerably reduced official trade flows in the Ferghana Valley, which has been detrimental to all the states that share it. Not only have Kyrgyz and Tajik companies been crippled by Uzbekistan's border policy, but Uzbek companies too are held back by being unable to benefit from economies of scale in a valley of ten million people. With one recent estimate putting 47 per cent of Uzbekistan's population below the poverty line, wealth creation should be a key objective of government policy.[97] With this end in view, the only economic solution should be to move to a situation of more open borders in order to reap the benefits of economies of scale and a better allocation of resources in the region. Directly, this will involve lowering official and unofficial transit costs, and reopening more crossing points. Indirectly, it will be assisted by the 'desecuritisation' of the customs regime: customs officials should not be seen as the frontline in a war against terrorism.

The second area of policy implications that we would make concerns the support of the international community for Uzbekistani border control agencies. Border controls can be conceived as a performance, and part of that performance in Uzbekistan is to demonstrate success by arrests and apprehensions. Increased input into the customs services may demand more 'output', creating an imperative to play not only for the national audience, but an international one – with knock-on effects in terms of violence against petty traders/smugglers. Voicing similar concerns, Lubin warns that international donors may be sweeping aside issues of corruption and state violence in misguided attempts to support the boundary enforcement regimes of Central Asian states, thus further entrenching corrupt regimes.[98] Since forming an alliance with Uzbekistan in 2001 as part of its 'war on terror', the United States has given significant funds to Uzbek customs and border

control services,[99] an ongoing policy (as yet) unaffected by the State Department's decision of July 2004 to close certain funding flows.[100] The United States supports other Central Asian states' efforts to combat smuggling with similar funds.[101] One of the primary purposes of these projects is to assist border-defence forces and customs services to secure state boundaries against smuggling.

Whilst a lack of resources does hinder border-crossing controls, it may be not the primary reason why smuggling continues, and merely increasing technical resources and training may not therefore be the solution. Much smuggling occurs because traders attempting to eke out a living have been forced into the black market by government policies, and some officials collude with these activities to augment their inadequate wages. As this article has argued, border controls also have political and theatrical/performative functions. Providing that these functions are fulfilled, it is not necessarily in the state's interests to substantially tamper with current enforcement practices and alienate its employees. It follows that, there can be no guarantee that upgrading the technical capabilities of customs services and border guards will genuinely cut smuggling. Risk-management assessments are crucial for the efficient operation of border controls, and depend upon the exchange of information between bordering states. Therefore, reinforcing border-control cooperation and capacity building are at least as important as providing new equipment to curb smuggling. Without such measures, additional technology may simply provide occasion to extort new bribes.

It is quite proper that foreign donors with resources and experience assist Uzbekistan, like its neighbours, as it strives to prevent the passage of narcotics, arms, and other harmful commodities through its territory. However, it is vital that this is done in a way that seeks to *demilitarise* border-crossings.

CONCLUSION

From early 1999, Uzbekistan began to tighten control of its international boundaries. This included the upgrading, expansion and partial militarisation of its border-crossing/customs controls. If this policy were to be judged in terms of its efficacy in constructing a border regime that promotes and facilitates official trade and accrues due revenue to the state, then it must be deemed a failure. On the contrary, it has raised transportation costs, thus contributing to a decrease in formal trade and an explosion in smuggling, and violence against borderland traders.

However, using the perspectives of borders theory, informed by recent work in political geography and anthropology, this article has argued that these criteria should not be the only ones employed. Rather, a further purpose of border-crossing policy is to perform and inscribe geopolitical

notions of sovereignty, national identity and territoriality. Re-theorised thus, 'the border', whilst at the skin of the state literally, rhetorically is at its heart. As Andreas suggests, regardless of how effective a tightened border regime is, 'there is a powerful political and bureaucratic imperative to at least project an impression of territorial control and to symbolically signal official commitment to maintaining such control'.[102] The drama of media coverage of the apprehension of smugglers at borders and brave customs officers winning presidential awards is a morality play performing a geopolitical notion of Uzbekistan as a blessed nation surrounded by less fortunate states. The discourse of militarisation that increasingly accompanied this mythologising was embedded in a concurrent militarisation of the Uzbek state, serving further to underline the necessity of the strong leadership of Islam Karimov as guarantor of the existing moral order.

