EMERGING OR RECURRING POLICY ISSUES
These brief notes are associated with links to more
extensive
treatments on other, related pages, where these are available.
1. Recurring Issues:
- Stability:
Every
statement of the objectives of farm or agricultural policies mentions
stability
as a policy obejctive. The conventional argument is that, because
supply is variable (weather, disease, etc.) and demand is typically
inelastic,
prices are volatile - the change a lot (often termed unstable - which
is
incorrect, since the prices are not unstable in the sense that they
either
collapse or explode indefinitely). It then follows that, because
of this instability (better volatility) of supplies and prices,
producers
will not produce as much or as efficiently as they could if markets
were
more stable (less volatile). Furthermore, because the
agricultural
sector is subject to these booms and depressions, this volatility is
also
transmitted to the rest of the local, regional and national economies,
making them more volatile than they could(or should) be.
But volatility and uncertainty are
facts of life, facts of
nature,
like energy - they cannot be eliminated, only dissipated or
trasnformed.
If one country seeks to stablise its own markets, it will necessarily
tend
to destabilise other markets - remember the world trade, spatial
equilibrium
analysis - the more insulative national policies are, the more
inelastic
Excess Demand (or excess supply) curves are for the rest of the world,
and the more responsive are world prices to changes in trade
volumes.
So trying to reduce volatility in domestic markets will make world
markets
more volatile.
Furthermore, this world price volatility will rebound on domestic
policy,
making tax costs and revenues more volatile, which in turn will
undermine
the objective of making the domestic market less volatile, since
government
funding pressures will tend to encourage reductions in domestic support
and insulation.
Since the URAA requires all countries to convert border protection
measures
into tariffs - the insulation between domestic and world markets should
now be substantially reduced - as world prices change, so too will
domestic
prices if protection is by fixed rate or % tariffs. Thus, world
markets
should become less volatile than previously. However, domestic
markets
(such as the EU) will tend to become more volatile than before (when
insulated
from the world market). Hence, especially in the EU, but also in
the US and Japan, there is more concern now about stability and the
appropriate
policies
to cope with volatility.
- Food Security:
- Food availabilities (effective supplies) are not the same thing
as food
entitlements (effective demands) - both need to be secured to
ensure
food security.
- National self-sufficiency (as Zimbabwe is in most years) is not
either
a necessary or sufficient condition for food security for all people.
Food
security can be guaranteed even in a food importing country, providing
everyone has enough income (from sale of other things or other
foodstuffs)
to pay for their basic food requirements.
- Markets can only provide for food security so long as everyone
has at
least
a basic level of income (that is, command over a basic level of
resources
from which to earn income).
- Properly functioning markets require an essential trust in the
workings
of the market place - a faith in their ability to provide incomes and
provide
necessary supplies of food when needed. If the markets are primitive,
then
they are likely to be subject to major imperfections (monopolies over
supplies,
disequilibrium conditions, volatility, chaotic information etc.)
Markets
will need safety nets - provided by social security systems in
developed
countries, or by aid packages and subsidised food in poorer countries.
- Replacement of market systems with planned and controlled
systems will
typically be no more efficient and effective than market systems, and
frequently
will be worse.
- Conversely, liberalising previously controlled markets requires
that
the
loosers (and the generally poor) be protected or assisted, and also
requires
intelligence about how to liberalise controlled systems. Simply
assuming
that markets will grow is often not enough - they will probably grow
eventually,
but meantime, a lot of poor people may starve or live (exist) in
conditions
of near starvation. Markets have to be helped to grow.
2. Emerging Issues
- Development Support: what sorts of policies are
going
to be
allowed for developing countries faced with an apparently inevitable
and
irresistable political demand to support and protect its declining
industry
(agriculture)? In particular, will these policies (closely
limited
direct income support, for instance) be both financially viable and
politically
acceptable? A group of developing countries, including Kenya,
Nigeria,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka, have put forward a proposal for the
"Development
Box" to allow domestic policies which seek higher productivity, higher
income levels and reduced vulnerability to price fluctuations, and are
also seeking exemption from any subsidy reductions for a list of basic
food security crops. Such proposals have recieved a cool
reception
from the developed countries and from the developing countries within
the
Cairns group, so far.