Finally, this article contributes to the inter-disciplinary literature on boundary studies. The temptation to reduce what Coleman describes as the 'fraught relationship between trade and security at the border'[103] to simple explanations must be resisted. Borders are sites where multiple, complex and sometimes contradictory processes of statecraft are simultaneously at play. The theorisation of boundaries as social processes has been a powerful tool to illuminate some of this complexity. However, it is always a danger that political-discursive studies of boundaries will overlook or displace economic considerations, fail to come to terms with everyday experiences of negotiating borders, or miss out important general elements in the equation that may be place specific (such as cultures and practices of officialdom[104]). This study shows that economic, discourse analytic and ethnographic insights can be combined to produce fuller and more policy-relevant accounts of border crossing control policies.

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NOTES

1. M. Coleman, 'U.S Statecraft and the U.S.-Mexico Border as Security/Economy Nexus', *Political Geography* 24/2 (2004) p.200.

2. J. Ackleson, 'Constructing Security on the U.S.-Mexico Border', *Political Geography* 24/2 (2004) pp. 165–84; Coleman (note 1) pp. 185–209; M. Purcell and J. Nevins, 'Pushing the Boundary: State Restructuring, State Theory, and the case of U.S.-Mexico Border Enforcement in the 1990s', *Political Geography* 24/2 (2004) pp. 211–35.

3. World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects* (Washington, DC: World Bank 2005), p. 80.

4. A. Fox, J. Francois, P. Londoño-Kent, 'Measuring Border Crossing Costs and their Impact on Trade Flows: the United States-Mexican Trucking Case', mimeo (2003).

5. A *maquiladora* is a Mexican company, which operates under a *maquila* programme (approved by the Mexican Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development). This programme entitles the company, first to foreign investment participation, and second to special customs treatment. Generally, all of a *maquiladora*'s products are exported.

6. J. Taylor, D. Robideaux and G. Jackson, 'U.S.-Canada Transportation and Logistics: Border Impacts and Costs, Causes, and Possible Solutions', *Transportation Journal* 43 (2004) pp. 5–21.

7. G. Raballand, 'Determinants of the Negative Impact of Being Landlocked on Trade: An Empirical Investigation Through the Central Asian Case', *Comparative Economic Studies* 45 (2003) pp. 520–36.

8. I. Babetskii, O. Babetskaia-Kukharchuk and M. Raiser, How deep is your trade? Transition and international integration in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, EBRD Working Paper 83, 2003.

9. Reliable figures are not available before 1995, mainly because of exchange rate volatility and disorganization of the statistical agencies in the early 1990s.

10. These statistics do not take into account trade in transit, which potentially could be the most affected by Uzbekistan's border policies.

11. We did not take into account the export of special machinery to the value of 2 million USD, because it appeared to be exceptional. If we include it, the actual drop is close to 98 percent.

12. In the 1990s, official trade competed with 'shuttle trade': small traders travelling to countries such as Turkey, China and the UAE and bringing back products to sell. Unfortunately, for the Uzbek state, this type of trade required a constant demand for hard currency, and imported cheap foreign goods that undercut local production. Consequently, from 2002 onwards Uzbek authorities adopted restrictions to undermine this trade. First of all, high tariff duties were introduced as a disincentive to import goods. Secondly, a minimal capital of 25,000 USD was established to obtain the authorisation necessary to become a wholesale trader (International Crisis Group, *The Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan: Ways Forward for the International Community* (ICG: Brussels 2004) p. 16). Thirdly, in July 2003, it was decreed that goods other than foodstuffs should be sold in shops or closed stands built in the markets. Costing between 3,000 and 5,000 USD each, these shops were beyond the means of large numbers of small traders (ibid.). As a result, many of them have been driven from the 'grey' to the 'black' economy.

13. P. Seneviratne, *Transportation Facilitation in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: Challenges and Opportunities* (Manila: Asian Development Bank 2003) p. 36.