This is likely to prove a major problem during the current round
of
Multilateral trade Negotiations (MTNs) under WTO. It is a major
concern
for traditional developing countries, who (with some justification)
feel
that trade liberalisation is not as beneficial for them as it might be,
and also feel that their own agricultural sectors need special
assistance
in growing and transforming from subsistence to commmercial market
systems.
It is also likely to be of major importance to the Transition economies
(those restructuring and developing from previous centrally planned,
communist
systems to market systems). In both cases, the agricultural
sectors
are presently large both in terms of occupation of people and also in
terms
of shares of GDP, though typically the share of national income is
substantially
smaller than the share of total employment - people in agriculture are
poor and numerous. The development process requires that the
agricultural
sector becomes smaller (unless it can export more) - which implies that
the market signals generated by the development process will make
people
in farming even poorer unless they leave the sector and do something
else.
But, until the development process begins to generate other jobs, there
may be no where for the hidden unemployed in the farm sector to go
to.
So they stay in agriculture and remain as subsistence farmers.
Yet,
in democracies, they are numerous, and relatively poor and apparently
disadvantaged
- so they will demand support, and probably obtain considerable
sympathy
from the rest of the population in these demands. Since these
countries
are not yet rich, the scope for direct payments to support farmers from
tax revenues is not large - and the strong temptation will be to
provide
support through market intervention. Yet the international
community
(through the URAA and the WTO) has declared market intervention to be
undesirable,
if not actually illegal. How this fundamental inconsistency will
be finally resolved is difficult to see at present, other than through
an extension of the special arrangements allowed for developing
countries.
This compromise, however, will then lead to major arguments about which
countries are to be allowed to call themselves developing, and under
what
conditions they will be judged to have become developed.
- Multifunctionality: the notion that farming produces
other
things than biomass (such as landscapes, wildlife, rural environments,
rural cultures, employment, food security etc., and that these
additional
outputs or services may not be well provided if farming is simply left
to the marekt place. Hence, a mjor reason for agricultural
policies
is to provide for things other than agricultural output. Hence,
for
Developed countries which - politically - still need to support various
agriculturally related activities or populations - how will they be
allowed
to do this, and to what extent? The US and Cairns group are
suspicious
that this is simply a smoke-screen for preservation of trade
restrictions
and traditional domestic support. There can be little doubt that
at least some in and connected with farming see this argument - farming
needs support because of its general contribution to the value of the
countryside
- as a way forward to continued public support. See here for a recent article trying to
explain the logic of multifunctionality.
The OECD has spent a considerable amount of time and effort
considering
these issues, and its multifunctionality
web page is worth a visit if you wish to see the nature of the
debate
(at least as far as the technocrats are concerned - how to identify and
measure the various concepts and characteristics of multifunctional
agriculture).
A lot of this debate is about the economics (technicalities) of Market
Failures: externalities and
public
goods - especially with respect to the environment:
- Environment: To what extent are trade restrictions
going
to be allowed to encourage or even force environmental protection (and
animal welfare or labour force protection as well), both at home and
abroad?
The present position is that trade restrictions are typically
inappropriate
and potentially counter-productive in seeking to promote these
objectives,
even if the objectives themselves are legitimate (as opposed to serving
as a smoke screen for traditional producer support and
protection).
However, it is not clear that this largely economic argument is
accepted
by or acceptable to the general electorates.
This functional illiteracy of the electorates could be critically
important
- we have already seen how apparently sensible policies - e.g. to
support
farm prices because farmers are poor and obviously deserving - has lead
to fundamentally counterproductive policies. If you do not want
to
be classed as functionally illiterate, then read and understand the
links
provided above!
- Quality, Health & Safety
-
sanitary and phyto-sanitary provisions: under what conditions and
according to what criteria can countries restrict or regulate trade to
protect consumers (or assuage consumer (or political) anxiety)?
At
present, the main criterion is that any restrictions be soundly based
on objective
scientific evidence, with the key condition that any
restriction
be universally applied and not simply applied to imports. Of
particular
concern here are such issues as GMO products, hormones in beef, etc.
- Two final issues - which underly all of the above - are:
- The nature of
competition
-
what does it actually mean and is it necessarily a good thing?
- The nature of the
development
process - is there a reliable recipe for economic development and
progress
with which we can all be satisfied? (This link is to some notes
developed
for the Rural Development and Resource Management MSc - the section on
multipliers is less directly relevant to this policy course)
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