14. Whereas, for example, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are members of only four conventions. UNESCAP, *Transit Transport Issues in Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries* (New York: United Nations), p. 53.

15. For the exact figures, see C. Grafe, M. Raiser and T. Sakatsume, 'The Importance of Good Neighbors: Regional Trade in Central Asia', mimeo (2003), Table 8.4.

16. The selected case studies were Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Lao PDR, Mongolia and Nepal.

17. UNESCAP (note 14) p. 22.

18. For a fuller account of the events of 1999, see N. Megoran, 'The Borders of Eternal Friendship: Kyrgyz-Uzbek Relations in 1999, I-III', *Eurasianet Insight* (New York: Open Society Institute 1999-2000) <http://www.eurasianet.org>, accessed 1 November 2004. See also 'Aralagan asap boldu chek ara, aymagïndï kasiettüü Fergana' ['Oh, Sacred Ferghana, your boundaries are crossed with much suffering'] *Fergana* 15 (65) (12-18 April 2003) pp. 1, 5.

19. Unpublished Kyrgyz government map of border crossing points, 1992.

20. Significantly, the major bridge was rebuilt by rebels who temporarily expelled government officials as part of an uprising in May 2005.

21. Interview with a journalist based in Osh working on cross-border issues.

22. NEA Transport Research and Training, 'Central Asia Trade & Transport Facilitation Study – Study on Kazakhstan', mimeo (2002), p. 8.

23. NEA Transport Research and Training, 'Central Asia Trade & Transport Facilitation Study – Study on Uzbekistan', mimeo (2003), p. 16.

24. Interview by author, 2 July 2004.

25. This fee is requested whatever the transit distance, which means a truck using the old route from Jalalabat to Osh transits through Uzbekistan for less than 10km but has to pay this fee.

26. This decision was taken by the government of Uzbekistan in December 1999.

27. In September 2004, a new transit tax of 5 per cent of the value of the goods transiting through Uzbekistan was established. If implemented, this new tax could further erode trade relations in the Ferghana region.

28. Interviews with local businessmen and officials in Osh region in September-October 2004.

29. L. Ojala, A. Kitain, A. and B. Touboul, 'Tajikistan Trade Diagnostic Study – Trade and Transport Facilitation', mimeo (2004), p. 52.

30. Interview, Kyrgyz small businessman, July 2004.

31. This figure is the product of the figure for operating costs for Kyrgyzstan by the additional distance, based on Seneviratne (note 13).

32. Cotton is regarded as a 'fictitious export' because it is accounted as a Kyrgyz export, but it is actually produced in Uzbekistan. Uzbek cotton producers prefer export via Kyrgyzstan because they can sell it at a higher price. In Uzbekistan, they are obliged by law to sell it a fixed price far below the international price. Consequently, Uzbek producers try to sell cotton from Kyrgyz-based companies, by smuggling it over the border. Kyrgyz companies can thus sell more cotton than they actually produce.

33. This material in this and the subsequent paragraph is based on many interviews with local officials and businessmen (in Kyrgyzstan's Osh region) conducted in September-October 2004.

34. S. Redo, *Organized Crime and its Control in Central Asia* (Huntsville, AL: Office of International Criminal Justice 2004), p. 129.

35. D. Dosybiev, 'Kazakhstan: The Business of Smuggling', *Reporting Central Asia* 2004 (London: Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2004), available at <http://www.iwpr.net>, accessed 1 November 2004.

36. O. Dosybieva, 'Kazak Flour Smuggling Targeted', *Reporting Central Asia* 248, 21 November 2003 (London: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2003), available at <http://www.iwpr.net>, accessed 1 November 2004.

37. U. Babakulov, 'War of Words over Frontier Killing', *Reporting Central Asia* 219, 23 July 2003 (London: Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2003), available at <http://www.iwpr.net>, accessed 1 November 2004; 'Uzbek Border Guard Shoots Kyrgyz Citizen', *RFE/RL Newsline* 7 (135) Part I, 18 July 2003; N. Megoran, 'To Survive, Villagers Buck Uzbek Border Controls', *Eurasianet Business and Economics*, 25 May 2004 (Washington, DC: Open Society Institute), available at <http://www.eurasianet.org>; Uzbekistan's Ezgulik Human Rights Society alleged that a young trader was tortured to death by Uzbek border guards, after being caught trying to smuggle 100kg of cotton to sell in Kazakhstan, at 12 times the price the Uzbek state procurement enterprise price. The Uzbek government described the death as an 'automobile accident', *RFE/RL Central Asia Report* 3 (39), 21 November 2003 (Prague: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2003).

38. The name and location of this post has been concealed in the article, as the aim of this section is not to expose or judge the activities of either individual officials or smugglers, which would demand a balanced consideration of the motives and pressures involved. Rather, it is to explore the theatre of the boundary zone.

39. As the only Central Asian republic to share a border with all the others, discussion of trade, borders and customs in neighbouring states frequently concerns Uzbekistan too.

40. For examples, see G. Gleason, 'Inter-state Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum', *Europe-Asia Studies* 53/7 (2001) pp. 1077–95; N. Polat, *Boundary Issues in Central Asia* (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers 2002); International Crisis Group, 'Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential', ICG Asia Report 33 (Osh/Brussels: ICG 2002).

41. It is recognised that the distinctions between political geography, anthropology and border performance theory are not as neat as this overview would imply. This is partially because these different literatures have increasingly engaged with each other. However, this distinction is helpful in introducing what remain approaches with broadly differing roots.

42. Curzon of Kedleston, *Frontiers* (Oxford: Clarendon 1907); C.S.T. Holdich, 'The Use of Practical Geography Illustrated by Recent Frontier Operations', *The Geographical Journal* 13/5 (1899) pp. 465–80; E. Semple, 'Geographical Boundaries – I.', *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society* 39/7 (1907) pp. 385–97; E. Semple, 'Geographical boundaries - II', *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society* 39/8 (1907) pp. 449–63.

43. For example, G. Blake (ed.), *World Boundaries Series*, vols 1-5 (London: Routledge 1994); R. Hartshorne, 'Suggestions on the Terminology of Political Boundaries', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 26/1 (1936) pp. 56–7; J.R. Prescott, *The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries* (London: Hutchinson 1965).

44. D. Newman and A. Paasi, 'Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: Boundary Narratives in Political Geography', *Progress in Human Geography* 22/2 (1998) pp. 186–207.

45. P. Aalto and E. Berg, 'Spatial Practices and Time in Estonia: From Post-Soviet Geopolitics to European Governance', *Space & Polity* 6/3 (2002) pp. 253–70; E. Berg and S. Oras, 'Writing Post-Soviet

Estonia on to the World Map', *Political Geography* 19/5 (2000) pp. 601–25; M. Kuus, 'Sovereignty for Security?: the Discourse of Sovereignty in Estonia', *Political Geography* 21/3 (2002) pp. 393–412; although not strictly post-Soviet, see also S. Moisio, 'Finland, Geopolitical Image of Threat, and the post-Cold War Confusion', *Geopolitics* 3/3 (1998) pp. 104–24.

46. J. Ackleson, 'Discourses of Identity and Territoriality on the US-Mexico Border', *Geopolitics* 4/1 (1999) pp. 155–79; Ackleson, 'Constructing Security' (note 2); S. Mains, 'Representing National Identity, Borders, and Migration', *Hagar: International Social Science Review* 3/2 (2002) pp. 271–97.

47. B. Buzan, O. Wæver *et al.*, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner 1998). The analysis of this so-called 'Copenhagen' school examines the political contexts in which certain issues become 'securitised', or defined as peculiarly threatening and thus demanding extraordinary counter measures.

48. J. Nevins, *Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the "Illegal Alien" and the Making of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary* (London: Routledge 2002), pp. 10–12.

49. Ibid., p. 12.

50. It should be acknowledged that there are significant differences between the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan boundary and the US-Mexico case study. Most importantly, migration is probably the key issue in the latter example, but is a relatively minor factor in the former. What is being argued here is that in both cases the securitisation and discursive construction of an international boundary plays an important role in the domestic politics of national identity.

51. N. Megoran, 'The Critical Geopolitics of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary Dispute, 1999-2000', *Political Geography* 23 (2004) pp. 731–64.

52. As Heyman demonstrates in his groundbreaking research on the work of the INS at the US-Mexico border, ethnographic explorations into the actual operation of border control regimes may reveal realities very different from those formally proclaimed by states (J. Heyman, 'Putting Power in the Anthropology of Bureaucracy: the Immigration and Naturalization Service at the Mexico-United States Border', *Current Anthropology* 36/2 (1995) pp. 261–87; J. Heyman, 'State Effects on Labour Exploitation: the INS and Undocumented Immigrants at the Mexico-United States Border', *Critique of Anthropology* 18/2 (1998) pp. 157–80).

53.T. Wilson and H. Donnan, 'Nation, State and Identity at International Borders', in T. Wilson and H. Donnan (eds), Border *Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998), p. 4.

54. For other examples, see W. Miles, Hausaland *Divided: Colonialism and Independence in Nigeria and Niger* (London: Cornell University Press 1994); D. Berdahl, *Where the World Ended: Re-Unification and Identity in the German Borderland* (London: University of California Press 1997); T. Wilson and D. Hastings (eds), *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998); U. Meinhof (ed.), *Living (With) Borders: Identity Discourses on East-West Borders in Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate 2002).

55. H. Donnan and T. Wilson, *Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State* (Oxford: Berg 1999) pp. 88–102.

56. Donnan and Wilson do recognise collusion between smugglers and officials (ibid., pp. 98–99, 103–104). Nonetheless, we still hold that terms such as 'resistance' and 'subversion' too starkly state the case, at least in the Central Asian context.

57. P. Nugent, *Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: The Lie of the Borderlands Since 1914* (Oxford: James Currey 2002) p. 265.

58. J. Welchman, 'The Philosophical Brothel', in J. Welchman (ed.), *Rethinking Borders* (London: Macmillan 1996), pp. 160–86.

59. T.T. Minh-ha, 'An Acoustic Journey', in Welchman, *Rethinking Borders* (note 58) pp. 1–17.

60. N. Richard, 'The Cultural Periphery and Postmodern Decentring: Latin America's Reconversion of Borders', in Welchman, *Rethinking Borders* (note 58) pp. 71–84.

61. G. Anzaldua, *Borderlands, La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (San Francisco, CA: Aunt Lute 1999 (1987)).

62. D. Avalos and J. Welchman, 'Response to the Philosophical Brothel', in Welchman, *Rethinking Borders* (note 58) pp. 187–99.

63. Ibid., p. 193.

64. Ackleson 1999 (note 46) p. 165.

65. For example, A. Diener, 'National Territory and the Reconstruction of History in Kazakhstan', *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 43/8 (2002) pp. 632–50.

66. See note 47.

67. N. Megoran, 'The Critical Geopolitics of Danger in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 28(3), pp. 555–580.

68. Ibid.

69. News broadcast, Tashkent TV1, 13 February 1999. I watched it at the time and wrote the quotation down the following week, so cannot confirm that these were the exact words used.

70. 'O'sh-Andijon chegarasi passajir transporti uchun yopiq nega?' [Why is the Osh-Andijon border closed for passenger transport?], *Mezon,* 13–20 February 1999, p. 1.

71. 'Sadïrbaev bir Akaevdi on Karimovgo almashpayt' [Sadïrbaev wouldn't swap one Akaev for ten Karimovs], *Asaba* 10, 5, 11 March 1999; 'Tübölük dostuktun baasï 5000 bölkö nan' [The price of eternal friendship is 5000 loaves of bread], *Res Publica* 8 (340), 16–22 March 1999, p. 1.

72. 'Jaholat huruji' ['The attack of ignorance'], *Halq So'zi* 189 (2751), 13 September 2001, p. 1.

73. Donnan and Wilson (note 55) pp. 100–101.

74. 'Qo'shning tinch - sen tinch' ['If your neighbour is at peace, you are at peace'], *Halq So'zi* 108 (2146), 2 June 1999, p. 1; 'Nafs bandalari' ['Slaves of greed'] *Halq So'zi* (2161), 23 June 1999, p. 4.

75. 'Bojhona: 130 kilogramm <<oq ajal>>' ['Customs checkpoint: 130kg of "white death"'], *Halq So'zi* (2113), 17 April 1999, p.1; 'Bojihona' ['The customs checkpoint'], *Halq So/zi* (2135), 18 May 1999.

76. 'Bojhonada nima gap? Ularning niyati buzuq edi' ['What is the news at the customs checkpoint? Their intentions were evil.'], *Halq So'zi* 96 (2134), 15 May 1999, p. 2.

77. 'Qalloblarning misi chiqdi' [The cheats have been exposed], *Halq So'zi* 50 (2088), 13 March 1999, p. 4. See Megoran (note 63) for a fuller examination of this material.

78. "O'zbekiston Respublikasi Prezidentning Farmoni: O'zbekiston Respublikasi Davlat Chegaralarini Himoya Qiluvchi Qo'mitani Tashkil Qilish To'g'risida' [The Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan: About the Formation of a Committee for the Defence of the State Boundaries of the Republic of Uzbekistan], *Halq So'zi* 9 (2047), 14 January 1999, p. 1. In the Soviet period 15 February was celebrated, the date in 1921 when the border guards were founded (A. Chandler, *Institutions of Isolation: Border Controls in the Soviet Union and Its Successor States, 1917–1993* (London: McGill-Queen's University Press 1998), p. 40). President Karimov's new celebration was thus new in content but not form, an assertion of state authority in a post-Soviet framework that would be readily comprehensible to politicians and public alike. Indeed, much of the rhetorical practice around customs officials has antecedents in the Soviet system, even to 1980s KGB chief, V.V. Fedorchuk, accusing Western 'centres of ideological diversion' of systematically violating Soviet borders by conducting illegal trade (p. 88).

79. A. Paasi, 'Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in the World of Flows', in D. Newman (ed.), *Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity* (London: Frank Cass 1999), pp. 69–88.

80. A. March, 'The Use and Abuse of History: "National Ideology" as Transcendental Object in Islam Karimov's "Ideology of National Independence"', *Central Asian Survey* 21/4 (2002) pp. 371–84.

81. See note 76.

82. 'Ombordan – bojhongacha' ['From the warehouse to the customs house'], *Halq So'zi* 158 (2196), 12 August 1999), p. 3.

83. 'O'zbekiston Respublikasi Prezidentning Farmoni: O'zbekiston Respublikasi Davlat bojhona qo'mitasining alohida o'rnak ko'rsatgan xodimlaridan bir guruhini mukofotlash' ['Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Rewarding A Group of Officers of the Customs Service Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Exemplary Performance'], *Halq So'zi* 27 (2065), 10 February 1999, p.1.

84. 'Hushhabarlar: Yangi bojhona' [Glad tidings: a new customs checkpoint], *Halq So'zi* 18 (2056), 28 January 1999, p.4. The customs code was revised and published in widely available form: O'zbekiston Respublikasi Adliya Vazirligi, *O'zbekiston Respublikasining Bojhona Kodeksi: O'zbekiston Respublikasining Boj Tarifi va Davlat Bojhona Xizmati To'g'risidagi Qonunlari* [The Customs Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan: Regulations Regarding Customs Tarifs and the State Customs Service of The Republic of Uzbekistan] (Tashkent: Adolat 2000).

85. 'Bojhona: Mahorat maktabi' ['The customs checkpoint: a school of excellence'], *Halq So'zi* 64 (2012), 01 April 1999, p. 1.

86. 'O'zbekiston Respublikasi Prezidenti Islom Karimovga tashakkurnoma' [A letter of gratitude to the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov], *Halq So'zi* 141 (2179), 17 July 1999, p.1.

87. 'Vatan sarhadlari mustahkam' [The frontiers of the fatherland are secure], *Halq So'zi* 202 (2240), 13 October 1999, p. 1.

88. Conversation with anti-narcotics officer in Kyrgyz police, 2000.

89. *Yostiq* is the Uzbek for 'pillow'.

90. Jaloladdin Manguberdi (1199-1231 resisted the Mongol invasion of Central Asia in the thirteenth century; Amir Timur (1336-1405) built a large empire based on Samarkand in the fourteenth. Both have been used as emblems of Uzbek statehood in official constructions of national identity since independence.

91. To use the terminology of M. Foucher, *Fronts et Frontières* (Paris: Fayard 1991). Foucher argues that turning a border into a 'frontline' ineluctably increase interstate tensions. A 'good border' is a border accepted as such by all the contiguous states, which is the ultimate legitimization of any border.

92. Exact figures of those who have perished along the boundary in recent years are difficult to obtain. Some reports have put the numbers in the hundreds, but a more conservative estimate would number them by the score.

93. 'O'zbek chegarachisi sudlanadi' [Uzbek border guards brought to trial], *Farg'ona* 36 (47) 13–19 October 2003, p. 1 (Jalalabat).

94. Groundbreaking work on the US-Mexico border by Falcón and Brownell has highlighted the increased dangers of sexual violence to women at the hands of US officials with the militarisation of border controls. Conversations and interviews with both local and foreign women in Central Asia suggest that sexual intimidation has increased with the militarisation of border and customs controls, and any policy that promotes further militarisation may contribute more to gender-based violence (P. Brownell, 'Border Militarization and the Reproduction of Mexican Migrant Labour', *Social Justice* 28/2 (2001) pp. 69–92; S. Falcón, 'Rape as a Weapon of War: Advancing Human Rights for Women at the U.S.-Mexico Border', *Social Justice* 28/2 (2001) pp. 31–50.). Reports by Human Rights Watched have also accused INS officials of rape and sexual abuse, as part of a catalogue of human rights abuses Human Rights Watch, *Brutality Unchecked:Human Rights Abuses Along the U.S. Border with Mexico* (New York: Human Rights Watch 1992); Human Rights Watch, *Crossing the Line:Human Rights Abuses Along the U.S. Border with Mexico Persist Amid Climate of Impunity* (New York: Human Rights Watch 1995). In the case of Uzbekistan, as Boboev reports, the customs service only recruits people who have performed military service. It is to be assumed that this makes the militarisation of the customs culture more likely. M. Boboev, *Conscription a Popular Career Move in Uzbekistan* Reporting Central Asia 322 (London: Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2004).

95. Erika Daily, 'Drug Searches And Human Rights Violations on the Tajikistan Border', *Eurasianet* (New York: Open Society Institute, 2000).

96. Sultan Jumagulov, 'Border Dispute Threatens to Escalate', *Reporting Central Asia* (London: Institute for War and Peace Reporting).

97. J. Glenn, 'Human Security and the Disaffected of Central Asia', *International Relations* 17/4 (2003) pp. 453–75.

98. N. Lubin, 'Who's Watching the Watchdogs?', *Journal of International Affairs* 56/2 (2003) pp. 43–58.

99. 'U.S. gives Uzbek Border Troops 17 Tons of Communications Equipment', *RFE/RL Newsline* 7 (161), Part I, 25 July 2003 (Prague: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2003); 'U.S. gives more Vehicles, Equipment to Uzbek Customs and Border Services', *RFE/RL Newsline* 8 (28), Part I, 12 February 2004 (Prague: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2004).

100. 'Washington Pushes Karimov Closer to Moscow', *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 1 (57) 22 July 2004 (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation 2004).

101. 'Rumsfeld in Central Asia', *The Monitor* 8 (85), 01 May 2002 (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation 2002); 'U.S. gives Helicopters to Kyrgyzstan to Help Secure Border', *RFE/RL Newsline* 8 (14), Part I, 23 January 2004 (Prague: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2004); 'U.S. Training for Tajik Soldiers', *RFE/RL Newsline* (8) 65, Part I, 7 April 2004 (Prague: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2004).

102. P. Andreas, 'Introduction: The Wall after the Wall', in P. Andreas and T. Snyder (eds), *The Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield 2000), pp. 1–11.

103. Coleman (note 1) p. 198.

104. For example, in this case the performative/representational aspects of border policy are not separate from, but mutually constitutive of, the beneficial economic side-effects for state officials who subvert formal procedures. However, this may necessarily be the case elsewhere.